


*Press  
for  
Conversion!*



October 2010 Issue #65

# A History of Canadian Complicity in the Iraq War

Press for  
**Conversion!**

Published by the  
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**O**ppose the  
**A**rms  
**T**rade



# A History of Canadian Complicity in the Iraq War (part one)

## Acknowledgements



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- students
- clergy, etc. etc.

## Canada's Covert War in Iraq

By Richard Sanders, coordinator, Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade; editor, Press for Conversion!

Since 2003, Canadians have been bombarded with media-spread mantras lulling people into the delusion that the Canadian government bravely stood up to U.S. pressure and refused to join the U.S. war against Iraq. Unfortunately, it's just not true.

Despite all the hype to the contrary, Canada was and still is an active participant in this horrific war that has claimed more than 1.3 million lives.

However, thanks to the constant repetition of the deceitful official narrative that Canada boldly opted out of the Iraq war, most Canadians—even progressives on the “left” who should know better—have long-ago fallen prey to the deception. As such, it is one of the most successful public relations campaigns ever foisted upon the Canadian public.

So powerful is the myth that even when confronted with many facts about Canada's very active participation in this U.S.-led war, many Canadians simply refuse to accept the truth.

In the very early days of the Iraq war, Canada's support for the invasion of Iraq was gratefully acknowledged by the then-U.S. Ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci. On March 25, 2003, during the devastating “shock and awe” bombardment of Iraq, Ambassador Cellucci admitted that

“ironically, Canadian naval vessels, aircraft and personnel...will supply more support to this war in Iraq indirectly...than most of those 46 countries that are fully supporting our efforts there.”<sup>1</sup>

Cellucci had let the cat out of the bag. However, his acknowledgement that Canada's “navy, aircraft and personnel” provided “more support to this war in Iraq” than most other countries in the world, it only begins to scratch the surface of Canada's tremendous support for the war.

A week earlier then-Secretary of State Colin Powell had announced, to much fanfare, that “We now have a coalition of the willing...who have publicly said they could be included in



**Paul Cellucci,**  
U.S. Ambassador  
to Canada  
(2001-2005)

“Ironically, Canadian naval vessels, aircraft and personnel in the Persian Gulf... who are fighting terrorism will provide more support indirectly to this war in Iraq than most of the 46 countries that are fully supporting our efforts there.”

such a listing.”<sup>2</sup>

Canada's absence from this “Coalition-of-the-Willing” list of publicly-admitted participants in the Iraq war has long been used as evidence that Canada said “no” and opted out of this unpopular war. Ignored is the fact that Powell also went on to say that “there are 15 other nations, who, for one reason or another do not wish to be publicly named but will be supporting the coalition.”<sup>3</sup>

Canada is the leading member of this in-the-closet coalition of governments that have been more than willing to support the Iraq war but are not willing to be “publicly named.”

Most Canadians, including many peace activists, fell for this ruse. As a result, Canada's avid, but furtive, participation in the Iraq war has remained shrouded in secrecy. Once conned by the official narrative, many peace activists have remained silent. The overall failure of the peace movement to see through the deception has ensured that there has been no real protest against Canadian complicity in the Iraq War.

It is important to reveal the truth about Canada's role in Iraq because it is such a brilliant example of

how the general public and even progressive anti-war activists can be successfully lulled into submission by a well-run psychological operation.

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On March 18, 2003, then-U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said:

“We now have a coalition of the willing... who have publicly said they could be included in such a listing.”

Many were proud to see that Canada was not on that list.

However, they ignore the fact that Powell went on to say: **“there are 15 other nations, who, for one reason or another do not wish to be publicly named but will be supporting the coalition.”**



Gen. Colin Powell points out where Canada should be listed

Afghanistan  
Albania  
Angola  
Australia  
Azerbaijan  
Bulgaria  
Colombia  
Costa Rica  
Czech Republic  
Denmark  
Dominican Republic  
El Salvador  
Eritrea  
Estonia  
Ethiopia  
Georgia  
Honduras  
Hungary  
Iceland  
Italy  
Japan  
Kuwait  
Latvia  
Lithuania  
Macedonia  
Marshall Islands  
Micronesia  
Mongolia  
Netherlands  
Nicaragua  
Palau  
Panama  
Philippines  
Poland  
Portugal  
Romania  
Rwanda  
Singapore  
Slovakia  
Solomon Islands  
South Korea  
Spain  
Tonga  
Turkey  
Uganda  
Ukraine  
United Kingdom  
United States  
Uzbekistan

## Canada is the leading member of a secret group of nations that could accurately be called call CW-HUSH, the “Coalition of the Willing to Help but Unwilling to be Seen Helping” Doublethink, Double-hatting and Cognitive Dissonance

By Richard Sanders, coordinator, Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade

In his novel *1984*, George Orwell developed the concept of “doublethink,” which he described as: “The power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them.... To tell deliberate lies while genuinely believing in them, to forget any fact that has become inconvenient.”<sup>1</sup>

This psychological process has also been described as: “a form of trained, willful intellectual blindness to contradictions in a belief system. Doublethink differs from ordinary hypocrisy in that the ‘doublethinking’ person deliberately had to forget the contradiction between his two opposing beliefs—and then deliberately forget that he had forgotten the contradiction.... Orwell describes it as ‘controlled insanity.’”<sup>2</sup>

Thankfully, psychologists have developed a useful concept called “cognitive dissonance” which offers a means of escape from “doublethink.” Cognitive dissonance is the “uncomfortable feeling or stress caused by holding two contradictory ideas simultaneously.”<sup>3</sup>

The theory holds that

“people have a fundamental cognitive drive to reduce this dissonance by modifying an existing belief, or rejecting one of the contradictory ideas.”<sup>4</sup>

Upon hearing examples of their government’s engagement in war and oppression, many Canadians experience this disquieting inner discord. They struggle to reduce their mental discomfort by dismissing news of Canada’s war culture as aberrations or untruths. Un-

settling information is soon forgotten and Canada’s mythological juggernaut lumbers forward unscathed.

Canadian anti-war activists should therefore aim to increase the cognitive dissonance of their fellow citizens by relentlessly exposing the ugly truth of Canada’s leading position in the bellicose system of corporate imperialism that pervades our planet. Canadians may then eventually reject the prevailing official narrative and free themselves from the confining straight-jacket of this country’s most powerful doublethink—the naive mythology of Canada’s role as a global force for peace.

The rise of a Canadian “hero” in the Iraq War to Canada’s top military post offers a valuable opportunity to shatter the chimera. Revelations of Natynczyk’s deep complicity in the Iraq war will make it that much harder for Canadians to maintain their peculiar brand of doublethink which is the bane of anti-war activists in this country.

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4. Ibid.



# Leading the Multinational Fleet in the Persian Gulf in 2003

## Task Force 151: A Significant Boost to the Iraq War

By Frank P. Harvey, NATO Fellow and Professor, Political Science, Dalhousie University and Center for Foreign Policy Studies.

Admiral Ken Summers (who commanded Canada's military in the 1991 Gulf War) confirmed that

"they are providing direct support to the war on terrorism...and indirect support to the war on Iraq, in that they are escorting through the Strait of Hormuz any allied ship that needs to get in or out of the gulf."<sup>1</sup>

Canadian commander, Commodore Roger Girouard, reported directly to U.S. Vice-Admiral Timothy Keating; who is the head of the U.S. 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet (fighting the Iraq War) and top naval officer in the war on terrorism.<sup>2</sup>

The Canadian naval task group did not and could not clearly separate the roles between terrorism and the war in Iraq. Indeed, the Canadian government really had no control over, nor could they establish definitive operational rules of engagement to separate, those two responsibilities.... If Ottawa passed along an order that, for practical operational and tactical reasons, was subsequently ignored in favour of maintaining a commitment to Canada's multilateral obligations, that speaks volumes about the capacity of defence officials to affect operational policy.

The fact that the Canadian navy followed previously established rules of engagement for tracking and arresting suspected terrorists, derived from a list that included Iraqi officials provided by the U.S. military, implies that the Canadian government had a lot less authority and influence than it implied in statements about the distinction between Canadian and U.S. operations—



Navy Commodore Roger Girouard, was the Commander of Task Force 151—the multinational fleet that protected and serviced U.S. warships in the Persian Gulf during the 2003 Iraq War.

In this DND photo Cmdr. Girouard poses on the bridge of Task Force 151's lead ship—a multi-billion dollar Canadian Destroyer, the HMCS Iroquois—in June 2003.

"Canada has dramatically increased its naval responsibilities in the Persian Gulf as the U.S. prepares for war against Iraq."

*Globe and Mail,*  
February 11, 2003.

there really was no distinction at all....

Canadian ships provided a significant boost to the war effort. Canada deployed the destroyer HMCS Iroquois to lead Task Force 151 (TF-151), made up of about twenty ships from six countries. Canada contributed four frigates to TF-151, in addition to the Iroquois.<sup>3</sup> While the ships were operating as part of Operation Apollo,<sup>4</sup> Defence Minister John McCallum stated that the ships

might be 'double-hatted' to offer support in a war against Iraq.<sup>4</sup> Irrespective of any 'double-hatting,' Canada's ships contributed to the coalition war effort.

The area of operations for the ships of TF-151 was redefined when Canada took control. The ships had been tasked to protect allied vessels and interdict terrorists in the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz. They had not operated in the Persian Gulf. When Canada took over, the area of operations was expanded to cover virtually the whole Persian Gulf, up to the 29<sup>th</sup> parallel, the southernmost point

in Kuwait.<sup>6</sup>

The [Canadian] ships...were in a position to lend direct assistance to coalition forces in transit to or engaged in operations against Iraq. Indeed, Commodore Roger Girouard, the Canadian who took control of TF-151, was charged with protecting all allied warships except carriers and their escorts operating in the Strait of Hormuz and south of Kuwait in the Persian Gulf.<sup>7</sup>

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Source: *Smoke and Mirrors*, 2004. Univ. of Toronto Press, pp.207-208 and 234-235.

## Canada's Naval Role in the Persian Gulf before and during the 2003 Iraq War

*Here's what United States Central Command had to say about the important roles played by Canadian warships in the Persian Gulf during the Iraq War and how they were "integrated into a coalition formation."*

### Force Protection

Heavily armed, manoeuvrable warships, such as Canada's destroyers and frigates, provide defensive capabilities to the more vulnerable specialized vessels in the multinational coalition fleet.

### Fleet Support

The replenishment ships HMCS Preserver and Protecteur cruised the Arabian [Persian] Gulf and Arabian Sea to replenish the coalition fleet. Replenishment ships are crucial to sustaining coalition naval operations; as well as food and essential materiel such as fuel, ammunition and replacement parts, they provide other ships of the fleet with specialized services such as health care and engineering expertise. During their time in theatre, HMCS Preserver and Protecteur conducted more than 200 replenishment operations. (See photographs, at right.)

### Leadership interdiction

To prevent Al-Qaeda and Taliban members from escaping the area of operations in merchant ships and fishing boats operating from Pakistan and Iran, Canadian ships hail vessels, identify them, pursue and board them when necessary, and search for material and activity indicating the presence of Al-Qaeda or Taliban members. (See p. 20.)

### Maritime interdiction

Since the beginning of Operation Apollo, Canadian ships hailed more than 21,800 vessels. To date [August 6, 2003], Canadian ships have performed more than half the 1,100 boardings conducted by the multinational coalition fleet.

**Source:** U.S. CENTCOM website, "Canada," August 6, 2003.

[www.centcom.mil/en/canada/](http://www.centcom.mil/en/canada/)

## "Force Protection" of the Coalition Navy



Retired Admiral Ken Summers confirmed in 2003, that the Canadian Navy was then providing "direct support to the war on terrorism ...and indirect support to the war on Iraq, in that they are escorting through the Strait of Hormuz any allied ship that needs to get in or out of the [Persian] gulf."

More than a decade earlier, Summers commanded Canada's naval, air and land forces during the 1991 Iraq War.

HMCS Preserver



HMCS Protecteur



## "Fleet Support" for the Coalition Navy

During the massive buildup of naval forces in the Persian Gulf prior to the invasion of Iraq, two Canadian Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment ships "cruised the Arabian [Persian] Gulf and Arabian Sea to replenish the coalition fleet."<sup>1</sup>

These ships' role is to provide "everything a frigate or destroyer needs at sea, thus increasing their range and endurance... [including] ammunition, fuel, stores, provisions and helicopter support."<sup>2</sup>

Canada's support ships carry "enough provisions to supply a task force of six destroyers for six weeks without having to return to port."<sup>3</sup> During Operation Apollo they "provided fleet support by conducting over two hundred replenishment missions."<sup>4</sup>

At 172 meters in length—the largest in Canada's Navy—each ship carry 365 sailors, including air crew for two CH-124 Sea King helicopters.

### Cargo Capacity (for other warships)

- 14,590 tons fuel
- 1,250 tons ammunition
- 1,048 tons dry cargo
- 400 tons aviation fuel

### Armaments

2 x Phalanx Close in Weapons Systems  
6 x 50 calibre machine guns<sup>5</sup>

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(See p. 20.)





"[O]ur Navy [is] doing sterling work escorting many of the ships bringing war materials and aid supplies to the war zone. Nevertheless, we are reminded *ad nauseam* that they are in theatre strictly to contribute to the war against terrorism. Anyone who thinks our Navy would abort an intercept of a threat to any ship they are escorting because they discover that it's an Iraqi threat doesn't know our Navy."

**Major-Gen. (ret.) Lewis McKenzie**

**"Admit it, we're engaged in combat."**

*National Post*, April 4, 2003.



# HMCS Iroquois

## Tribal-Class Destroyer

Built by: MIL Davie, QC

Homeport: Halifax, NS

Crew: 300 Sailors



## The Flagship of Task Force 151 during Operation Iraqi Freedom

(Deployed to Persian Gulf, February 24 - July 29, 2003)

### Armaments:

29 x Surface-to-Air, Standard Missiles (Lockheed Martin, US)

1 x 76 mm (62 calibre) Artillery Gun (OTO Melara, Italy)

6 x high-explosive MK-46 torpedoes (Alliant Techsystems, US)

1 x Phalanx 20mm radar-guided Gatling gun (Raytheon, US)

2 x M2 Browning heavy machine guns (General Dynamics, US)

## Multi-Role Patrol Frigates

Each with a crew of 225 sailors

HMCS Regina

Deployed:  
Feb. 2 - July 1,  
2003



Built by: MIL Davie Shipbuilding, QC  
Home: CFB Esquimalt

### Armaments:

24 x high-explosive MK-46 torpedoes (Alliant Techsystems, US)

16 x Evolved Sea-Sparrow Surface-to-Air Missile (Raytheon, US)

8 x RGM-84 Harpoon Surface-to-Surface Missile (Boeing, US)

1 x 57 mm Mk2 gun (Bofors, Sweden, now BAE Systems, UK)

1 x Phalanx 20mm radar-guided Gatling gun (Raytheon, US)

6 x .50 caliber Browning machine guns (Gen. Dynamics, US)

HMCS Fredericton

Deployed:  
Mar. 5-Aug. 28,  
2003



Built by: Saint John Shipbuilding, NB  
Home: CFB Halifax

HMCS Calgary

Deployed: June 15 - Dec. 14, 2003



Built by: Saint John Shipbuilding, NB  
Home: CFB Esquimalt

HMCS Winnipeg

Deployed:  
Sept. 15, 2002 -  
May 2, 2003



Built by: St. John Shipbuilding, NB  
Home: CFB Esquimalt

HMCS Montreal

Deployed: Sept. 9, 2002 - April 25, 2003



Built by: Saint John Shipbuilding,  
Home: CFB Halifax

## TF151: Half Pregnant, Double Hatted (and Two Faced)

By Janice Gross Stein (director, Munk School of Global Affairs, Univ. of Toronto) and Eugene Lang (was chief of staff for Liberal Defence Ministers John McCallum and Bill Graham)

In early February 2003, then-Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Ray Henault and his deputy, Greg Maddison [a former vice admiral], told Defence Minister John McCallum that the Canadian navy had an opportunity to lead a multinational naval Task Force [TF], which included U.S. ships and those of other countries not yet committed to an invasion of Iraq. Known as TF151, it would support Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) [i.e., the Afghan War], but would require a change in the area of operations for Canada's navy; the navy would move farther up into the Persian Gulf, very close to Iraq's territorial waters and a long way from Afghanistan. To lead this task force, Canada would have to deploy a destroyer, the HMCS Iroquois, with command and control capability. This meant a net gain for Canada of one ship in the region—two frigates and one destroyer—for six-months.

After McCallum had one or two more discussions with Henault and Maddison, it became apparent that TF151 would be *de facto*, if not *de jure*, "double-hatted." It would support OEF but would also probably provide some as yet undefined support to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

The multilateralists in Foreign Affairs, who were so deeply committed to the UN process on Iraq and strongly opposed Canada's involvement in the war without another UN resolution, might have been expected to dismiss leading this naval force. But Canada's senior diplomats held a much more pragmatic, Washington-centric view. Canada's ambassador to NATO, David Wright, urged McCallum to take on the leadership of TF151. Wright warned him that Canada would pay a price if it didn't double-hat its ships in the region. The senior Foreign Affairs mandarins were also generally supportive of leading TF151. They saw it as a demonstration of tangible support for the U.S. in the region and ar-

Canada's Iroquois and Regina warships were "double-hatted" to wage the Iraq and Afghan wars.

Top politicians, bureaucrats, diplomats and military brass all supported Canada's leadership of the multinational TF151 fleet even though they knew Canada would thus take a lead naval role in the Iraq War.



DND Photo: Corp. Shawn Kent, May 6, 2003

gued this support was especially important given the likelihood that Canada would [officially] refuse participation in the Iraq war.

Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Graham reflected later on advice from senior officials in his department:

"The discussion centred around the problem, we're not involved in the Iraq campaign, what justification do we have to be involved in the naval operation [TF151]? And our view was the naval operation dated from the original mission to restrain the Taliban and control al-Qaeda, and that therefore this was a legitimate presence in the Gulf for a different purpose. And for us to pull out at that time would have been highly aggravating to the Americans and our other allies ... One thing that certainly cinched it for me was there was a French vessel in the Task Force, so I said if the French can stay there—with all their Cartesian logic—we can do the same."<sup>22</sup>

Deputy Prime Minister John Manley subsequently made similar arguments. He thought that with the Iraq decision behind the government, "We've made our point with the Americans. A Canadian role in this naval task force," he said, "gives us something to point to with the Americans."<sup>23</sup> Ottawa decided that Canada would assume command of TF151, and would worry later about how it would manage the problem of continuing to lead once the U.S. invasion of Iraq had begun.

Predictably, officials in the South Tower [i.e., the military leaders

within National Defence HQ] leaked the news. On February 11, *The Globe and Mail* reported that

"Ottawa and Washington have agreed that a senior Canadian officer will command all allied naval warships, aside from the U.S. aircraft carrier and its close escorts, in the Persian Gulf south of Kuwait .... Commodore Roger Girouard assumed command on Friday [February 7] of the new Task Force 151, which will be responsible for escorting ships, intercepting and boarding suspect vessels and guarding against attacks on shipping."<sup>24</sup>

The paper went on to point out that this initiative was part of a Canadian plan to increase preparations in anticipation of a war against Iraq and that 25 senior Canadian officers had been sent to a U.S. base in the Persian Gulf to plan for that purpose in Iraq.<sup>5</sup>

The *Globe* then went further:

"If war breaks out, the Canadian warships will, at the very least, start escorting civilian ships such as tankers..., which would be critical to the war effort. 'The region will be more dangerous,' Cmdre. Girouard said. 'We...would have to co-ordinate some escorts, in particular in the strait, by offering protection to ships and oil tankers.'"<sup>25</sup>

The Canadian Commodore suggested that were Canada to participate in the war against Iraq, the warships would likely escort ships farther north, closer to Iraq.<sup>6</sup>

The scene had been set, publicly, for controversy.



## The South Tower Gets Uncomfortable

It wasn't until the end of February that the military leadership fully realized where the prime minister was going in his thinking about Iraq. When they did, Henault and Maddison shifted gears. They told McCallum that Canada would have to pull out of the leadership of TF151, which it had just assumed, if Ottawa was not going to participate in military operations against Iraq. Henault has since confirmed this advice to McCallum, but for an entirely different reason:

“Yes, I did recommend that we resign the leadership of TF151.... We had provided a very high level of support for naval operations. We needed to give the Navy time to reconstitute. The Navy needed a break in operational tempo.”<sup>77</sup>

But at this point the navy had only been involved in TF151 for a matter of days.

Lawyers were brought in to help navigate these treacherous waters. International lawyers in both the Department of National Defence and in Foreign Affairs believed that if TF151 were protecting ships involved in the invasion of Iraq, then Canada might

legally become a belligerent or a party to the conflict. “The Judge Advocate General [the chief military lawyer] was not very popular with the CDS [Henault] when he gave these legal opinions,” reflected McCallum.<sup>8</sup> Graham went further:

“The tricky bit was we had some legal opinions intimating the fact that if we were there and were doing interdiction work, that we were at war with Iraq technically and legally, even though we were saying politically that we were not. This was very murky waters, there is no question about that.”<sup>9</sup>

Since Iraq interdiction work was likely to be part of the mandate of the naval task force, it seemed clear to officials in Defence that Canada would have to bow out. Or perhaps the Americans would save Canada the embarrassment and reassign the command of TF151 to a nation that was [openly and officially] part of the coalition.

Foreign Affairs thought differently on this issue from [the Department of] Defence. The diplomats were now deeply concerned about Canada-U.S. relations in the wake of the impending [supposed] “No” on Iraq. They

saw Canada's leadership of TF151 as a way to mitigate Washington's inevitable displeasure at Canada's [statement of] refusal to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom.


But the military leadership disagreed. What Foreign Affairs proposed was not feasible militarily and would be far too confusing operationally, they argued. A Canadian officer aboard a Canadian ship would be commanding the ships of other nations, including an American ship, involved in a coalition that was at war when Canada was not [openly and officially] part of that coalition. To the military, such a position was untenable and, frankly, unimaginable. The senior military leadership also expected that Canada would be asked to leave [CENTCOM war planning HQ in] Qatar once active coalition operational planning began, if Ottawa did not officially support the Iraq War. This would have made leading TF151 impossible.

U.S. war against Iraq and to make a military contribution to the war effort. Initially, before Chrétien had made his decision on Iraq, Canada's generals and admirals probably thought that taking on TF151 would “help” the

### “Naval commitment was most valued contribution Canada could make”



John McCallum,  
Minister of Defence  
(June 26, 2002 – Dec. 11, 2003)



V. Adm. Greg  
Maddison,  
then-Dep. Chief  
of Defence Staff



Lt. Gen.  
Ray Henault,  
then-Chief of  
Defence Staff

“After McCallum had one or two more discussions with Henault and Maddison, it became apparent that TF151 would be *de facto*, if not *de jure*, ‘double-hatted.’ It would support OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom, i.e., the Afghan War] but would also probably provide some as yet undefined support to Op. Iraqi Freedom [i.e., the Iraq war].”

Then-Defence Minister John McCallum said that in February 2003, Air Force General Ray Henault, then Canada's Chief of Defence Staff, and his deputy, Vice Admiral Greg Maddison, the former head of the navy “wanted to be more heavily engaged [in Iraq] than I wanted them to be engaged. They were implicitly assuming we would be going with the Americans.”

Henault stated that the U.S. was ready to begin military action against Iraq in one month. He claimed that a Canadian naval contribution, perhaps consisting of both frigates and destroyers, would be welcome in Washington. If Canada sent ships, it could support both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom [the Afghan and Iraq Wars]—what the military calls a ‘double-hatted task force.’ *The general and his deputy felt that a naval commitment was the most valued contribution that Canada could make.*

**Source:** Excerpt, “Walking the Tightrope,” *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*, 2007.

“The tricky bit was we had some legal opinions intimating the fact that if we were there and were doing interdiction work [with TF151 in the Persian Gulf], that ***we were at war with Iraq technically and legally, even though we were saying politically that we were not.***”

Bill Graham, Foreign Affairs,  
January 15, 2002 - July 19, 2004



## Clarity from the Allies, Contortions in Canada

The Dutch, New Zealanders, and French then clarified their positions. They ordered their naval commanders not to allow their ships in TF151 to operate in the Persian Gulf, so as not to support the war. They were also instructed not

to engage with Iraqi vessels or vessels under an Iraqi flag. But Canada’s naval commanders were not as lucky. In an effort to satisfy Ottawa’s political objectives in Washington, they now found themselves in extraordinarily difficult circumstances.

The U.S. and other countries clearly saw the task force as doubled-hatted, serving both OEF [the Afghan and Iraq wars]. As a result, some countries chose to work under one hat only, and restricted their ships’ operations geographically to ensure that they provided no direct support to the [Iraq] war. Since Canada had command of the task force, it had no such luxury.

According to the official record, the Canadian navy somehow managed the seemingly impossible. It ran and participated in a double-hatted naval task force but [supposedly] did not get involved in command or operational responsibilities related to one of these hats. A very blurred line existed between OEF and OIF [i.e., the Afghan and Iraq wars], a blurriness that the U.S. probably deliberately encouraged.

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politicians make the “right” decision. Surely Canada could not continue to lead this task force and not be part of the Iraq coalition. And surely Canada would not pull its navy out of the task force days after it had assumed command. There was a black and white choice to be made. Military leaders hoped to create the enabling conditions for the outcome they wanted. They did not, however, consider the domestic political factors that weighed so heavily with Chrétien.

Officials in Foreign Affairs, unlike their colleagues in the South Tower, wanted it both ways. They did not want Canada to support the Iraq War without another UN resolution, which they considered highly unlikely. Yet they wanted Canada’s military to remain in the region to help manage the Ottawa-Washington relationship.

The prime minister eventually resolved the internal debate about Canada’s role in TF151. While Chrétien understood the difficulties, he did not want Canada to be seen to be leaving the Persian Gulf at that critical time. Chrétien was a pragmatist, and he wanted deft management of the highly charged issue of the role of Canada’s navy in the region. Ottawa would need to put a little water in its wine, take some political risks at home, and move forward with a somewhat less-than-coherent policy on Iraq.

In Ottawa, there was great angst among the military leadership that the prime minister’s [ostensible] opposition to the Iraq invasion made it impossible for Canada to retain the leadership of TF151. But the prime minister thought otherwise. His statement in the House of Commons indirectly revealed his predisposition: “We have ships in the area as part of our participation in the struggle against terrorism. Our ships will continue to per-

form their important mission against terrorism.” That was the distinction. Canada would remain leader of TF151 but [supposedly] wear only one hat—the OEF [Afghan] hat—even though the military argued that separating the two [i.e., separating the Iraq and Afghan war functions of TF151] would prove almost impossible operationally.

Now that the policy with respect to TF151 was clear, NDHQ turned its attention to the challenging issues of implementation. Commodore Girouard was instructed that the Canadian navy was not to engage in activities associated with the invasion of Iraq. But the general instruction could not address myriad political and operational issues. Some Iraqis would flee once combat began. If a Canadian ship interdicted them, would they be returned to Canada or handed over to the Americans? Detainees from Iraq would have no legal status in Canada because Ottawa was officially not supporting the Iraq War. And were the Canadian navy to hand over an Iraqi national to the U.S., Canada would appear to be—and legally might well be—supporting the [Iraq] war. There were no clear answers to those kinds of questions. (See article on p.19.)

These tortured scenarios illustrated Canada’s extraordinarily awkward position once it had decided to retain command of TF151. The contradictions were obvious and the wound was self-inflicted. At times the contortions of military leaders approached the comic. In April, after the war had started, Girouard was forced to make a bizarre public statement:

“There’s no doubt in my mind that if Saddam Hussein himself ... was found in a vessel that we stumbled upon for some reason, we would not knowingly let a member of that level of the regime go.”<sup>10</sup>

See article on p.19.)

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# Canada Captured and Handed over Iraqis to U.S. Forces

By Kelly Toughill, Director, School of Journalism, University of King's College, Halifax.

Canadian sailors are actively hunting Iraqis at sea on behalf of the U.S., even though Canada has refused to join the war.

A U.S. official confirmed that the duty of Canadian ships deployed in a two-year-old coalition against terrorism includes screening travellers in the Persian Gulf for Iraqi military officials and government leaders.

"Anyone connected with the Iraqi regime is on the list," U.S. Air Force Lt.-Col. Martin Compton said yesterday [April 1, 2003].

The media relations officer at Central Command in Tampa explained that Canadian sailors who board ships in the Persian Gulf run passengers' identities through a U.S.-controlled database that includes Al Qaeda terrorists and Iraqi officials.

If any are found, they are to be turned over to U.S. authorities.

That contradicts a specific promise Prime Minister Jean Chrétien made that Canadian ships committed to the war on terrorism wouldn't be drawn into the war in Iraq.

"The only authorization they have is to work on the problem of Afghanistan and terrorism," Chrétien said March 18 when asked about the role of Canadian frigates now patrolling the Persian Gulf. "They are not authorized to work on the problem of Iraq."

Canada's decision to stay out of the conflict is not as simple as it seemed. Canada was one of the first countries to join the war on terrorism after September 11 and has three ships patrolling the Persian Gulf. Joining the frigates HMCS Montreal and Winnipeg is the destroyer HMCS Iroquois.

The Winnipeg and Montreal are about to head home, while the frigates HMCS Fredericton and Regina are en route to the region to replace them.

The Iroquois will take over from the Montreal as the centre of operations for Cdre. Roger Girouard, who is overseeing a multinational task force of about 12 ships from the U.S., UK, France, Italy and other nations.


"Canadian sailors are actively hunting Iraqis at sea on behalf of the U.S."

Kelly Toughill, journalist



"We are in the war anyway, that's the reality."

Dan Middlemiss,  
Dalhousie University



Canadian sailors boarded hundreds of ships in the Persian Gulf taking aside "anyone who looks suspicious." Suspects' names and photos were "transmitted to a central [U.S.] database" of alleged terrorists and Iraqi officials. "If they have a hit, those people are turned over to our coalition partners," said Canadian Army Maj. Richard Saint-Louis. Some were sent to a U.S. prison in Bagram, Afghanistan, where some detainees had been tortured to death.

A key role of the Canadian ships is to monitor small boats that pass through the busy waters and look for terrorists trying to escape Afghanistan or Pakistan. Canadian sailors have boarded hundreds of vessels.

When they board, they sort through passengers and take aside anyone who looks suspicious. Pictures of suspects are transmitted to a central database to determine if they are wanted.

"If they have a hit, then those people are turned over to our coalition partners," said Canadian Army Maj. Richard Saint-Louis, stationed at U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida.

Neither Maj. Saint-Louis nor Compton had statistics on how many suspected terrorists were discovered by Canadians. It is known that Canadians turned over two suspects to U.S. authorities last July. They were taken to Bagram air base in Afghanistan, where the U.S. runs a detention centre.

Maj. Saint-Louis said Canadian forces have no control over or specific knowledge about who is included in the U.S. database, or how that country determines who should be arrested.

"We just don't know," he said

yesterday. "You would have to ask the Americans about that."

Compton said the database also includes Iraqi war criminals and anyone the U.S. thinks should be arrested in connection with the war in Iraq.

When asked if Canadian sailors, would be expected to detain Ali Hassan al-Majid, a notorious Iraqi general sought by U.S. forces, Compton said of course. "If you consider the regime, his name is second or third or fourth."

Dan Middlemiss, who teaches defence and foreign policy at Dalhousie University, said Canada's role in the Persian Gulf is inconsistent with its neutrality, but also not surprising. "We are in the war anyway, that's the reality," Middlemiss said.

"Canada is playing an almost identical role to the one it played in the first Gulf war." Middlemiss pointed out that Canadian ships are patrolling most of the Persian Gulf, almost to the border of Kuwait.

**Source:** "Canadians help U.S. hunt in Gulf," *Toronto Star*, April 2, 2003. [www.iraqwararchive.org/data/apr02/canada/star01.pdf](http://www.iraqwararchive.org/data/apr02/canada/star01.pdf)







# Canada's General Walt Natynczyk led 35000 troops in Iraq

By Richard Sanders, coordinator, Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade.

**D**uring his three decades of military service, Canada's new Chief of Defence—Lt. Gen. Walter Natynczyk—has led soldiers in Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo and East Timor.<sup>1</sup> However, Natynczyk's fighting career reached a crescendo in 2004, during his year-long stint in Baghdad.

During that year, while embedded in the highest levels of command of Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), Natynczyk led 35,000 troops fighting throughout Iraq. Working first as its Deputy Director of Strategy, Policy and Plans and then as its Deputy Commanding General,<sup>2</sup> he helped MNC-I fulfil its mission to conduct:

“offensive operations to defeat remaining non-compliant forces and neutralize destabilizing influences in Iraq...”<sup>3</sup>

In short, the MNF-I was the U.S.-led coalition fighting the Iraq War. As of January 1, 2010, the MNF-I officially changed its name to United States Forces-Iraq.

Natynczyk's leadership in the Iraq war contradicts one of our country's most popular misconceptions: that the Liberal governments of Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin defiantly stood up to George Bush by refusing to participate in the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq.

This misbelief is a corollary of the overarching national myth that Canada is a global force for peace. One way to debunk this cultural chimera is to expose the discomfiting reality that Canada has actively aided and abetted the Iraq war since its very inception.

Natynczyk—the poster boy for Canada's Armed Forces—exemplifies the incongruity between our peaceful self-image and the reality of Canada as a warmonger in Iraq.

After attending the prestigious U.S. Army War College, Natynczyk was—like his predecessor, Chief of Defence Rick Hillier—honoured when appointed to become the Deputy Commanding General of the U.S. Army's III Corps.



**Lt. Gen. Walter Natynczyk, like two other Canadian Generals, served as Deputy Commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq the U.S.-led coalition fighting the Iraq War.**



Based in Fort Hood, Texas, III Corps envisions itself as the “premier Corps in the Army” with warfighters “prepared for full spectrum operations in support of Joint, Combined and Interagency missions” that are “offensive in nature.”<sup>4</sup>

Reluctant to believe that Canada has helped lead the Iraq war, Canadians might strain to preserve the

nation's delusory peacekeeping mirage by imagining that Natynczyk's key role in Iraq had somehow escaped their government's attention, just as it had escaped their own. Let's dispel any such musings. On January 24, 2006, Canada's Governor General bestowed Natynczyk with a Meritorious Service Cross. This decoration—which recognizes “individuals for their outstanding professionalism and for bringing honour to the Canadian Forces”—is awarded to those “whose specific achievements have brought honour to the Canadian Forces and to Canada.”<sup>5</sup>

What “specific achievements” in Natynczyk's illustrious career warranted this prestigious “cross”? The government's statement was clear. Natynczyk was being recognized

“for his outstanding leadership and professionalism while deployed as Deputy Commanding General of the Multi-National Corps during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

From January 2004 to January 2005, Major General Natynczyk led the Corps' 10 separate brigades, consisting of more than 35,000 soldiers stationed throughout the Iraq Theater of Operations. He also oversaw planning and execution of all Corps level combat support and combat service support operations. “His pivotal role in the development of numerous plans and operations resulted in a tremendous contribution by the Multi-National Corps to Operation Iraqi Freedom, and has brought great credit to the Canadian Forces and to Canada.”<sup>6</sup>

**Resolving the Contradictions**  
How can Canadians reconcile Natynczyk's incontrovertible role in Iraq, with the mythic fantasy that Canada never even joined the Iraq war?

Natynczyk tried to explain this contradiction between public perception and reality during an interview in Iraq with *Esprit de Corps* magazine's Scott Taylor. When asked “how Canada could oppose the war yet deploy a senior officer,” Natynczyk responded:

“The Canadian government approved my deployment, so from my perspective there was no controversy.



The instructions to me were clear: ‘move out’—and as a soldier I complied....

I take orders from the Canadian government. The Canadian government sent me to Fort Hood, bottom line, to show in a tangible way the close affiliation between the U.S. and Canada.

I answer to the [Canadian] deputy chief of defence staff and through him to the chief of defence staff.... In this environment [i.e., in Iraq], I’m under the operational control of the III Corps commander.”

So, while asserting: “I take orders from the Canadian government,” Natynczyk avowed unequivocally that “I’m under the operational control of the [U.S. Army’s] III Corps commander.” Natynczyk’s case thus illustrates that any perceived conflict between the Canadian and U.S. militaries over Iraq is mere political illusion.

Canada’s government commanded Natynczyk to take his marching orders from the U.S. Then, while under U.S. “operational” control, Natynczyk commanded tens of thousands of American troops in Iraq.

This belies the fact that there is no ideological contradiction between the two countries’ basic military policies in Iraq. As Natynczyk said, the Canadian government used him in Iraq “to show in a tangible way the close affiliation between the U.S. and Canada.” This, he explained, was the “bottom line.”

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## Statement by the Office of Governor General Michaëlle Jean



“From Jan. 2004 to Jan. 2005, Major General Natynczyk led the Corps’ 10 separate brigades, consisting of more than 35,000 soldiers stationed throughout the Iraq Theater of Operations. He also oversaw planning and execution of all Corps level combat support and combat service support operations.

“His pivotal role in the development of numerous plans and operations resulted in a tremendous contribution by the Multi-National Corps to Operation Iraqi Freedom, and has brought great credit to the Canadian Forces and to Canada.”

**Source:** Governor General announces awarding of Meritorious Service Decorations, January 24, 2006. [www.gg.ca/media/doc.asp?lang=e&DocID=4653](http://www.gg.ca/media/doc.asp?lang=e&DocID=4653)



On February 8, 2005, retired General Gordon O’Connor (who became the new Conservative government’s first Minister of National Defence, 2006-2007), spoke out against the Liberal government’s hypocrisy on Canada in the Iraq War:

“The Prime Minister said that his government refused to send Canadian troops to Iraq two years ago and that decision stands. This, of course, is not in concert with the facts. Canada had and has troops serving in Iraq. Is the government embarrassed by their presence? Is that why it says one thing and does another?... The Canadian Forces had and have members serving with allies in Iraq. *Some of these members are operating at the highest level of command.*” (Emphasis added.)

**Source:** *Hansard*, House of Commons, February 8, 2005.

## Canada's 'Fiercely Proud' Lt.Gen. Devlin in Iraq, 2006-08



While a Major General, Peter Devlin received the U.S. Legion of Merit medal for his “exceptionally meritorious conduct” as Deputy Commander of MultiNational Forces in Iraq.

Over the decades, the U.S. has awarded this prestigious medal to dozens of military leaders, from many countries, including Adolf Heusinger, who had been the Nazi Army's Chief of General Staff. Other notable recipients include Kings of Britain, Greece, Romania, Saudi Arabia and Thailand, as well as Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi—the Shah of Iran.



By Richard Sanders, coordinator, Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade.

In 2008, when Peter Devlin was a Canadian Major General, he received the U.S. Legion of Merit medal for his command of multinational forces fighting in Iraq.<sup>1</sup> This military decoration is awarded by the U.S. Department of Defence for “exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services and achievements.”<sup>2</sup> Devlin received this prestigious medal for executing command responsibilities while posted with the U.S. Army to Iraq for 15 months between December 14, 2006 and 2008.<sup>3</sup>

In March 2007, while in Iraq, Devlin wrote to the University of Western Ontario alumni magazine, saying:

“Greetings from Iraq.... I have been in Iraq for almost three months...and I occupy the Deputy Commanding General position for Multi-National Corps Iraq. It is very rewarding and I am mainly responsible for coalition operations and Iraqi infrastructure.... It is an honour to be serving with the Coalition Forces in Iraq and I am *fiercely proud* to be wearing a Canadian flag.”<sup>4</sup> (Emphasis added.)

Devlin was deployed to Iraq as part of his three year stint as Deputy Commander of the U.S. Army's 3rd (III) Corps and the Fort Hood military base in Texas between 2005 and 2008. As the *Fort Hood Sentinel* explained

“His time here included a 15-month deployment to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 06-08 where he saw a dramatic change in the war-torn nation. ‘It was a professional response by the U.S. military,’ Devlin said. He added the deployment was among his most cherished memories from his time at Fort Hood.”<sup>5</sup>

Devlin, whose job involved overseeing issues relating to the military coalition fighting in Iraq, said “there are great strengths that come from multinationality. It brings different cultures, different equipment, different approaches, greater legitimacy to the effort here in Iraq.”<sup>6</sup>

Besides advocating a “greater legitimacy” for the war by having different nations involved in the U.S.-led occupation, Devlin's tour included visiting various military contingents fighting in Iraq. For instance, in October 2007, he spent some time embedded with an Estonian infantry platoon patrolling Baghdad streets.<sup>7</sup> This platoon is “bur-

General Devlin toured with troops like this Estonian infantry brigade in Iraq in 2007..



Devlin



ied within” an American battalion.<sup>8</sup>

Devlin was the fourth of five Canadian generals on “exchange” with the U.S. Army to hold this top command position of 3rd Corps and Fort Hood.<sup>9</sup> In 2008, when replaced by the current deputy commander at Fort Hood, fellow Canadian Brig. Gen. Peter Atkinson, “Devlin complimented the American soldiers he worked with at Fort Hood, calling them smart, disciplined and strong. He wore the III Corps insignia with ‘*fierce pride*,’ he said.”<sup>10</sup> And, as he told another Texan reporter, Fort Hood “made us feel a part of the family... We wish we were still there. Be *fiercely proud* of that strong sense of community.”<sup>11</sup>

Upon completing his three years in the Lone Star State as a leading officer in the U.S. Army, Devlin became Deputy Commander of Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, which is responsible for all Canadian military missions abroad, except so-called “Special Operations.”<sup>12</sup>

In June 2010, Devlin was promoted to Lt. Gen. and made Chief of the Land Staff. During “Change of Com-



(October 2007) Peter Devlin, who is now the Commander of Canada’s Army, was patrolling the streets in Baghdad with Estonian Infantry Battalion Commander, Lt. Kaido Kivistik.

mand” ceremonies he told predecessor, Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie, “you make all of us *fiercely proud* with your devotion and your commitment to our great nation.”<sup>13</sup>

Now, as chief of Canada’s Army, Devlin says the “experience of combat” has “reinvigorated” our troops. With his usual creative flare, he notes that “we need to be *fiercely proud* of what we have accomplished.”<sup>14</sup>

This was not the first time that Devlin expressed such deeply-felt sentiments for Canadian troops fighting the Afghan war. In 2004, while commander of the Kabul Multinational Brigade (KMNB), Devlin displayed his distinctive parlance by saying “I am *fiercely proud* of the Canadian units deployed as part of KMNB.”<sup>15</sup> Upon leaving that post, with his usual panache, “his voice strained with emotion,” Devlin proclaimed: “I leave *fiercely proud* of the accomplishments of all the soldiers in the brigade.”<sup>16</sup>

Devlin continues to promote Canada’s army with

inventive statements to the media. For instance, in support of the annual “Army Run” this September in Ottawa, Devlin dug deep into his impressive vault of metaphors to tell CTV News that “Canadians are *fiercely proud* of what we on behalf of them accomplish around the world.”<sup>17</sup>

Most Canadians *are* certainly proud—though it is not known how “fiercely”—of the prevailing myth that Canada refused to take any part in the U.S.-led Iraq War. It is, however, not certain exactly where the general public would direct their “fierceness” if only they knew that the current chief of Canada’s army had commanded troops in the Iraq war and received a U.S. military medal for that work.

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# Canada's Top Former-Commando was Deputy Commander of the Iraq War, throughout 2008



## Brig. Gen. Nicolas E. Matern

By Richard Sanders, coordinator, Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade.

In January 2008, Brigadier-General Nicolas Matern—former commanding officer of Canada's Joint Task Force Two "counter-terrorism" commando unit—began a year-long tour with the U.S. Army in Iraq. Matern held a senior leadership position in the Iraq War. He was Deputy Commanding General, Coalition and Infrastructure for Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I).<sup>1</sup>

While deployed in Iraq, Matern reported directly to Lieutenant-General Lloyd Austin III, the U.S. general who led the 170,000-strong MNC-I, "the tactical unit responsible for command and control of operations throughout Iraq."<sup>2</sup> In January 2010, the MNF-I changed its name to U.S. Forces-Iraq.

While stationed in Iraq throughout 2008, Matern's responsibilities included "helping U.S. forces there and preparing to co-ordinate coalition units."<sup>3</sup>

U.S. Colonel Bill Buckner, spokesman for the 18th Airborne Corps said this part of Matern's "battlefield circulation will be going and visiting" soldiers from various countries based in Iraq "and making sure they're getting the things they need, the support they need and making sure they are integrated into our [U.S.] operations."<sup>4</sup> The U.S. Colonel also revealed that Canada's General Matern "is fully integrated into everything we do.... He attends all of our planning sessions, our plans and operations briefings, all of our commander's staff meetings."<sup>5</sup>

Colonel Buckner displayed great faith in Matern's ability to fulfil his important responsibilities in Iraq saying that the Canadian Brigadier-General's

"special operations experience, in addition to his other service in the army, fits in well with the U.S. unit. 'He comes in with a unique set of skills.... We're the 18th Airborne Corps, we're the home of the airborne and the special operating forces, so he fits in very nicely to this warrior ethos we have here. He's going to do a great job.'"<sup>6</sup>

This perception that Matern had the right stuff to fit in "very nicely" to the U.S. Airborne's "warrior ethos," stemmed from his experience with Canada's so-called "elite commandos." Prior to becoming a Brigadier-General, moving to the U.S. and joining the war in Iraq, Matern was Deputy Commander of the "Canadian Special Operations Forces Command" (CSOFCOM),<sup>7</sup> in Ottawa. Before that he commanded Joint Task Force 2, which is CSOFCOM's best-known secret unit. And, in August 2006, Matern was the acting commander of the Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR), another unit within CSOFCOM. When CSOR first appeared, Matern was quoted as saying: "'JTF2 is a scalpel; what you have here is more of a hammer,' said Matern, speaking in Petawawa. 'Sometimes you need the hammer to clear the way for the scalpel.'"<sup>8</sup>

Matern's training in counterinsurgency warfighting also included overseas missions. He was, for instance, "a seasoned special operations officer who served with Canadian Special Forces in Afghanistan."<sup>9</sup>

Upon returning to the U.S. from Iraq in January 2009, Matern resumed the posting he had begun in June 2007 as Deputy Commanding General of Operations for the 18th Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, in North Carolina.<sup>10</sup> Matern described his role in the Iraq war as "mindboggling, interesting and rewarding." He also claimed to have "learned a lot from the experience about orchestration of staff and staff management."<sup>11</sup>

By January 2010, during the extremely-militarized response to the catastrophic earthquake in Haiti, General Matern was acting as the "coordinator of humanitarian assistance with the U.S.-run Joint Task Force-Haiti."<sup>12</sup> Canadian antiwar researcher Anthony Fenton cites a corporate news article claiming that the "lessons learned" by Ft. Bragg airborne units—when "dealing with counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan"—were applied to "the job of distributing food and water and providing medical help"<sup>13</sup> in Haiti. It seems more likely that the heavy-handed militarization of aid—epitomized by using war-hardened counterinsurgency commandos as supposed agents of development aid—was deemed necessary because of fears that Haitians might rise up in a revolt against long-standing occupation, injustice and exploitation.

After Matern "bid farewell" to his deputy command responsibilities at Fort Bragg in July 2010, he took up a new post as Chief of Staff for Operations for Canadian

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Forces Expeditionary Command (CEFCOM),<sup>14</sup> which is “responsible for planning and conducting all CF operations outside North America, except those conducted by Canadian Special Operations Forces Command.”<sup>15</sup>

While in the National Security Studies Programme at the Canadian Forces College in 2006. At that time, when Matern was a Colonel, he wrote a major paper called “Continental defence integration divide: can it be bridged?” In it, he “examines the main impediments” that “hamper any meaningful advancement in...continental defence integration.” He also “explores opportunities” and concludes that “moving to an enhanced state of continental defence integration would likely require more political impetus if not another tragic event the likes of 9/11.”<sup>16</sup>

Having served Canada as a top commander in the U.S.-led war in Iraq, Brigadier-General Matern may now be using his new position as CEFCOM’s Chief of Staff, to push towards the “continental-defence-integration” ideal that he explored as a Colonel.

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During an election debate on March 11, 2008, Liberal Foreign Affairs critic Bob Rae repeatedly and adamantly denied Chris Tindale’s assertion that Canada had senior military officers in Iraq.

## Bob Rae Seriously Uninformed about Canadian Commanders serving in the Iraq War

By Chris Tindale, Green Party activist and candidate.

While answering a question at the debate, I mentioned that there are currently Canadian military officers serving in Iraq as part of the American command. Bob Rae interrupted me to object adamantly, almost angrily. “No there aren’t!”

Yes, I said, there are. “No there aren’t,” Mr. Rae said again: “They’re part of our military exchange program,” I explained. Strangely, Mr. Rae demanded that I tell him where in Iraq our officers were stationed, as if my inability to do so would prove they weren’t there. [Rae asked this six times in as many seconds.]

At that point, seeing no immediate resolution to our disagreement, I moved on with the rest of my answer. I’m quite taken aback that Mr. Rae could have been so misinformed about our military’s exchange program with the U.S. and our direct involvement in the war in Iraq. It’s made worse by the fact that Mr. Rae isn’t just any Liberal candidate: he’s the party’s foreign affairs critic.

On January 19, 2008, during this election campaign, *Canwest News Service* reported that Canadian Forces Brig.-Gen. Nicolas Matern had “recently arrived in Baghdad” to take “a leading roll [sic] in Iraq.”

Canadian officers have been serving in Iraq since at least 2003 as discussed in both the House of Commons and the mainstream media.

How is it possible that the Liberal foreign affairs critic was not only unaware of these basic facts, but was so sure of the opposite that he forcefully interrupted to contradict me, not once, but repeatedly? This raises serious questions regarding his knowledge of his own portfolio.

**Source:** “Rae Seriously Uninformed Regarding Iraq,” March 12, 2008. [www.christindal.ca/tag/iraq/](http://www.christindal.ca/tag/iraq/)  
See the video: [www.youtube.com/watch?v=LhkVwOdjh3g](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LhkVwOdjh3g)



# Using Canadian Airspace, and Refuelling in Newfoundland

By Richard Sanders, coordinator, Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade

U.S. aircraft transporting hundreds of thousands of troops and carrying weapons and other military hardware to and from the Iraq War, have had free unrestricted use of Canadian airspace. American soldiers and supplies bound for Iraq have also been welcomed at three public airports in Newfoundland.

Although this use of Canadian airspace and facilities has been mentioned very briefly in the Canadian media, it has largely escaped national public scrutiny. In March 2003, a very short the *Ottawa Citizen* item noted: “The war has brought millions of dollars’ worth of new business into the international airports at St. John’s, Gander, and Stephenville, in recent weeks, as the U.S. has used Newfoundland as a refuelling stop for military flights en route to the Middle East.... Newfoundland has been a re-supply station for the U.S. military for decades.”<sup>21</sup>

Here is some information about military use of these three Canadian airports that have continued to service U.S. military flights enroute to and from the Iraq War throughout the entire invasion and occupation.

## St. John’s

Back in 2006, when the City of St. John’s poured \$1 million dollars into subsidising the airport to encourage military traffic, then-Mayor, Andy Wells, called it “military tourism” and said “It’s great business b’y.”<sup>22</sup> And, as an article in the *Toronto Star* said “He’s got another term for it, too: ‘big, big bucks.’”<sup>23</sup>

Other ways to describe this might reasonably include “aiding and abetting the business of war” or “complicity in crimes against humanity.”

These however aren’t the terms you’ll hear used by the St. John’s International Airport Authority (SJIAA). This not-for-profit business which has been privately managing the facility since 1998, prefers to describe the airport as a “destination of choice for servicing military aircraft.”<sup>24</sup> It also says the airport is “a technical stop for



U.S. Air Force personnel pose in front of their C-130 transport plane during a stopover at St. John’s airport

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military aircraft” and calls it a “popular crew rest location for military aircraft personnel from around the world.”<sup>25</sup>

The airport’s value to the military cannot be underestimated:


“[T]he airport’s strong history and connection with the military is still prevalent today. As the last stop in North America on the way overseas and the first stop after crossing the Atlantic, St. John’s International Airport is strategically positioned for fuel stops and crew rests.”<sup>26</sup>

The SJIAA has revealed that 1,465 “military aircraft...refuelled at the airport in 2009 - a 20 per cent increase over 2008.”<sup>27</sup> Between 80 and 90 percent of these military landings at St. John’s are by the U.S. Air Force [USAF].<sup>8,9</sup> The SJIAA also reports that in 2009 there had been a “25% increase in military aircraft landings since 2006.”<sup>10</sup>

When reporting these figures, and stating that the St. John’s airport is “an increasingly popular destination for military aircraft,” the SJIAA acknowledges the role of public funding from its “partner,” the City of St. John’s:

“The number of landings... would not have been possible without the

partnership with the City of St. John’s to develop the Airport’s multi-purpose facility. Since the completion of this facility in 2006, larger and more military aircraft are able to park and overnight in St. John’s.”<sup>11</sup>



“In recognition of the value of this new facility in accommodating large military and cargo traffic” the municipal government “made a \$1 million contribution toward the construction” of “new infrastructure in 2006.”<sup>12</sup>

(See photo)

This infusion of tax dollars—the “Military Tourism Partnership”—was deemed a “strategic investment” to make

the airport “more viable” for “military aircraft.”<sup>13</sup>

Although all civilian aircraft that use the airport pay “landing fees,” the same is not true of warplanes. As stated in the airport’s 2009 report, the “Airport Authority does not receive landing fees from military aircraft.”<sup>14</sup>

The not-for-profit “Airport Authority” justifies this generous public subsidisation of military flights by stating that these stopovers help local businesses. For example, in 2005, “more than 28,000 hotel room nights were sold to military personnel in St. John’s.”<sup>15</sup>

In 2007, the SJIAA further ex-





U.S. C-130 “Hercules”  
transport s at the  
St. John’s airport

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plained that each year “more than 15,000 military personnel ...spend time at our Airport and in our City” and spend money on “accommodation, entertainment and transportation services.”<sup>16</sup>

Although the same could be said of the 1.2 million civilians using the airport annually,<sup>17</sup> landing fees for their aircraft are not waived. The SJIAA does not explain this double standard or why military planes receive this special discount.

The big ticket item for military warplanes landing in St. John’s is fuel

and the main supplier is Irving Aviation which provides “[s]pecialized handling for military aircraft through Canadian Air Reserve Forces.”<sup>18</sup>

Another airport service is de-icing. The airport’s new De-icing Facility allows “larger military aircraft that previously could not be accommodated. Such aircraft include C-17s and C-5s.”<sup>19</sup> These U.S.-built military cargo planes are among the world’s biggest. Other large U.S. military planes used to supply the Iraq War have also landed in St. John’s, including C-141 Starlifters<sup>20</sup> and C-130 Hercules.

C-130s are, in fact, “the most popular type of military aircraft landing in St. John’s” and the airport’s new De-icing Facility can “accommodate up to eight” of them. This 45,000-sq-metre, municipally-funded facility accommodates 15 planes and effectively doubles the number of parking space available for large military aircraft.<sup>21</sup> This, said the SJIAA, led to a “healthy increase in military aircraft traffic” in 2007.<sup>22</sup>

But not everyone in St. John’s is keen to spend their city taxes on increasing the airport’s ability to facili-

## Newfoundland Airports have always Served the Military

### St. John’s

The St. John’s International Airport began as a Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) base called Torbay in 1941. It was shared with the Britain’s Royal Air Force and the U.S. Army Air Corps until 1946.<sup>1</sup> Torbay was then “transferred ...to the Canadian Department of Transport to operate as a civilian airport.” However, thanks to the Cold War, the U.S. and RCAF continued to have a presence there until it was reopened as a Canadian Air Force Base (AFB) called “Station Torbay,” between 1953 and 1964.<sup>2</sup>

In order to support its Air Force Base in St. John’s, called Pepperrell AFB, the U.S. Air Force

“constructed two 25,000-square-foot aircraft hangars as well as a 36,000-square-foot machine shop and administrative offices at the [Torbay] airfield.”<sup>3</sup>

### Gander

Like the St. John’s airport, Gander has long been a major stopping point for military flights. In fact, within a few years of its opening in 1938, RCAF Station Gander was “the main staging point for the movement of Allied aircraft to Europe during World War II.” As “an ideal wartime refueling and maintenance depot for bombers flying overseas,” it quickly became “the largest airport in the world.” Gander continued to grow during the Cold War with the co-location of various Canadian Forces and NORAD facilities there.<sup>4</sup>

### Stephenville

At one time Stephenville was “the largest military airport of the United States Army Air Force outside of continental USA.”<sup>5</sup> Known as the Ernest Harmon Air Force Base (AFB), it was operated by the U.S. military between 1941 and 1966. There is also an abandoned U.S. Air Force radar facility located nearby.<sup>6</sup>

Although the massive, 11,000-foot runways at this American AFB provided refueling stops for trans-atlantic military flights, their main function was to service KC-97 Strato-tankers. These large U.S. military aircraft were based at Stephenville to refuel the Strategic Air Command’s nuclear bombers enroute to Cold War targets.<sup>7</sup>

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
tate U.S.-led wars in Iraq or elsewhere. Take James MacLean, for instance. He's a professor at the Memorial University of Newfoundland and a member of St. John's Campaign against War. He says local politicians and businesspeople "appear to have no respect for human life when there is a dollar to be made." He also notes that "In criminal law, it's an established principle that if you help someone commit a crime, you yourself are committing a crime. The same principle can be applied to war crimes and crimes against humanity.... The invasion of Iraq was illegal...and those who have helped make possible this illegal war certainly share in responsibility for the many tens of thousands of civilians American forces have massacred."<sup>23</sup>

## Gander

The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq was a financial boon for Gander. On March 22 of that year, during the initial "shock and awe" bombardment of Iraq—while bombs and cruise missiles pulverised Baghdad, killing untold numbers of innocent people—the President and CEO of Gander's International Airport happily reported that "In recent weeks, as the U.S. has used Newfoundland as a refueling stop for military flights en route to the Middle East. 'We've been getting roughly 2 or 3 U.S. flights a day, with probably 1000 troops coming through each day.'"<sup>24</sup>

Then, in 2004, Vey looked back positively on the previous year, saying 2003 "was a strong year as military tensions brought an extraordinary amount of international business to YQX [Gander Airport]."<sup>25</sup> Indeed, from a strictly business point of view, the 2003 invasion of Iraq was great for the Gander airport, which saw 1350 military aircraft touchdown on its runways that year. This was a 50% increase over 2001 and 2002 levels, when only 900 military landings took place. In 2003, Gander also saw an upsurge in civilian cargo planes from 300 to almost 500.<sup>26</sup> Many of these flights were paid by the U.S. military to move troops, weapons, ammunition and other military supplies to the Iraq warzone.

Dion Faulkner, manager for air-



Gary Vey, CEO  
Gander Airport

2003 "was a strong year as military tensions brought an extraordinary amount of international business to YQX [i.e., Gander airport]"

port ground handling, says "Gander traditionally sees benefit from political unrest or tragedies." The airport, he explains gets an "upswing in business" from "the conflict in Iraq."<sup>27</sup>

And, as the GIAA's Finance Committee Report noted in 2003, there was "an operational improvement of \$400,000" largely "attributable to increased revenue" from higher traffic volumes. "Global unrest and military conflict," it stated, "had a profound impact on traffic volumes for 2003" and "[m]ilitary movements grew by 21%" over the previous year.<sup>28</sup>

Further demonstrating that war is a wonderful boon to the airport business, the GIAA's report for the first half of 2004 included the following "highlights":

- "Military traffic increased 36% over budgeted traffic.
- Cargo movements are down slightly over 2003, largely due to a significant spike in movement last year attributed to charter freighters moving supplies for the Gulf War. However, cargo movements are up 72% over budgeted levels.
- Total international movements are down slightly over 2003 levels, again attributed to commercial carriers chartering military personnel last year, but up 37% over budgeted totals."<sup>29</sup>

In its annual report for 2004, however, the GIAA regretfully an-

nounced that "Military traffic was down almost 20% over 2003, as armed conflict overseas stabilized." On the bright side though it went on to say that, "Nonetheless, military traffic was up over 2001-2002 levels."<sup>30</sup>

According to evidence presented at a Senate Committee by Bettina Ford who was a Councillor for the Gander "military community":

"The significance of Gander International Airport supporting military flights cannot be overstated. That support includes the landings of some 1,100 military aircraft in 2004."<sup>31</sup>

Although over the succeeding years, military-related traffic flow at Gander has seen some ups and downs, it continues to be a major source of revenue for local businesses.

"Our traditional international refueling business has been fairly good. Cargo movements are up 54% year-to-date over 2006 and military aircraft patronage has shown a 13% growth."<sup>32</sup>

On its website, under the subtitle "Welcoming the World's Armed Forces," the GIAA proudly says that it "routinely welcomes a whole range of military aircraft from fighter jets to military charters and Hercs." [i.e., C-130 "Hercules" cargo/transport planes]<sup>33</sup>

And, as its 2008 report explains "Patronage from military aircraft

C-130 cargo planes  
—workhorse of the U.S. Air Force—  
move troops, weapons and other equipment  
to and from the Iraq War,  
through Canadian airspace and airports.

Stephenville,  
Newfoundland



remains a cornerstone of both the airport and Central Newfoundland community. Including fuel sales, concessions, accommodations, handling and related spending, military aircraft at Gander generate \$25 million in revenue annually.<sup>34</sup>

But, like St. John's, Gander does not charge landing fees for military aircraft, "which account for about 50 per cent of the airport's traffic." This translates into a loss to the GIAA of "more than \$2 million a year."<sup>35</sup>

As GIAA chair, Donna Rideout, has explained, the airport authority "continues to absorb the cost of foreign state-owned and Canadian military aircraft landing at Gander, without compensation."<sup>36</sup>

Or, as then-Councillor Ford put it, Gander is "a civilian airport operated by a local authority of dedicated volunteer board members providing support to NATO aircraft."<sup>37</sup>

Although the Gander airport authority treats the NATO military pact as if it is a worthwhile charitable organisation, it has long refused to pay its fair share of municipal taxes. By 2002, the GIAA owed the town of Gander \$250,000 in back taxes. While the airport waged a six-year legal battle against paying its taxes, they accumulated another \$2.5 million in unpaid taxes. In 2008, Newfoundland's Supreme Court ruled that Gander airport did not need to pay local taxes. So, while the airport is happy to subsidise military flights by waiving landing fees—including for U.S. warplanes carrying troops and weapons to the Iraq War—it has refused to pay its dues to the local government.

And, citizens across Canada are also chipping in. In 2007, the federal government donated a "cash infusion" of \$5 million to the Gander Airport.<sup>38</sup>

## Stephenville

Relatively little data is publicly available on the Stephenville airport's role in servicing U.S. military aircraft travelling to and from Iraq. However, from what is known, this western-Newfoundland airport has been as involved in facilitating U.S. military air traffic to Iraq as St. John's and Gander.

An *Ottawa Citizen* article during the initial 2003 invasion, listed Stephenville an airport that was being used by the U.S. to refuel troop-carrying aircraft en route to the Iraq war.<sup>39</sup>

There is also anecdotal evidence to this effect. In the summer of 2003, with the war raging in Iraq, the following observations from Stephenville were posted to an online, military-related discussion group relating to the Iraq war:

"I was camping recently at a park near the town of Stephenville in Newfoundland....

Normally, there isn't so much air traffic that it would keep a camper awake, but the night I was camping there, there seemed to be a plane flying overhead every few minutes. It was much more than the usual commercial traffic. Then I remembered that the U.S. Military was using Stephenville as a refueling base for planes flying to the Persian Gulf area."<sup>40</sup>

Stephenville Airport Authority proudly describes itself as providing "refueling and ground handling services to corporate, military, general aviation and other customers."<sup>41</sup>

The airport serves as "a refueling stop to...military aircraft all year long" because of its responsibility as "the official alternate to our sister airport: 'Gander International Airport.'"<sup>42</sup>

Stephenville's regular customers include "large military cargo air-

craft" operated by the U.S. Air Force such as Boeing C-17 Globemaster IIIs and Lockheed C-5 Galaxies.<sup>43</sup> These transports frequently move troops and material to the Iraq warzone.

Like other Newfoundland airports, Stephenville has played host to private planes carrying U.S. troops and equipment across the Atlantic. Although publicly-available data on these flights is sparse, we know for example that a Boeing 757 operated by Omni Air International, carrying "101 American military personnel and 11 crewmembers," used the Stephenville airport in mid-January 2008.<sup>44</sup> Omni is known to peace activists monitoring Ireland's Shannon Airport as a contractor that has landed some 600 U.S. troops per day on the other side of the Atlantic.<sup>45</sup> We can only speculate how many of these flights landed in Stephenville, Gander or St. John's before proceeding to Shannon on their way to Iraq.

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# The Shannon Connection: Learning from our Irish Colleagues

By Richard Sanders, coordinator, Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade

On March 28, 2008, an American cargo plane contracted by the U.S. military to supply the war in Iraq, made an emergency landing at Shannon's civilian airport in Ireland. The cargo plane had stopped at the Gander International Airport in Newfoundland before its Atlantic crossing. It was enroute to Qatar in the Persian Gulf from McChord Air Force Base, the home of "Combat Airlift." Upon leaving Shannon, the DC8 transport had an engine failure that local witnesses described as a "streak of flame trailing from the plane."<sup>1</sup>

Tracey Belle, spokesperson for Murray Air Cargo, the U.S.-military charter company operating the plane, said they were licensed to transport "explosives, weapons and depleted uranium through Shannon Airport."<sup>2</sup>

This revelation added fuel to the fire of local citizen's concerns that their airport was being used as a stopover for U.S. flights ferrying troops, weapons and other military equipment to aid and abet the Iraq war. Like the Canadian government, Ireland claims

that it has stayed uninvolved in this latest U.S.-led war in the mideast.

However, like Newfoundland's Gander, St. John's and Stephenville airports, Shannon has been open for business servicing U.S. military flights bound for the Iraq war since it began in March 2003. Similarly, all of these airports are civilian facilities, not military bases. Because so many U.S. military flights going through Ireland also stop in Newfoundland, Canadians have a lot to learn from what is known about U.S. use of the Shannon airport.


Shannonwatch, a dedicated group of Irish peace and human rights

activists, has closely monitored U.S. military traffic through Shannon airport. For instance, they have gathered data showing that "at least 970 U.S.-military-contracted flights and a further 360 U.S. Air Force/Navy planes landed at Shannon in 2009."<sup>3</sup>

John Lannon, a Shannonwatch researcher, has revealed that since March 2003 "[o]ver one and a half million U.S. troops plus regular cargo shipments to Iraq and Afghanistan have gone through Shannon Airport."<sup>4</sup>

Lannon also notes that Irish Transport Minister Noel Dempsey has "confirmed that a total of 1,276 civil-

After a stopover in Gander, Newfoundland, this Murray Air cargo plane—enroute to the Persian Gulf in March 2008—was forced to land in Shannon, Ireland. Murray Air then admitted it was contracted by the U.S. military to carry "explosives, weapons and depleted uranium."



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Evergreen and Kalitta Air at the Gander airport

Shannonwatch says Murray, Evergreen and Kalitta “routinely ship munitions for the U.S. Air Force.” Amnesty says Evergreen and Kalitta are known for “covert intelligence and military operations.”

ian flights were granted permits to carry weapons and munitions of war through Ireland in 2009. In response to a parliamentary question... [Dempsey] said the vast majority of these were from American civil airlines, chartered by the U.S. military, and involved flights to or from the U.S., and that almost all landed at Shannon.”<sup>5</sup>

Shannonwatch has exposed many details about the specific civilian airlines contracting their services to move U.S. troops and equipment for the war in Iraq. They have also uncovered much evidence that Shannon airport has been used by cargo companies contracted by the CIA for so-called “extraordinary rendition” flights in which kidnap victims are shuttled to secret prisons for torture.

Newfoundland airports are similarly complicit. The Gander International Airport, for instance, lists six charter companies that it describes as “frequent visitors to Gander.” Their website kindly provides web links to these six companies on a webpage called “Cargo Opportunities at Gander International Airport”<sup>6</sup>:

- Atlas Air
- Evergreen Aviation
- Gemini Air Cargo
- Kalitta Air
- Murray Air
- Vega Air

Of these six companies, Shannonwatch<sup>7</sup> and Amnesty International<sup>8</sup> identify five as either U.S. military contractors used to move troops and munitions to warzones, or for CIA “rendition” flights to shuttle kidnap victims to torture centres.

Shannonwatch research reveals Murray, Evergreen and Kalitta “routinely ship munitions for the U.S. Air Force.”<sup>9</sup> Amnesty describes Evergreen

and Kalitta as companies “known for their connections to covert intelligence and military operations.”<sup>10</sup>

Atlas Air is similarly described by Shannonwatch as a “well-known carrier of war munitions,”<sup>11</sup> while Gemini is listed as a company providing “Aircraft Linked to CIA Extraordinary Rendition Flights.”<sup>12</sup>

While Canadian peace researchers can benefit from their Irish colleague’s investigations into trans-Atlantic refuelling stops by U.S. military and intelligence agencies, Canadian anti-war activists can also learn from their Irish colleagues as well. Shannon airport has been the frequent site of protests, blockades and other nonviolent acts of resistance against the Iraq war. In 2003, five members of the Catholic Worker movement used household hammers to disable a U.S. warplane that had stopped at Shannon. In 2006, they were found not guilty by a unanimous verdict from the 12 jurors. In response, the five activists issued a statement which read in part:

“The jury is the conscience of the community chosen randomly from Irish society. The conscience of the

In 2003, five Irish peace activists disabled a U.S. Navy warplane at Shannon airport that was enroute to Iraq.



In 2006, they were found not guilty.

community has spoken. The government has no popular mandate in providing the civilian Shannon airport to service the U.S. war machine in its illegal invasion and occupation of Iraq...

“The decision of this jury should be a message to London, Washington DC and [Ireland’s Parliament] that Ireland wants no part in waging war on the people of Iraq. Refuelling of U.S. warplanes at Shannon Airport should cease immediately.”<sup>13</sup>

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“Sentry crews provided 24-hour surveillance of OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] ...battle space....from March 19 to June 8, 2003... [and] flew 313 sorties totaling 3,115 hours.”

## E-3 “Sentry” AWACS

Airborne Warning and Control System



Polly Orcutt,  
“E-3 Sentry celebrates 30 years in Air Force's Fleet,”  
April 4, 2007. [www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123047059](http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123047059)

## Canadians AWACS Crews in Iraq, 2003

By Bryan Dean

The commander of Canadian military personnel at Tinker Air Force Base said he and his group are proud of their role in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Later that day [April 8, 2003], Prime Minister Jean Chrétien endorsed the U.S. mission and asked parliament to declare support for a quick victory by coalition forces.

Of the Canadians known to be supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom, many are AWACS fliers connected to the 552nd Air Control Wing at Tinker. The wing includes 43 Canadian troops, who are integrated with U.S. air crews who fly AWACS E-3 jets.

Lt. Col. Martin Galvin, commanding officer of the Canadian Component, said a “significant number” of those troops are deployed with the 552nd and have flown missions against Iraq since the air campaign began.

“I think everybody is uniquely proud and happy to have their role... [and] this opportunity. Our wives and families also are very proud that Canadians here are able to participate.”

Galvin said it is interesting that Canadian forces at Tinker are allowed to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom when their government did not support military action.

“We’ve been asked by the people we work with the same thing,” Galvin said. “It’s an apparent contradiction. We were given the authority to participate in the Iraq conflict....”

Tinker’s Canadian fliers have flown nearly every mission AWACS crews have been a part of since the

NORAD program began in 1979.

“Canadians were involved in the Gulf War, they were involved in the Kosovo conflict,” Galvin said. “They have been involved from the beginning of the war against terrorism in Afghanistan. Now I think I can say that we’re very proud to have a unique role in the Iraq mission, as well.”

Brig. Gen. Mike Hostage, commander of 552 Air Control Wing, said working with Canadian forces gives the wing a special bond with its allies.

“The Canadians are superb airmen,” Hostage said. “They fit seamlessly into the combat mission and are outstanding team players.... Living and working with our Canadian counterparts and their families is enriching for all of us, and it helps us to be better neighbors and stronger friends.”

“It says something about confidence,” Galvin said. “It says we trust you to have our personnel involved in this conflict. We fly with our U.S. colleagues day in and day out. It’s in our interest to stay involved and to participate alongside where that’s possible.”

Maj. Rod Black, chief of staff of the Canadian Component, said he is happy Canadians have a role in Iraq. “We’re proud to contribute to this mission,” Black said. “We want to do our part. We train with these folks. We’re down here to contribute. We train for these...contingencies and we’re very proud to be AWACS crew members.”

**Source:** “Canadian AWACS fliers take part in Iraq mission,” *Oklahoman*, April 9, 2003. [www.newsok.com/article/1923767](http://www.newsok.com/article/1923767)

## Lt. Col. Galvin: Iraq War “mission was exceptional”

More than 200 airmen from the 552nd Air Control Wing, the Canadian Component and the 513th Air Control Group returned home from Operation Iraqi Freedom to an outpouring of support to an outpouring of support from a crowd of family members, friends and fellow Tinker employees. Thirty-six Airborne Warning and Control System personnel returned April 24 [2003] [to Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma].

Members of the wing’s Canadian Component also participated in OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom], despite Canada’s initial stance against the war. The Component was authorized to honor its long-standing commitment to the wing and serve next to their American counterparts during the operation. “All the returning Canadians felt their mission was exceptional, and they are very happy they were part of it,” said Lt. Col. Martin Galvin, commander, 552nd [Air Control Wing] Canadian component.

**Source:** Welcome home: AWACS troops return to anxious families, *Tinker Take Off*, May 2, 2003. [journalrecord.com/tinkertakeoff/2003/05/02/welcome-home-awacs-troops-return-to-anxious-families/](http://journalrecord.com/tinkertakeoff/2003/05/02/welcome-home-awacs-troops-return-to-anxious-families/)

“All the returning Canadians felt their mission was exceptional, and they are very happy they were part of it.”  
Lt. Col.  
Martin Galvin



## Colonel Martin P. Galvin Commanded Canadian AWACS Crews in Iraq, 2003

As Commanding Officer of the Canadian Component, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, from 2001 to 2004, Colonel Galvin was responsible for Canadian Forces members flying with U.S. AWACS crews in contingency and combat operations over Afghanistan and Iraq.

Flying aboard the NATO E-3A AWACS, Colonel Galvin was employed as an instructor and Evaluator

Tactical Director and participated in Operation Allied Force [NATO's 1999 War against Yugoslavia].

As Vice Director, NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center (Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, CO), Col. Galvin now leads

strategic daily operations and continued transformation of this important bi-national, joint operations center.



Source: Senior Officer Biography, National Defence website.

[www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dsa-dns/sa-ns/ab/sobv-vbos-eng.asp?mAction=View&BiographyID=721](http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dsa-dns/sa-ns/ab/sobv-vbos-eng.asp?mAction=View&BiographyID=721)

From 2001 to 2004, Galvin was responsible for Canadians flying with U.S. AWACS crews in contingency and combat operations over Afghanistan and Iraq.

## Canadian AWACS Crews Sought Recognition in 2003 for Role in Iraq War

Canadians are serving on board AWACS command-and-control aircraft orchestrating the aerial bombing of Iraq.

The wife of one wishes Ottawa would acknowledge the role Canadians are playing in the war, in part to deflate some of the anti-Canadian backlash she has experienced.

"An American came up to me," said the woman living at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma, where Canadians serve with the 552nd Air Control Wing. He said, "[W]hat the hell are you doing here? Go back to the hole you call Canada."

"You are constantly looking over your shoulder," she said. "I didn't know whether I was allowed to tell this guy that my husband is over there, sitting next to an American, doing the same job," she said. "You think to your-

self, 'Here is this person rhyming off a list of expletives and yet my husband is sitting in a plane doing the same job as the Americans are doing.'"

The woman said she and other spouses have security concerns because their American neighbours don't seem to realize that despite Canada's political opposition to the war, its military has indirectly made a contribution to the Iraq campaign.

"The Americans we live with, many of them carry guns. And some of them get very serious," the woman said. "That is a concern to us."

Source: Excerpted from Allan Thompson, "Ten Canadian pilots flying on AWACS in air campaign," *Toronto Star*, April 5, 2003.

[www.pcqanda.com/dc/dcboard.php?az=show\\_mesg&forum=4&topic\\_id=29445&mesg\\_id=29445](http://www.pcqanda.com/dc/dcboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=4&topic_id=29445&mesg_id=29445)

## About the E-3 "Sentry" AWACS

The E-3 Sentry is an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft providing all-weather surveillance, command, control and communications to U.S. and NATO air force commanders. As proven in Desert Storm [Iraq War, 1991], it is the premier air battle command and control aircraft in the world.

The E-3 Sentry is a modified Boeing 707/320 commercial airframe with a rotating radar dome. The dome contains a radar subsystem that conducts surveillance from the Earth's surface up into the stratosphere, over land or water. The radar has a range of more than 320 kilometers for low-flying targets and farther for aerospace vehicles flying at medium to high altitudes. The radar can look down to detect, identify and track enemy and friendly low-flying aircraft.

Other major subsystems in the E-3 are navigation, communications and data processing. Computer consoles display data in graphic and tabular format on video screens. Console operators perform surveillance, identification, weapons control, battle management and communications functions.

The E-3 Sentry's radar and computer subsystems gather and present broad and detailed battlefield information as events occur. This includes position and tracking information on aircraft and ships.

In support of air-to-ground operations, the Sentry provides information needed for interdiction, reconnaissance, airlift and close-air support for friendly ground forces. It also provides information for commanders of air operations to gain and maintain control of the air battle.

E-3s detect, identify and track airborne enemy forces far from the boundaries of the U.S. or NATO countries. It directs fighter-interceptor aircraft to these enemy targets.

The E-3 Sentry support worldwide military deployment operations.

Source: Air Force Fact Sheets. [usmilitary.about.com/library/milinfo/affacts/ble-3sentryawacs.htm](http://usmilitary.about.com/library/milinfo/affacts/ble-3sentryawacs.htm)

# Bruce Barnes Led Canada's AWACS Crew back to the Iraq War in 2008

## Maj. Bruce Barnes' Bio

In 2007 and 2008, he deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan with the U.S. Air Force and flew 30 combat missions supporting NATO and Coalition stability operations for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.

Between 2005 and 2009, he was at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma. An Evaluator/Instructor Mission Crew Commander at the 552nd Air Control Wing, Barnes commanded combat crews on E-3 Sentry AWACS.

Barnes was posted to Germany (1997-2001) and flew on NATO AWACS. This tour included over 200 UN and NATO peace support missions over the Former Yugoslavia and 25 combat missions over Kosovo in Operation Allied Force (1999).

As a senior officer in the Canadian Air Force, Barnes is a Command and Control Doctrine Analyst with the Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre in Trenton, Ontario. He also teaches at the School of International and Area Studies, University of Oklahoma.

**Source:** University of Oklahoma [www.ou.edu/sias/home/audience\\_navigation/faculty\\_and\\_staff/bruce\\_barnes.html](http://www.ou.edu/sias/home/audience_navigation/faculty_and_staff/bruce_barnes.html)



## Mission Crew Commander

There are many people in the 552nd Air Control Wing that aid in each successful E-3 Sentry mission, and every one is an integral piece of the big wing puzzle.


The mission crew commander (MCC), is a key piece that makes the mission run smoothly and safely.

"The hardest part about our job is listening," said Maj. Bruce Barnes, a Canadian Component MCC with 964th AAC. "Our job is to communicate and to push people. You're constantly monitoring and managing people," Maj. Barnes said.

MCC is not a job one is put into after basic training. It is earned with time and experience.

"You normally have to start in another position on the airplane," said Maj. Barnes. "Most will start out at a weapons controller, learning how to control fighters. Then you will be promoted to positions like senior director, air surveillance operator or system operator."

**Source:** Sr. Airman Lorraine Amaro, "The E-3 Sentry Puzzle: mission crew commanders," May 18, 2007. [www.552acw.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123055211](http://www.552acw.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123055211)



"Being able to ensure the troops on the ground get the firepower they need from above as soon as they ask for it is extremely rewarding."

**Major Bruce Barnes,**  
Mission Crew Commander

## AWACS and GWOT

It's the most powerful airborne radar ever developed, and it's the world's most powerful air force's main aerial command and control weapon. Airmen of the 380th AEW's 964th Expeditionary Airborne Air Control Squadron (EAACS) at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, continue to keep the E-3 flying and fighting in the Global War on Terror. Their mission is to provide global power and vigilance by conducting command and control operations in support of fighter, bomber and combat forces on tactical, strategic and special missions.

"The AWACS is an essential force multiplier for the Global War on Terror," said Lt. Col. Jay Bickley, 964 EAACS Commander. "Its ability to manage the battle space and provide command and control is critical to the synergistic use of airpower."

"Being able to ensure the troops on the ground get the firepower they need from above as soon as they ask for it is extremely rewarding," said [Canadian] Major Bruce Barnes, 964 EAACS Mission Crew Commander.

**Source:** Sr. Airman Ross Tweten, "Airmen continue to manage GWOT battle space," *Sand Script*, 380 Air Expeditionary Wing, March 21, 2008. [www.380aew.afcent.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-080503-005.pdf](http://www.380aew.afcent.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-080503-005.pdf)

## Proud of Role in Global War on Terror (GWOT)

Major Gen. Kevin Kennedy, participated in an E-3 Sentry mission with the Airmen of the 964th Expeditionary Airborne Air Control Squadron. According to the general, the E-3 Sentry plays an extremely vital role in winning the Global War on Terror. "No single piece of that Air Force can do the mission by itself... The AWACS has a critical part. We use it every time we have a special operation in Afghanistan or Iraq."

According to Maj. Bruce Barnes, 964 EAACS mission crew commander of the Canadian Air Force, the real strength of the AWACS concept is in the team that makes it hap-

pen. "The general commented to me that he was extremely impressed by how the entire team truly cared about their jobs and that they should be proud of the key role they play in the ongoing Global War On Terror," he said.

As for the Airmen of the Desert Phoenix Squadron's Alpha Crew, "General Kennedy can fly with us again, anytime, anywhere," said Major Barnes.

**Source:** SrA. Ross M. Tweten, "ACCE director takes ride with EAACS Airmen," *Sand Script*, March 7, 2008. [www.380aew.afcent.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-080503-007.pdf](http://www.380aew.afcent.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-080503-007.pdf)

# Canadians aboard AWACS in Southwest Asia, 2010

By Master Sgt. Scott Sturkol

**T**o U.S. members of the 965th Expeditionary Airborne Air Control Squadron (EAACS), the five Canadians who work with them are part of the team.

Each day the Canadians work as part of a crew on E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft supporting missions in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility from an air base in Southwest Asia. The Canadian airmen live and work at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma.

“At Tinker we are (partners)” said Maj. Scott Marshall, an E-3 mission crew commander, whose hometown is Sudbury, Ontario. “We are not exchange officers or exchange personnel. It’s a co-manning situation based on the NORAD agreement.”

He said there are about 50 Canadian airmen working at Tinker’s 552nd Air Control Wing. They “get farmed out to all the different sections and squadrons” and integrate with U.S. airmen. “For our current deployment, it *includes* supporting Operation Enduring Freedom and International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan.” (Emphasis added)

As far as what they bring to the fight, each of the Canadian airmen said they seamlessly fit into operations.

“It’s just like when I was back at (Canadian Forces Base) North Bay where we have Americans there and they integrate into our forces,” said Master Cpl. Mark Keown, a senior air surveillance technician and nine-year veteran of the Canadian Forces.

“They are all very good people too, so it is very easy to integrate,” said Keown, from Powassan, Ontario.

Capt. Chris Horner, an E-3 senior director and weapons officer and 11-year Canadian Forces member who has been with the 965th EAACS for more than three years, said when he and fellow crewmembers are out on a combat sortie, their only concern is supporting the troops on the ground. “They are...the ones serving as the pointed end of the sword versus us playing a supporting role,” said Horner from Collingwood, Ontario.

“Coming out here is great,”



Maj. Scott Marshall, Capt. Chris Horner, Lt. Will Natynczyk, Sgt. Theresa McLaren and Master Cpl. Mark Keown

## Canadian AWACS crew in Iraq, 2010

**T**he accompanying article is deliberately cagey about which Southwest-Asian combat missions these Canadians are supporting. The article says their “current deployment ...*includes* supporting Operation Enduring Freedom and International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan.” This means they are *also* supporting *other, unspecified* operations.

Fortunately, there are dozens of references on official US Air Force (USAF) websites, in the first four months of 2010, which clearly state that the 965th EAACS squadron (which includes the “Canadian Component”) “also supports Operation Iraqi Free-

dom” (i.e., the Iraq War).<sup>1</sup>

said Lt. Will Natynczyk, an E-3 air weapons officer and 6.5-year veteran of the Canadian Forces. “It’s a great group and we laugh a lot.” [Will is related to Canada’s Chief of Defence Staff, Walt Natynczyk. See p. X.]

Sgt. Theresa McLaren, with more than 19 years in the Canadian Forces, [is] an E-3 air surveillance technician. [W]hen she’s talking to family about why she keeps doing what she’s doing, she gives a simple answer, “For the love of the game.”

“It’s truly exciting,” said Sgt. McClaren of Calgary, Alberta. “We do

dom” (i.e., the Iraq War).<sup>1</sup>

For example, many USAF articles about, and photographs of, the early-2010 deployment include the following, or similar statements: “The 965th EAACS, as part of the 380th AEW, supports operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.”<sup>2</sup>

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a lot of training...but when you do it for real and get that adrenaline rush... you go home with a lot of job satisfaction.”

“It doesn’t matter what uniform we are wearing—it’s interchangeable,” Marshall said. “We have a really great relationship with the American forces ... [N]o matter where we are, it’s very easy to get the job done as one team.”

**Source:** Excerpted from “Tinker’s Canadian airmen support airborne control in Southwest Asia,” Armed Forces News Service, February 11, 2010. [www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123189284](http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123189284)



# The Role of Canada's CC-130 aircraft in the Iraq War

By Richard Sanders, coordinator, Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade

On April 30, 2003, a comprehensive U.S. Air Force document called *Operation Iraqi Freedom: By the Numbers*,<sup>1</sup> revealed that Canada had taken part in the initial phase of the Iraq war by providing three "Hercules" CC-130 transport aircraft. The author, Lt. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, commander of Central Command Air Forces, provided a thorough review of all the U.S. and allied aircraft used during the first month of the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

## Deny, Deny, Deny

When confronted with General Moseley's report, the military officials and Canadian government representatives repeatedly denied that Canada had indeed supported the Iraq war with CC-130 aircraft. For instance, when the report was first quoted in the *Ottawa Citizen* on June 14, 2003, a public relations spokesperson for the Canadian Forces, Maj. Lynne Chaloux, denied the U.S. assertion and claimed:



## CC-130 "Hercules"

Canadian military transport aircraft  
"Workhorse" of the Canadian Air Force

"We supported [Operation] Enduring Freedom, the war on terrorism [in Afghanistan], not [Operation] Iraqi Freedom, the war in Iraq." (See *Citizen* article below, "Canada's planes flew in Iraq: says U.S.")

Two days later, the matter was raised in the Senate by a member of

the Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, the now-deceased Conservative Senator J. Michael Forrestall. He said:

"a U.S. general has written a report that reveals that Canada's three C-130 Hercules tactical transport aircraft took part in the U.S.-led war

## Canada's planes flew in Iraq: says U.S.

### Canadian Forces deny claim, say Americans have their wars mixed up

By David Pugliese

The U.S. military is crediting Canada's air force with taking part in the Iraq war by contributing three transport planes to support the American-led invasion force.

But Canadian Forces officials aren't exactly jumping at the kudos contained in a detailed U.S. air force study of the war, a conflict that Prime Minister Jean Chrétien insisted the country's military never took part in.

"Air operations used virtually all types of combat aircraft in the U.S. inventory," wrote U.S. air force Lt.-Gen. T. Michael Moseley in the report issued April 30 [2003]. "Coalition aircraft came from the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia."

Moseley, who compiled the report, *Operation Iraqi Freedom — By the Numbers*, helped oversee the

air portion of the war against Saddam Hussein's regime. He writes that his study was compiled with input from Canadian and allied officers. But Canadian military officials strenuously insist that no Canadian aircraft took part in the conflict and that the Americans have their wars mixed up.

Canadian military officials say the U.S. has confused Canada's contribution of three Hercules transport planes to the war on terrorism and missions in Afghanistan. "That report is erroneous," said Canadian Forces spokeswoman Maj. Lynne Chaloux. "We supported [Afghan Operation] Enduring Freedom, the war on terrorism, not Iraqi Freedom, the war in Iraq."

However, U.S. Air Force spokeswoman 2nd Lt. Sara Banda said that the study by Lt.-Gen. Moseley deals with only aircraft involved in or supporting the Iraqi campaign and did

not look at any contributions made for Afghanistan or the war on terrorism. Thirty-one Canadian military personnel took part in the Iraq war, according to Lt.-Gen. Moseley. His report covers operations from the opening attack on Baghdad on March 19 to April 18, a few days after the collapse of the Iraqi regime.

The claims made in Moseley's report are bound to raise questions, since Parliament was told that Canada would not join the U.S.-led military strike without United Nations backing.

During the war, some opposition MPs accused the government of quietly supporting the U.S.-led war after news broke that around 30 Canadian military personnel serving as exchange officers with U.S. and British units were involved in the conflict. Similar concerns were raised when it was revealed that Canadian warships in

on Iraq. Did the Canadian Forces C-130 Hercules aircraft or any other Canadian Force units take part in the U.S.-led war in Iraq?"<sup>3</sup>

In response, the Liberal government leader in the Senate, Sharon Carstairs, joined the denials. She contradicted the official U.S. Air Force report by simply quoting the denial that had been made by Canadian Forces's spokesperson, Major Chaloux, from that week's *Ottawa Citizen*. But, Senator Forrestall was not to be so easily pushed aside. He then made an official request for information, saying:

"To bring this controversy to an end, would the minister undertake to seek from [Defence] Minister McCallum an undertaking to bring forward, for tabling in this chamber, the pertinent extracts from the logs of those three Hercules aircraft so that there might be a public glimpse

the Persian Gulf were escorting U.S. supply vessels carrying equipment and ammunition for the war. Canadian Forces officials explained that the ships were involved in the war on terrorism and were protecting the American vessels from "terrorist" attacks.

Randy Mylyk, a spokesman for Defence Minister John McCallum, said he was not aware of Lt.-Gen. Moseley's report, but that it is highly unlikely Canadian planes would have been involved in the Iraq conflict. "I'm not aware of any and I'd be very surprised" if they had, he noted.

Maj. Chaloux said Canadian aircraft are now involved in humanitarian efforts in Iraq. A Hercules transport plane completed the first flight in bringing in relief aid on June 2.

Citing security and other reasons, Canada's military has declined to say where exactly its transport aircraft are based in the Persian Gulf.

**Source:** "Canada's planes flew in Iraq: U.S.," *Ottawa Citizen*, June 14, 2003, p.1.



Lt.-Gen. T. Michael Moseley, then-Commander of U.S. Central Command Air Forces, reported that Canada supplied CC-130 aircraft for the Iraq war. But Canadian Forces spokesperson Maj. Lynne Chaloux, and Government Leader in the Senate, Sheila Carstairs, vehemently denied it.

of just what the facts are?"<sup>4</sup>

Senator Carstairs readily agreed, saying she would "share the information...when it becomes available." This took almost four months. Finally, in October 2003, Carstairs tabled the following curt response to Forrestall's request for "the pertinent extracts from the logs of those three Hercules aircraft":

"No Canadian Forces (CF) aircraft took part in the Iraq conflict and the information provided by the U.S. military was confused with the CF's contribution of three Hercules transport planes to the international campaign against terrorism and missions in Afghanistan."<sup>5</sup>

This statement simply repeated the Liberal government's denial, which as the *Ottawa Citizen* had stated, claimed that the U.S. military simply made a mistake and got "their wars mixed up." This new denial did not provide any details whatsoever about the use of Canada's C-130s in Iraq, and it did not make any reference to the CC-130's flight logs which Forrestall had specially requested.

### The War is over, Long Live the War:

Although the Canadian government and its military vehemently denied U.S. reports that CC-130s had supported the "Iraq conflict," they did surprisingly admit that these large Canadian tactical transport planes were used in June 2003 to assist U.S. military

operations in Iraq.

This is an example of the kind of verbal sleight of hand that we must be wary of in official government and military statements. How can it be that Canadian CC-130s were *not* used as part of the U.S. war in Iraq, but *were* used in June 2003 to help further the U.S. military mission in Iraq? The official obfuscation of reality relies on a clever, legalistic use of terminology.

The initial phase of the U.S. war in Iraq was dubbed "Operation Iraqi Freedom" and it officially came to an end on May 1, 2003.<sup>6</sup> This date, therefore, was said to have marked the conclusion of the Iraq war. The U.S. pretence that its war in Iraq had ended so quickly, was absurd, but it was—nonetheless—conveniently adopted by Canada's Liberal government at the time. This is illustrated by a Canadian government media release of April 29, 2003. Entitled "Canada makes Further Contribution to Humanitarian and Reconstruction Efforts in Iraq," the statement begins

"Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announced today that Canada will expand the role of its three CC-130 Hercules aircraft currently in the Gulf region to support immediate humanitarian and reconstruction efforts in Iraq....

Canada is responding to U.S. requests for assistance in this *post-conflict* period and is assessing additional contributions to Iraq's reconstruction."<sup>7</sup> (Emphasis added.)

The ridiculous notion that the “conflict” in Iraq, let alone the war there, was over by the end of April 2003, is—of course—a complete and total farce. This reality aside, the “war-is-over” meme became part of the government’s official narrative about Iraq, and appeared in the Liberal government’s 2004 Budget which stated that “Restoring stability and aiding reconstruction in *post-conflict* states such as Afghanistan and Iraq has become more pressing.”<sup>8</sup> (Emphasis added.)

Predictably, this facade that Iraq was a “post-conflict state” was quickly adopted without question by many journalists in Canada’s mainstream corporate media. News reports such as the mid-June-2003 article in the *Ottawa Citizen* (see pp.34-35), repeatedly refer to the Iraq war in the past tense. The journalist even begins a sentence saying, “Almost a month after the war ended...”

The official mythology that the Iraq war would be over before it really even began, was promoted by Canada’s

Chief of the Defence Staff, Ray Henault, and his deputy, Vice Admiral Greg Maddison. According to Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang’s book, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*, Henault and Maddison told Defence Minister John McCallum that “the war would be very short, lasting no more than six weeks, with an air campaign of perhaps as little as five days.” This “six-week war scenario,” say Stein and Lang “was consistent with what McCallum had been told in Washington in early January” at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) which has “strong and active links with the Defence Department, the State Department, the National Security Council, and the CIA.” Stein and Lang, who describe this quick-war scenario as “staggeringly naïve, deeply ideological, and breathtakingly irresponsible,” assume that the U.S. and Canadian militaries honestly did not realise that the Iraq war would drag on for years. This assumption is in itself “staggeringly naïve.”

### This ain’t no War, it’s Post-conflict Humanitarian Relief

By building the myth that the Iraq war was already over, Canadian officials were then able to pretend that this country’s military efforts to assist the U.S. occupation of Iraq *after* June 1, were not contributions to an ongoing war, but were noble contributions to much-needed post-conflict humanitarian, re-building and reconstruction efforts. Using this obvious but clever deception, the Canadian government, it’s military and subservient media used an unbelievable, linguistic feint to cover up Canada’s ongoing involvement in the Iraq war. It was simultaneously used to paint the impression that Canada only became involved in Iraq in order to heroically solve “humanitarian” problems caused by the war.

The above-mentioned, April-2003 media release on “Humanitarian and Reconstruction Efforts” in the “post-conflict” Iraq, spearheads this

## Canada’s “humanitarian” Operation Iris: Transporting U.S. troops and machine guns to Iraq!

Canadian CC-130 “Hercules” military aircraft flew U.S. soldiers, their machine guns, semiautomatic and other weapons, a Hummer truck and unspecified “miscellaneous cargo” to Baghdad in June 2003. Prime Minister Chrétien said these flights were to “help meet the immediate needs of the Iraqi people.” Canada called it a “humanitarian” mission to “deliver reconstruction aid” to “post-conflict” Iraq.



Source: Canada’s Air Force. [www.airforce.forces.gc.ca](http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca)

Photo by: Cpl. Henry Wall

Image: APD03-0659-50



official narrative. Stretching credulity to the utmost limits, Prime Minister Chretien was quoted in the April 2003 media release as saying:

“Canada is pleased to make this further contribution to help meet the immediate needs of the Iraqi people,” and “We will continue working closely with the international community to determine how best Canada can help Iraq build a future that is secure and stable.”

Pugliese’s *Ottawa Citizen* article also puts forward the ludicrous government claim that continuing Canadian CC-130 flights into Iraq were not part of the war effort but were actually “humanitarian” in nature. The article, dated June 14, 2003, reports that Canadian Forces spokesperson Major Lynne Chaloux said “Canadian aircraft are now involved in humanitarian efforts in Iraq.”<sup>10</sup>

This official narrative is also reported unquestioningly when the reporter states that Canadian Hercules transport planes “completed the first

flight in bringing in relief aid on June 2 [2003].” There is—of course—no evidence presented by the government, military or the media that these Canadian CC-130 flights provided any “relief” or “aid” whatsoever. Based on the evidence available, the opposite is more likely true, namely, that these flights actually aided and abetted the U.S. war against Iraq and precipitated further public suffering and an even greater need for “humanitarian” assistance.

### Operation Iris: Transporting U.S. Weapons and Warriors into Iraq

The Canadian military does admit that it used CC-130s to move U.S. troops and supplies into Iraq, beginning on June 2, 2003. These flights were code named “Operation Iris.” The Canadian military’s “Mission/Operation Notes” for Iris state:

”After the first Gulf War, more than a decade of UN-approved sanctions,

and then the American-led invasion of March 2003, Iraq required considerable reconstruction. On 29 April the Canadian government approved the delivery of aid to the country.”<sup>11</sup>

In this way, Canadian military support for the U.S. campaign in Iraq was disguised as a peaceful effort to help the Iraqi people to recover from a deadly, decade-long economic blockade, followed by the war that began in 2003. (Left unmentioned, of course, was Canada’s leading role in enforcing the deadly U.S./UN blockade of Iraq during the 1990s that killed some 225,000 Iraqi children.<sup>12</sup>)

Operation Iris was documented by Canadian Forces photographer Cpl. Henry Wall and is described on its official website. As the only concrete, publicly-available evidence regarding “Operation Iris,” Wall’s photographs are worth studying. They certainly do not give the impression that “Iris” was a “humanitarian effort” designed to in any way bring much-needed “relief aid”



**B**esides carrying U.S. soldiers and weapons into Iraq, Canadian CC-130 transport planes shipped other military supplies to aid and abet the Iraq war. For example, on June 2, 2003, during the first flight of Operation Iris, Canada flew this U.S. Hummer Cargo/Troop Carrier from Kuwait to Iraq. This was done in the name of promoting “humanitarian, reconstruction and stability efforts in Iraq.” This thin cover was accepted as fact by Canadian media.

**Source:** Cpl. Henry Wall, website of the Canadian Air Force. <[www.airforce.gc.ca](http://www.airforce.gc.ca)> Images: APD03-0659-36, APD03-0659-71



**C**anadian pilot Paul Anderson (left) and flight engineer Colin McDonald (right), are shown here in the cockpit of a CC-130 as they flew U.S. soldiers,

weapons and supplies into Baghdad, Iraq, during Operation Iris, on June 2, 2003. These and other Canadian Air Force personnel were living and working at an undisclosed Canadian military base in the Persian Gulf region, likely “Camp Mirage” near Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates.

**Source:** Cpl. Henry Wall, website of the Canadian Air Force. <[www.airforce.gc.ca](http://www.airforce.gc.ca)> Image: APD03-0658-06

## Canada's role in Iraq called "humanitarian, reconstruction & stability" effort

*This media release from June 3, 2003, was issued by Canadian Forces (CF) Southwest Asia Theatre Support Base at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, home of U.S. Central Command. CENTCOM wages U.S. wars in the Middle East and Central Asia.*

On 2 June [2003], a Canadian Forces CC-130 "Hercules" transport aircraft completed the first Canadian flight in support of the reconstruction of Iraq. The aircraft comes from the Tactical Airlift Detachment deployed in the Arabian Gulf area on Operation Apollo. It transported eight passengers and a load of miscellaneous cargo including a truck and trailer from Kuwait to Baghdad, Iraq.

"The Government of Canada announced on 29 April [2003] that Canada would expand the role of its three CC-130 Hercules aircraft deployed in the Gulf region to support humanitarian, reconstruction and stability efforts in Iraq," said General Ray

Henault, Chief of the Defence Staff. "We are very proud of the exceptional work being done by the men and women serving with the Tactical Airlift Detachment."

"This is the first of a series of flights that will involve Canadian support to Iraq reconstruction," said Brig.-Gen. [Dennis] Tabbernor, Commander of the Canadian Joint Task Force Southwest Asia. "The 1,000 CF members deployed in southwest Asia


"Operation Iris is the CF [Canadian Forces] contribution to the humanitarian, reconstruction and stability efforts in Iraq."

are eager to contribute to the ongoing efforts to improve the conditions in Iraq. They will do their utmost to airlift, as often as possible,

the loads of goods required in Iraq." Operation Iris is the CF contribution to the humanitarian, reconstruction and stability efforts in Iraq.

**Source:** Media release, "First Canadian flight in support of the reconstruction of Iraq," June 3, 2003. [www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?cat=00&id=1096](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?cat=00&id=1096)

"The 1,000 CF [Canadian Forces] members deployed in southwest Asia are eager to contribute to the ongoing efforts to improve the conditions in Iraq. They will do their utmost to airlift, as often as possible, the loads of goods required in Iraq."



Brig.-Gen.  
Dennis Tabbernor  
Commander,  
Canadian Joint Task Force  
Southwest Asia

to Iraq's devastated population.

The stated "Mission Mandate" of "Operation Iris" was "To deliver reconstruction aid to Iraq." Canada's Department of National Defence (DND) describes this operation as "the CF contribution to the humanitarian, reconstruction and stability efforts in Iraq."<sup>13</sup> Further details about this operation appear in captions associated with Cpl. Wall's photographs. Some of the photos note that the operation's first flight transported "eight passengers and a load of miscellaneous cargo including a truck and trailer from Kuwait to Baghdad, Iraq."<sup>14</sup> One photograph shows some 18 battle-ready U.S. ground troops waiting to board Canadian CC-130s. The U.S. soldiers' weapons include pistols in thigh-holsters and 5.56mm-calibre, semi-automatic M16 rifles.<sup>15</sup> Also visible are two M249 Squad Automatic Weapon Systems, on bipods. These fully-auto-

matic 5.56mm-calibre machine guns fire up to 1000 bullets per minute<sup>16</sup> and are not generally known among reputable development agencies as standard operating equipment during "humanitarian efforts" or for dispersing "relief aid."

The photographs also show a U.S. Hummer. This M1038 Cargo/Troop Carrier is a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV or Humvee). It is "equipped with basic armor and used to transport equipment, materials and/or personnel."<sup>17</sup> Like the various weapons systems that Canadian warplanes were transporting into Iraq during "Operation Iris," Hummers are not known for their use in "humanitarian" or "relief aid" operations.

None of the available photographs, captions or descriptions of "Operation Iris" on the Canadian Forces website give any explanation of

how U.S. soldiers and their weapons could be construed as "relief aid." Many people in Iraq, having just suffered a massive aerial bombardments and an invasion led by U.S. troops, were no doubt in need of humanitarian assistance. It is unknown whether "Operation Iris" also included the movement of food, medical supplies and other useful materials for distribution to victims of the U.S.-led war. If this were the case, wouldn't the Canadian Forces' public relations staff have shown us photos or some descriptions of these materials? Instead, we are treated to only the vaguest descriptions of other items transported by Canada's CC-130s, such as "a load of miscellaneous cargo."

The government's April 29, 2003 media release about "Humanitarian and Reconstruction Efforts" in "post-conflict" Iraq, also claimed that Canada had "already committed more



than \$100 million to humanitarian efforts in Iraq.” Considering that the use of Canada’s CC-130s to transport U.S. troops and their weapons was also described as a “humanitarian” operation, one can only wonder exactly how much of that \$100 million was, in actuality, just Canada playing its part in aiding and abetting the American-led war in Iraq.

### Timeframe for CC-130 Missions in Iraq

Lt. Gen. T. Michael Moseley’s U.S. Air Force report, *Operation Iraqi Freedom: By the Numbers*,<sup>18</sup> revealing that three Canadian CC-130s aided the war in Iraq, only covered the first 30 days of the campaign, i.e., between March 19 and April 18, 2003.

The Canadian Forces description of Operation Iraqi Freedom, which it says spanned from March 19 to June 1, 2003, includes this statement:

“Canadian CC-130 Hercules, deployed in the Persian Gulf in support of Operation Apollo were temporarily diverted from supporting that operation to supporting Operation Iris in Iraq.”<sup>19</sup>

This indicates that Operation Iris was in fact part of Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, there is a discrepancy in this scant, Canadian military documentation regarding Operation Iris. The official online description of Operation Iris states that it took place between June 2 and 4, 2003, i.e., immediately *after* Operation Iraqi Freedom had concluded.

The Canadian government media release of April 29, 2003, suggests that Canada’s CC-130 flights into Iraq may also have taken place in May 2003. The statement begins by saying that “Canada will expand the role of its three CC-130 Hercules aircraft currently in the Gulf region to support *immediate*...efforts in Iraq.”<sup>20</sup> (Emphasis added.) It seems unlikely that the government would issue a media release saying its CC-130 military aircraft were going to “support immediate ...efforts in Iraq,” and then wait over a month, until June 2-3, before getting into gear. This suggests that CC-130 flights were probably taking place in May 2003.

We also know that on June 14, 2003, the *Ottawa Citizen* reported that CF spokesperson Major Chaloux said



Colonel Michel Latouche

## Canadian CC-130 Pilot flew missions in the Iraq War, 2003

In 2002, when Michel Latouche was promoted to Lt. Col., he became Commander of 435 “Chinthe” Squadron in Winnipeg. As such, he flew CC-130 “Hercules” on missions which employed these aircraft in their three main roles: (a) the transport of troops and cargo, (b) the air-to-air refuelling of fighter planes and (c) search and rescue. His 2002-2003 tour of duty “included a deployment to the Persian Gulf with Operation Apollo and Operation Athena with missions to Afghanistan and Iraq.”

### Southwest Asia Service Medal

His decorations include the “Southwest Asia Service Medal for his role in Operation Apollo in 2003.”<sup>1</sup> One side of this medal depicts the Queen, while the other shows

“the mythical figure of Hydra, a many-headed serpent of Greek mythology described as a multifarious evil.... The Hydra is transfixed by a Canadian sword and over the design is the Latin phrase, ‘ADVERSUS MALUM PUGNAMUS’ - ‘We are fighting evil.’”<sup>2</sup>

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“Canadian aircraft are now involved in humanitarian efforts in Iraq.”<sup>21</sup> (Emphasis added.) Use of the word “now” in this statement indicates that the CC-130 flights discussed in this article were still ongoing almost two weeks after Operation Iris was officially supposed to have ended.

All this seems to indicate pretty clearly that Canadian CC-130s were probably flying missions into Iraq throughout March, April, May and June 2003.

And, in the government’s June 3, 2003, media release about CC-130 missions into Iraq, Brig.-Gen. Dennis Tabbernor, the Commander of the Canadian Joint Task Force Southwest Asia proudly described the participation of Canada’s military in the Iraq theatre. In particular, he extolled Canadian “Hercules” transport crews and suggested that their efforts were part of a robust and ongoing Canadian commitment to the U.S. effort in Iraq.

“The 1,000 CF members deployed in southwest Asia are eager to contribute to the ongoing efforts to improve the conditions in Iraq. They will do their utmost to airlift, as often as possible, the loads of goods required in Iraq.”<sup>22</sup>

This did not give the impression that Canada CC-130 flights would end anytime soon. On the contrary, his statement conveyed the sense that this Canadian contribution was sure to continue and that it would be contribute as much as possible. There has been no follow up media release from the government announcing that this contribution was winding down.

### Ongoing CC130 Missions

Because of strong public opposition to participation in the Iraq war, the Canadian government was very cagey about what it would reveal regarding such things as its CC-130 transport missions ferrying U.S. warriors and their weapons into Iraq. And, just as Canada’s lead naval role in the Iraq war was disguised by the government using parlance that described it as being part of Operation Enduring Freedom against terrorism in Afghanistan, so too were Canada’s CC-130 flights covered up in this same manner.

Of course, the Canadian gov-

ernment has also been extremely careful in crafting its wordsmithing to conceal ongoing military contributions to the Iraq war. One of the ways it has done this, in the context of CC-130 flights, is to say that Canada’s military transport missions are carried out in the CENTCOM area of operations, “including Afghanistan.” For instance, on its webpage extolling the CC-130, Canada’s Department of National Defence says:

“By the end of Operation Apollo, in October 2003, these [CC-130] aircraft had transported some 6,000 passengers and more than 6.8 million kilograms (about 15 million pounds) of freight to destinations in the theatre of operations, *including Afghanistan*.”<sup>23</sup> (Emphasis added.)

This is an oblique reference to CC-130 flights into Iraq.

Another such wink and nod to Canada’s CC-130 missions in Iraq is found in a military document called “The Canadian Forces’ Contribution to the International Campaign Against Terrorism.” In describing Canada’s Tactical Airlift Detachment (TAL Det), it says:

“The mission of the TAL Det is to support coalition forces by transporting military personnel, equipment and cargo between destinations in the theatre of operations, *including Afghanistan*. The versatile CC-130 Hercules is ideal for this mission: it can lift a 16,000-kg payload, and land safely with a full load on a basic airstrip only about as long as three football fields.”<sup>24</sup> (Emphasis added.)

After the incident with General Moseley when the U.S. Air Force and Canadian officials contradicted each other about Canada’s supply of CC-130s to the war in Iraq, the American military became much more obligingly careful not to reveal further examples of Canadian participation. This was no doubt done to help protect the Canadian government’s need to publicly pretend that it wasn’t involved in the Iraq war. The coverup was reflected, for instance, in frequent U.S. Central Command Air Force (CENTAF) media releases describing coalition contributions to the air war in Iraq. After

releasing General Moseley’s *Operation Iraqi Freedom: By the Numbers*, CENTAF began issuing daily air power summaries.<sup>25</sup> These daily reports detailed the support that American forces received from allied countries in the Iraq and Afghan wars. Hundreds of these daily reports since 2003 contain statements about Canada’s CC-130 flights. However, none of these statements reveal which of the two wars Canadian CC-130s were supporting. Instead, readers are repeatedly given statements like

“Coalition C-130 crews from Canada...flew in support of either OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] or OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom, i.e., the Afghan war].”

It was clearly not in U.S. interests to reveal information about Canada’s role in Iraq that would alienate allied governments like the Liberal one in Canada that was contributing as much as it possibly could to the Iraq war, while at the same time trying to maintaining the public illusion that it was not involved at all.

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APD03-0562-40  
19 March 2003  
Arabian Gulf Region

Corporal Chris Milne, a member of the Op Apollo's Tactical Airlift Detachment (Tal Det), sits at the air navigator work station of a CC-130 Hercules aircraft while it is on the ground for maintenance. He uses a check list during maintenance work on the chaff and flares systems on the aircraft.

The mission of the TAL Det is to support coalition forces by transporting military personnel, equipment and cargo between destinations in the theatre of operations, including Afghanistan. Op Apollo is Canada's military contribution to the international campaign against terrorism.

<http://www.forceaerienne.forces.gc.ca/v2/netpub/index-eng.asp?rid=2278-APD03-0562-40>

Canadian CP-140 “Aurora” spy planes gathered intelligence for the U.S. military during the first four months of the Iraq War in 2003.



## *The Hunt for Moving Targets, from Submarines to Subversives: The 2003 Iraq War as Turning Point in the Evolution of Missions for Canada’s CP-140s*

By Richard Sanders, coordinator, Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade

In March 2003, NDP Leader Jack Layton said that, despite claims to the contrary, Canada *was* involved in the war on Iraq. He called for Canadian troops to be withdrawn and charged that Canada CP-140 “Aurora” spy planes were supplying information used in U.S. attacks:

“We think there’s a very strong likelihood that that information is used to assist in the bombing, that Canadians are complicit as a result, and our government is complicit.”<sup>1</sup>


Soon thereafter, Conservative Senator J. Michael Forrestall raised the issue, though without the demand that Canadian troops be recalled from Iraq. “Honourable senators,” Forrestall said, “a week ago it was reported that our Aurora maritime patrol aircraft in the Persian Gulf were feeding the Americans direct intelligence on Iraqi naval movements.”<sup>2</sup> His point, as always, was to expose Liberal government hypocrisy in denying Canada’s involvement in the Iraq war. He, like other Conservatives, was not demanding that Canadian Forces, like the CP-140 crews, be brought home, but just that they be recognised and honoured for their role in the Iraq War.

What is the CP-140 Aurora? Built by U.S. war-industry behemoth, Lockheed, the Aurora is described as Canada’s strategic Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance aircraft. This long-range military patrol plane is equipped with a variety of high-tech electronic imaging devices and target tracking systems that are designed to supply the data used by warships, land forces and other warplanes to carry out their bombing and attack missions.

Canada’s CP-140—a variant of

*“We think there’s a very strong likelihood that that information is used to assist in the bombing, that Canadians are complicit as a result, and our government is complicit.”*

*Jack Layton, NDP Leader*



the U.S. Navy’s P-3 Orion—was originally designed and used during the Cold War to find and destroy the latest stealth submarines. However, because of the change in perceived threats and the fact that it can fly over 9200 km without refuelling, the aircraft has been “ideal for an evolving variety of operations.”<sup>3</sup>

In mid-February 2003, CBC News Online reported that there was “a detachment of Canadian Aurora maritime patrol aircraft” based in the

United Arab Emirates (UAE), a small country on the Persian Gulf. These Canadian warplanes, “operating from the Al Dhafra air base, have been helping enforce UN shipping sanctions against Iraq.”<sup>4</sup> According to Major Neil Tabbenor, when he and other Canadian Aurora personnel were deployed to the Persian Gulf, they were based in Dubai, UAE, and worked out of Canada’s elusive “Camp Mirage.”<sup>5</sup>

The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which projects America’s military might throughout the Middle East and Central Asia, mentions CP-140s in its description of Canada’s role in the so-called “War on Terror.” CENTCOM explains that “two CP-140 Aurora long-range surveillance and maritime patrol aircraft with about 200 Air Force personnel, including flight crews and support personnel” were deployed to the Persian Gulf between December 27, 2001, and June 19, 2003.<sup>6</sup> This document goes on to explain that the primary mission of Canada’s Long-Range Patrol Detachment (LRP Det.) was to

“deliver reconnaissance and surveillance support to the maritime coalition forces. The CP-140 Aurora extended the surveillance range of maritime coalition forces to areas not accessible to ship-borne radar, and Aurora crews typically gathered information well before ships’ radar operators could. Aurora crews also contributed to the security of



coalition forces by watching for vessels of interest....

The Auroras are equipped with a sensor array that includes forward-looking infrared cameras, digital cameras and conventional radar. With speed, endurance and range of coverage, the Auroras and their crews kept a watchful eye on the myriad of surface vessels operating in the Arabian Gulf and the Arabian Sea.<sup>77</sup>

Richard Gimblett, "Command Historian of the Canadian Navy," notes that the "CF Aurora long-range patrol aircraft flew 507 missions, for a total of 4,375 hours" during the 530 days of their mission under Operation Apollo.<sup>8</sup>

This is also confirmed by the official Canadian Air Force website which states that CP-140 aircraft were deployed to "the Persian Gulf from late 2001 to mid-2003" where they "flew 500 air patrol sorties as part of Canada's role in the international campaign against terrorism."<sup>9</sup>

### Supporting America's 5th Fleet in the "War on Terror"

Canadian Forces' photographs of CP-140s in the Persian Gulf just before the official start of the Iraq War in March 2003, have captions that sum up the role of Canada's Long Range Patrol Detachment (LRP Det.) in America's so-called War on Terror. For example:

"LRP Det. members provide maritime surveillance support and intelligence-gathering in support of Operation Apollo, Canada's military contribution to the Campaign Against Terrorism."<sup>10</sup>

"The mission of the LRP Det is to work with the U.S. Navy 5th Fleet to deliver reconnaissance and surveillance support to the U.S.-led maritime coalition forces."<sup>11</sup>

According to its official website, the mission of the American Navy's 5th Fleet is to conduct

"persistent maritime operations to forward U.S. interests, deter and counter disruptive countries, defeat violent extremism and strengthen partner nations' maritime capabilities."<sup>12</sup>



From under the wing of a CP-140 "Aurora," several CC-130 "Hercules" are seen in the background. This photograph was taken on April 4, 2003, at an undisclosed location in the "Arabian Gulf Region" (likely at Canada's "Camp Mirage," UAE).

To this end, the 5th Fleet oversees all U.S. naval forces and their military operations. These operations are carried out as if the U.S. and its allies had complete and total impunity from the laws of the 27 countries fronting on "2.5 million square miles of water area" in the Central Command so-called "area of responsibility." Under the 5th Fleet's self-anointed jurisdiction are the "Arabian Gulf, Red Sea, Gulf of Oman and parts of the Indian Ocean."<sup>13</sup> Its self-described mission includes "Combat Operations" which are defined in this way

"Maritime forces maintain the capability to project power ashore, to conduct sustained combat operations in support of coalition land commanders, provide air support to multinational forces on the ground as well as conduct long range strikes with aircraft and Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missiles against enemy targets."<sup>14</sup>

Among the 5th Fleet's most regular activities are what they euphemistically call Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO). A subcategory of these are so-called Leadership Interdiction Operations (LIO).

In a 2003 paper on "The Perception versus the Reality of Canadian Military Involvement in the Iraq War," professor Sean Maloney—an avid militarist at Canada's Royal Military College—noted that the "initial Canadian contribution" to the Afghan War's "Operation Enduring Freedom" in-

cluded not only "six ships (four frigates, a destroyer and a support ship)" and "three C-130 transport aircraft," but also a "pair of Aurora maritime patrol aircraft." "These forces," he says, were "operating alongside coalition forces" to conduct "leadership interdiction operations... to prevent Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders from escaping by sea."<sup>15</sup>

Maloney, however, does not discuss the important issue of "double-hatting" which refers to how these Canadian operations were clearly designed to assist both the Afghan War and war against Iraq. (For more details on Canada's role in Persian Gulf naval operations that were intent on the capture and "rendition" of Iraqi suspects to U.S. custody in early 2003, see p.X.)

The involvement of Canadian CP-140s in these naval interdiction operations is confirmed in a report for the U.S. Congress by the Congressional Research Service. This report, which provides a list of Canadian contributions to the War on Terrorism, notes that "Two CP 140 Aurora aircraft are conducting MIO/LIO operations as part of Carrier Task Force [CTF] 57."<sup>16</sup> CTF 57 is the "Maritime Patrol Force" of the U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet. Although its basic goal is to conduct "maritime surveillance and reconnaissance operations region wide,"<sup>17</sup> this mission has been changing as the spy technologies aboard these aircraft have continued to advance.

## The Operational Shift from Sea to Land Operations

The evolving nature of CTF-57 operations became especially apparent during the opening salvos of the Iraq war.

“In March 2003, CTF-57 demonstrated groundbreaking employment of [Maritime Patrol Reconnaissance Aircraft] MPRA aircraft overland [in] Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. P-3s [the U.S. equivalent of Canada’s CP-140s] flew armed surveillance and reconnaissance missions, both overland and in maritime roles.”<sup>18</sup>

This “overland” use of MPRA aircraft is also discussed in a September 2003 article celebrating the CTF-57’s role in Iraq. In this article, “Journalist 1st Class” Dennis J.Herring, from 5th Fleet Public Affairs, says the CTF 57’s

“two primary missions are supporting ground troops in Iraq and performing [Operation Iraqi Freedom] OIF maritime interception operations (MIO) as part of the coalition’s effort to stop illegal smuggling of oil.”

He then quotes the CTF-57’s deputy commander, Capt. David Mitchell, who explains that the Task Force’s

“overland mission has been primarily in support of Marine Corps troops on the ground, but also Army... During these missions, we usually have one of their officers ride along and communicate with

the troops on the ground.”<sup>19</sup> And as Air Warfare Systems Operator 2nd Class, Cheryl Campbell explained, airborne camera operators aboard P-3s now “have the ability to watch ground operations, and relay information to the troops about activity in the area.”<sup>20</sup>

Clearly, 2003 was a watershed moment for the overland use of these “maritime” aircraft. As the Commander of CTF-57 Public Affairs said “The mission of the P-3 has evolved even further inland during this conflict, and has continued to make the Orion the ‘asset of choice’ for real time imagery that Marine units need for success on the battlefield.... As new targets or potential targets would emerge... the P-3 provides a mix of imagery [including] high resolution infrared images which provide the ‘big picture’ to those on the ground....

The P-3 continues to move forward and evolve as a package, giving the operational commander flexibility and options for both target identification and neutralizing threats to ground forces.”<sup>21</sup>

According to documents obtained by the NDP in 2006, upgrades to the sensor technology aboard Canadian CP-140s had already been done to allow these sorts of new, land-surveillance operations to assist military units fighting on the ground.

“Auroras have been fitted with up-

graded equipment that will allow the airplanes to conduct increased and more detailed surveillance over land.

Using the aircraft for overland intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance is a new role for Auroras, say the documents, which note the planes may need an army liaison officer to be part of the on-board crew.”<sup>22</sup>

These enhancements to Canada’s fleet of CP-140s were part of the \$1.67 billion Aurora Incremental Modernization Project (AIMP) which began in 1998. Among many other additions and improvements to the CP-140, the AIMP has included:


- Upgrades to navigation and flight instruments (CMC Electronics),
- New electro-optical and infrared sensors (L-3 Communications),
- New MX-20 long-range multisensor imaging system with electro-optical, laser-illuminated, see-in-the-dark surveillance cameras<sup>23</sup> (L-3 Wescam),
- APS-508 radar project which integrates maritime patrol and overland air-to-ground, Synthetic-Aperture Radar/Ground Moving Target Indicator<sup>24</sup> (MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd., and Alliant Tech Systems).

Probably the most important phase of AIMP began in 2003. That’s when they began to add

“a new airborne radar surveillance solution... [to] give Canada’s fleet [of CP-140s] the ability able to detect, track, and image objects moving on land as well as at sea.”<sup>25</sup>

Armed with this and other new ground-breaking “over-land” technology, Canada began using CP-140s in Afghanistan in 2009. This “deployment of the Auroras and their highly specialized sensor equipment,” said Defence Minister Peter MacKay, “will produce valuable digital aerial imagery to improve awareness of the situation on the ground for deployed Canadian Forces and allied troops.”<sup>26</sup>

Lt.-General Angus Watt, Chief of Canada’s Air Force, also commented on this expanded role for the CP-140 by saying that the deployment of Auroras to Afghanistan “represents an expansion from its long-time role of maritime patrol.”<sup>27</sup>



Corp. Chris Buglar, from 14 Wing Greenwood, NS, a member of the Long-Range Patrol Detachment (LRP Det), washes a CP-140 Aurora at an undisclosed air base in the “Arabian Gulf Region,” probably Canada’s “Camp Mirage” in the UAE.

The caption for this photo on the Canadian Forces website notes that: “The mission of the LRP Det is to work with the US Navy 5th Fleet to deliver reconnaissance and surveillance support to the US-led maritime coalition forces.”

Source: Canadian Forces photo by Corp. Henry Wall, Feb. 12, 2003. APD03-0512-15

See photogra

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## The CP-140s Latest Targets: Domestic “Security” in Vancouver and Toronto

The CP-140’s warfighting role has continued to expand and evolve for decades. It has been used to track Russian submarines, to pursue elusive Iraqi leaders fleeing aboard ships in the Persian Gulf, and to target insurgents fighting the occupation of Afghanistan. Now there is a new target in the Aurora’s sights. Canada’s CP-140s have most recently been used to carry out surveillance work during two huge domestic operations within Canada, namely, at the Winter Olympics and during the G8-G20 extravaganzas.

The first of these—Operation Podium—took place during the Olympic/Paralympic games, in February and March 2010. Canada’s Air Force has described Op Podium as “the most complex domestic operation ever undertaken in Canada,” and says it was “the largest [Canadian Forces] CF and Air Force deployment in recent memory.”<sup>28</sup> It was also “the first time in Canada” that “video streaming from CP-140” was “operationalised,” i.e., used in a “real world” operation outside a military exercise. And, the


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Battle tested over Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan, CP-140 spy planes flew over the 2010 protests in Vancouver and Toronto. As the VP of Canada’s L3 Wescam proudly reports, they provided “persistent surveillance in an overview capability to keep an eye out for **anyone who might want to cause trouble.**”

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Air Force describes it as a “world first,” in terms of using “integrated data links from the Air Force, Navy and [Canadian NORAD Region] CANR, as well as the U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force and U.S. Coast Guard, into one coherent air and maritime picture.”<sup>29</sup>

Cutting through such technical descriptions, the vice president of Canada’s L-3 Wescam—which makes high-tech spy cameras and sensors for the CP-140—summed up its role at



CP-140 “Aurora” Spy Plane over Toronto, June 27, 2010, during the G8-G20 protests



**MX-20 Imaging Turret**  
Combining highly accurate gyro-stabilization with multiple, high-magnification, day and night vision sensors, this long-range imaging system is mounted under the nose of the CP-140. It contains electro-optical, laser-illuminated, see-in-the-dark surveillance cameras. It is manufactured by L3 Wescam in Burlington, Ontario.

the Olympics in this way:

“They were used at the Winter Olympics in Vancouver this year providing persistent surveillance in an overview capability to keep an eye out for anyone who might want to cause trouble.”<sup>30</sup>

A few months later, the CP-140 was at it again, this time over the turbulent downtown streets of Toronto, during protests against the G8-G20 summit. On June 26<sup>31</sup> and June 27,<sup>32</sup> an Aurora aircraft was seen continuously circling over Toronto’s core as thousands of citizens assembled to express opposition to government policies, including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

(See photograph on page X.) An Aurora was also spotted flying nearby over Burlington and Hamilton, Ontario, on June 23,<sup>33</sup> as excessive security restrictions descended upon the citizens of the entire region.

The CP-140 that was on the lookout over Toronto was part of what the military called Operation Cadence. Col Eyre, Commander of a Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group at Canadian Forces Base Petawawa, described it as “the largest security operation in the history of Canada.”<sup>34</sup> It was also a

first, say Maj. Kael Rennie and Capt. Matt Crosbie, in that “a Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) saw its first ever major domestic operation in Canada.” This was unusual, they continue, because

“Normal TACP duties included the employment of fixed wing and attack helicopters in the employment of air-to-ground munitions. While that works well in Afghanistan, it was obviously not the desired effect for the G8/G20.”<sup>35</sup>

Canada’s new, battle-tested technology is referred to as the “Overland Equipment Mission Suite” and the “Tactical Common DataLink.” Using cameras affixed to CP-140s, these new systems provide “full motion video imagery” for the immediate use of army and/or police units on the ground, whether they are battling the Taliban or ban-the-bomb protesters. As Major CMR Larsen puts it:

“In plain speak: the Aurora can now use its powerful camera system efficiently, and while airborne can actually transmit video to a supported unit.... What we can see from the air, a tactical commander can see on the ground. It is not hard to imagine how this capability greatly adds to the ‘big picture’ required by operational commanders.”<sup>36</sup>

Note to  
the 19

ph on page X.



In an even 'bigger picture' view of this 'technological advancement,' what this means is that the militarization of policing in Canada is reaching phenomenally new heights.

The CP-140 overflying the highly-militarised \$1 billion response to protests in Toronto was operating out of a Canadian Forces Base (CFB) in Trenton, Ontario. Two RCMP officers very-happily took turns working 12-hour shifts doing "air services" aboard the CP-140. As RCMP Cpl. Bob Thomas describes it:

"We did flight observation for the security on the ground.... Just before both Summits started I moved to CFB Trenton and did all my flying from there as the Summits were going on."<sup>37</sup>

Thomas was chosen for the job because of his experience with "aerial flight observation and infrared camera training." He was

"one of just two RCMP officers assigned to fly with the...surveillance aircraft, a CP-140 Aurora. It was that opportunity that Thomas found most memorable. 'It was an awesome experience.'"<sup>38</sup>

### What's Next?

The "good old days" when Canada's CP-140 Auroras were used primarily for hunting Soviet submarines, have long gone. The Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance technology that appeared aboard America's P-3 Orion warplanes during the 2003 Iraq war, is now being used by Canadian CP-140 versions of these long-range patrol aircraft to conduct overland missions in rural Afghan warzones and the quasi-war zones of urban Toronto.

The dramatic evolution from the CP-140s role in "leadership interdiction" missions over the Persian Gulf in the early 2000s to their "leadership protection" missions above Toronto's summit meetings in 2010, took a dramatic turn in 2003 due to "advances" in airborne surveillance technologies that occurred during the height of the air war against Iraq. Canada's military caught the wave of those "advances" and is now riding it rapidly forward aboard modernized, battle-hardened CP-140s.

What does this bode for the

future use of CP-140s in foreign wars and domestic operations? There is definitely a cross-fertilisation occurring between Canada's military and police forces. The technologically-enhanced experiences of warriors who use airborne surveillance platforms like the CP-140 while fighting insurgents in foreign battlezones is being increasingly used to enhance and inform major "homeland security" operations against dissidents on Canadian streets. Canada's Air Force says it is planning to "capitalise" on this cross-fertilisation:

"With the wrap up of Op Cadence, the 9-member [Tactical Air Control Party] TACP team will dissolve and each member will return to their home units. The Air Force, however, is planning to expand the capability of the TACPs within each Brigade beginning in the summer of 2010 in order to capitalize on the hard-earned successes not only in the skies and on the battlefields of Afghanistan but also here at home in Canada."<sup>39</sup>

The Canadian crews who operate CP-140 Auroras at the Comox Air Force Base on Vancouver Island, BC, aptly call themselves the "Demon Squadron." In their "vision" statement, they recognize the changing nature of the CP-140's role, saying: "The Demons will be leaders in a dynamic environment. In our quest for excellence, we will embrace and pursue technological change."<sup>40</sup> And, in their Mission statement, Canada's "Demon" warriors express their willingness to embrace that future wherever it leads:

"The 407 Demon Squadron mission is to provide regional, national and expeditionary commanders with a rapidly deployable, self-sufficient, combat [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance] ISR and [Anti-Submarine Warfare] ASW attack capability to enable them to project air power at home and abroad."

Finally, as the "Demon's Creed" concludes:

"The Demons are proud warriors.... We are the eyes, ears and fists of commanders over the land and sea.... We are proud to be recognized as Demons."<sup>41</sup>

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## Not Just a Spy Plane



Toronto International  
Air Show,  
September 4, 2005.

A CP-140  
with  
wide-open  
weapons-bay  
doors.

## The "Aurora's" Weapons Capabilities

By Richard Sanders, coordinator, Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade

The Canadian Air Force website lists the following "weapons systems" used by CP-140s: "Mark 46 Mod. V anti-submarine torpedoes; signal chargers; smoke markers; illumination flares."<sup>1</sup> This official military source then notes that the CP-140 can "be retrofitted to carry anti-ship air-to-surface missiles."<sup>2</sup>

Other online sources state that the CP-140 "can be fitted after a minor retrofit" to carry "air-to-surface rockets or conventional bombs. Virtually any armament cleared for use on the P-3 series can be fitted for use based on airframe similarities."<sup>3</sup>

(The P-3 "Orion" is the U.S. Long Range Patrol aircraft from which Canada's CP-140s are derived, and they are "virtually identical externally."<sup>4</sup>)

The fact that CP-140s can carry the same variety of weapons as P-3s is also indicated by the type of "weapon shackles" that these two aircraft employ. These "shackles" or "bomb racks" inside CP-140 bomb bays, are the pylons to which weapons are affixed or mounted during flight. These racks allow bombs to be "safely" and efficiently dropped from the aircraft. The Canadian CP-140 "Bomb bay uses BRU-12A Weapon shackles;

Bomb bay and wing stations [are] fitted with BRU-15A shackles."<sup>4</sup> These two varieties of BRUs (Bomb Release Units) are also used aboard America's P-3 "Orion" warplanes.<sup>5</sup>

A 1987 source on weapons systems states that the CP-140's "lower fuselage weapons bay [is] capable of taking 4,800 lb (2177 kg) of stores on eight stations or 6,350 lb (2427 kg) on three stations.... Among the weapon types which can be carried are depth bombs, mines, torpedoes and missiles such as the AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missile."<sup>6</sup>

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## Lt.Col. Jason Major and Col. Bill Seymour served with LRP Squads in Iraq War, 2003

By Richard Sanders, coordinator, Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade

Col. Bill Seymour and Lt.Col. Jason Major both built their Air Force careers around Canada's CP-140 spy planes. Both have seen combat missions aboard these Long Range Patrol (LRP) aircraft, and both had a taste of the war in Iraq.

### Lt.Col. Jason Major

Lt.Col. Major is now the Commander of the 405 "Pathfinder" LRP Squadron in Greenwood, Nova Scotia, which operates CP-140s. After becoming a pilot in 1995, he was posted to the 407 Squadron at Comox Air Force Base on Vancouver Island. While there, he was promoted to Captain, became a Crew Commander, and was chosen to go on "exchange" with "206 Sqn at Royal Air Force [Base] Kinloss [Scotland] to fly the Nimrod MR2 aircraft."<sup>1</sup>

Nimrod MR2s are Britain's

equivalent of Canadian "Auroras." Both countries deployed these LRP aircraft to the Persian Gulf in the early 2000s to abet U.S.-led plans for all out war against Iraq. Then, in early 2003, when the "shock and awe" bombing of Iraq was launched and the war officially began, Canadian and British LRP aircraft and crews were already on hand to join the fray. This was how Major found himself flying British Nimrods and waging war during America's so-called Operation Iraqi Freedom:

"While on exchange, Capt Major served as the Sqn Standards Pilot and was Crew Commander of one of the Maritime Counter Terrorism Crews. In 2002, he and his crew deployed to the Middle East in support of Op Enduring Freedom conducting patrols in Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Gulf. In 2003, Captain Major returned to the Middle East again, this time to fly in Op[eration] Iraqi Freedom, where he earned the

## Lt. Col. James Irvine

As former Commander (2008-2010) of Canada's west coast fleet of CP-140s at Comox Air Force Base in BC, Irvine was

"very proud of the Sqn's role in Operation Athena providing mapping imagery to the ground troops in Afghanistan, providing airborne surveillance at the 2010 Olympics in Vancouver for Op Podium and providing air surveillance at the G8 – G20 political summits in Ontario for Op Cadence."

(Source: 405 Long Range Patrol Squadron, Change of Command Parade, August 26, 2010.)

Iraq War Medal."<sup>2</sup>

Major's "Iraq War Medal," awarded by the UK Ministry of Defence, honours participants in "Operation Telic" which began January 20, 2003. It was "awarded to UK Armed Forces and civilian personnel, including embedded media, and certain foreign nationals assigned to the operation."<sup>3</sup>

Like Canadian Auroras of today,

(See p.X.  
(See p.Y  
AC-130.)



Nimrod MR2 firing a Harpoon missile

Canada's Lt.Col. Jason Major flew a British Nimrod MR2 during the Iraq War, in 2003. These spy planes are armed with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, Stingray anti-sub torpedoes, and Harpoon anti-ship missiles. They were also fitted with L3 Wescam's MX-15 target-finding sensor turret made in Canada.





**Lt. Col. Jason Major  
received Britain's  
"Iraq War Medal"**

most of the Nimrods deployed to the Iraq war in 2003 had state-of-the-art sensor/camera turrets made in Burlington Ontario by L3 Wescam (See p.X.). The Nimrods had

"new L-3 Wescam MX-15 electro-optical turrets under their starboard wings, and were employed to obtain reconnaissance imagery over Iraq—very different from their normal maritime patrol duties."<sup>4</sup>

The Nimrods in Iraq "used their electro-optical equipment to identify potential targets" and specifically to "assist AC-130 Spectre [Attack] Gunships and RAF Tornado GR4 [Fighter-Bomber] aircraft by pinpointing targets with their sensors."<sup>5</sup> (See p.Y for more on the AC-130.)

Major has served as vice president of a global network to "foster goodwill and fellowship" among LRP flyers "of the free world" who have flown 2000+ hours aboard these spy planes.<sup>6</sup> Both Irvine and Seymour are proud members of this club.

### Col. Bill Seymour

Col. William F. Seymour's Air Force career has included work as a navigator on NATO E-3A "Airborne Warning and Control System" warplanes as well as aboard Canadian CC-130 "Hercules" transport/cargo aircraft. However, most of his flying time has been with CP-140 "Auroras."<sup>7</sup>

In July 2009, Seymour—with more than 3400 flying hours on CP-140s—took command of 14 Wing Greenwood, in Nova Scotia. Greenwood has two squadrons (named 404

and 405) that operate thirteen of Canada's eighteen CP-14s.

Seymour served "multiple flying tours" aboard CP-140s, including twice with 407 "Demon" Squadron, at the Comox Air Force Base, on Vancouver Island, BC, and twice with the 404 "Thundering Herd" Squadron, based in Nova Scotia. (Seymour was the Commanding Officer of 404 Squadron between 2005 and 2007.)

During one of his CP-140 overseas operational tours, Seymour was a crew commander "flying armed missions" during Operation Sharp Guard to enforce the imposition of economic sanctions against the

Col. Bill Seymour is the Commander of 14 Wing Greenwood, Canada's largest east coast Air Force Base. Home to 13 of Canada's 18 CP-140 "Auroras," 14 Wing deployed two of these Long Range Patrol aircraft to the Iraq War in 2003.



Former Republic of Yugoslavia.<sup>8</sup>

As for his tour of duty in the Persian Gulf, Seymour's official biography states:

"In 2003 he deployed to the Middle East prior to the second Gulf War to support LRP operations in Operation Apollo as the Canadian LRP Liaison Officer to [the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command] COMUSNAVCENT in Bahrain, supporting Canadian CP-140 Aurora and [Canadian Forces] CF Naval operations in the region."<sup>9</sup>

Although Seymour may not have flown onboard CP-140 during their missions against Iraqi targets, his leadership role was pivotal to ensuring that all such Canadian missions were efficiently subsumed within the U.S.-led operations. His job involved report directly to the leading American Naval officer in charge of the huge Central-Command "Area of Responsibility." CENTCOM is responsible for waging all U.S. wars throughout the Middle East and Central Asia, including Iraq and Afghanistan.

In his key role as the Canadian LRP Liaison Officer to the Commander of the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, Seymour was ultimately responsible for coordinating with America's 5th Fleet not only Canada's CP-140 sorties over the Persian Gulf, but also this country's considerable Navy operations that were part of the the so-called War on Terror and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

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## Major Jeremy Reynolds, a.k.a. “Globesmasher”:

# A Canadian C-17 Pilot Reflects on his Iraq War Experiences

By Richard Sanders, coordinator, Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade

Major Jeremy Reynolds has been a frequent contributor to various online, military-discussion groups. Reynold’s self-ascribed online moniker in these fora is “Globesmasher.” This is a play on the official nickname for the huge Boeing-built C-17 cargo/transport plane, namely the “Globemaster III.”

“Globesmasher” has introduced himself to internet discussion groups as a Canadian pilots who flew U.S. Air Force (USAF) C-17s during the Iraq war. He and other discussants provide enough detailed information to reveal without a doubt that “Globemaster” is, in fact, Major Jeremy Reynolds.<sup>1</sup>

During these often-technical discussions, Major Reynolds offers “first hand” knowledge of the C-17 to an appreciative, at-times reverential, audience of Canadian militarists. While sharing his considerable exper-

tise about the C-17, Reynolds has also offered glimpses into Canada’s contribution to the Iraq War from the point of view of someone who, as he puts it, was “engaged in the actual open days of the invasion.”<sup>2</sup> For example, in reference to the C-17, he makes the following revelation about his many sorties into Afghanistan and Iraq:

“I’ve operated the aircraft from 2001 - 2004 on dirt strips ([Forward Operating Base] FOB Rhino and also shattered slab concrete runways (Kandahar [sic], Bagram, Masar-i-Sharif) in Afghanistan, and *all of the northern FOBs in Iraq.*” (Emphasis added)

In another online C-17 discussion, Major Reynolds says

“I flew the beast from Sept 2001 - Sept 2004. 1500 hours in 3 years .... 2 years on OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] in Afghanistan and 1 year on *OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] in Iraq.*” (Emphasis added)

## The Bashur Airdrop

Major Reynolds uses acronym-laden prose to describe his contribution to a major operation of the Iraq War:

“I also flew in the Bashur airdrop of the 173rd [Airborne Brigade] in [Operation Iraqi Freedom] OIF (#9 [plane] in a formation of 15). 1000 men dropped [using parachutes] from 10 [C-17] aircraft in formation, blacked out [i.e., with their lights off] on NVGs [i.e., using Night Vision Goggles] and 5 [C-17] aircraft in the lead dropping [heavy equipment] HE in formation. 1000 men in a single pass over the [Drop Zone] DZ - 100 [paratroopers] per aircraft, 50 per side double door.... It is a very capable ‘tactical’ aircraft.”<sup>3</sup>

This “airdrop” of paratroopers and heavy equipment, in which Major Reynolds so proudly took part, was an important event in the early days of the 2003 invasion. It is widely recognized as having “opened the northern front”

## Canadian C-17 Crews Trained on U.S. Missions in Iraq



Photo: U.S. Air Force

Maj. Jeremy Reynolds (left) “gearing up for a night flight aboard the C-17 while serving on exchange with the U.S. Air Force in 2004.” Maj. Jean Maisonneuve (right) piloting a Canadian C-17.



Photo: Jean Maisonneuve

Canadian military pilots, Majors Jean Maisonneuve and Jeremy Reynolds were “exchange pilots with the U.S. Air Force [USAF] between 2001 and 2004”<sup>4</sup> and “flew the C-17 in Iraq and Afghanistan.”<sup>2</sup>

While “taking part in operational missions”<sup>3</sup> in the Iraq and Afghan wars, these Canadian CC-130 pi-

lots learned to fly the giant C-17 Globemaster III transport/cargo planes and saw “what the aircraft can do first-hand.”<sup>4</sup> During his three years with the USAF, Major Reynolds chalked up 1,500 hours<sup>5</sup> flying C-17s, while Major Maisonneuve acquired “about 2,000 hours”<sup>6</sup> piloting these huge “strategic airlifters.”

There were also three other Canadian air force personnel learning the ropes with Reynolds and Maisonneuve. Besides these two “pilots who were part of the original C-17 exchange program from 2001 – 2004,”

“there was one MX officer” (or “Maintenance Major”), “one loadmaster” and “a logistics Capt[ain].”<sup>7</sup> While stationed at state-side USAF bases and during military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, these three Canadians learned the technical intricacies of loading and maintaining the mammoth C-17 aircraft.





Boeing Frontiers Online, May 2003.

On March 26, 2003, 1000 soldiers were dropped over Bashur, Iraq. Paratroopers are seen here waiting to board C-17s for the Bashur mission, the largest U.S. formation airdrop since WWII.

of the Iraq war. In fact, this much-heralded operation has found its place in military lore as “the largest formation airdrop carried out by the United States since World War II.”<sup>4</sup> It took place on March 26, 2003, when “more than 950 paratroopers from the 173d Airborne Brigade jumped into Bashur, Iraq, to set the stage for a northern front. Two days later [there were] ...more than 2,000” U.S. troops en-

trenched at the small landing strip.<sup>5</sup> On April 9, the Stars and Stripes military magazine reported that “So far, more than 150 flights, mostly C-17 Globemasters, have touched down at the airfield since the paratroops secured the area,” and “[o]n average, the Air Force is delivering 1 million pounds of cargo a day to Bashur.”<sup>6</sup>

The heaviest pieces of cargo delivered to Bashur by C-17s were Abrams Main Battle Tanks. As Major Reynolds put it:

“The C-17s hauled the American

Abrahms [sic] M1A1 into Northern Iraq in 2003. They weighed in at 134,000 lbs, fully armoured and fully armed (full ammo complement).”<sup>7</sup>

He went on to describe the scene aboard the C-17 saying

“All the ammunition was loaded in the racks in the actual tank. It drove on—the crew stepped out and sat in the sidewall seats. It then drove off at destination ready to fight—that was it. All the ammo and add-on armour

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This photo of an U.S. M1 Abrams battle tank aboard an American C-17, was posted by “Globesmasher” who said: “The ammunition was loaded in the racks in the actual tank. It drove on—the crew stepped out and sat in the sidewall seats. It then drove off at destination ready to fight.”



added a great deal to the overall weight of the vehicle.”<sup>8</sup>

To illustrate this, Reynolds posted “a picture of one of the hauls one night.” It shows an ammo-laden Abrams tank draped with U.S. flags and lashed down within a C-17. Whether “Globemaster” took this photo during one of his forays into Iraq is unknown. (See image on previous page.)

### Why were Canadians trained to fly C-17s in 2003?

In another online discussion about the C-17, Major Reynolds notes that in “Sept 2004” “I left the USAF exchange [program] as an Airdrop [Night Vision Goggles Instructor Pilot] NVG IP.”<sup>9</sup> “Instructor pilots,” like Reynolds and Maisonneuve, are specially trained to teach others, and Reynolds’ training involved learning to instruct pilots how to operate C-17s during lights-out, nocturnal operations, in which night



This Canadian C-17 (CC-177) was flown by Major Reynolds at the Brantford Air Show, 2008.

vision goggles are used.

The fact that Reynolds and Maisonneuve started training on USAF C-17s as “Instructor Pilots” in 2001 is curious because Canada did not actually own any of these warplanes until 2007. An election-campaign pledge to purchase C-17s was made by the Conservatives in December 2005,<sup>10</sup> but it wasn’t until June 2006 that their newly-elected government announced its controversial intention to purchase

these strategic airlifters.<sup>11</sup> Canada’s \$3.4 Billion dollar contract to buy four C-17s from Boeing was signed in February 2007.<sup>12</sup>

Whatever the reason for their training as C-17 “Instructor Pilots” five years before an elected Canadian government decided to buy these planes, it certainly was propitious. So, when the Canadian Forces did finally have four C-17s on order, pilots Maisonneuve and Reynolds were not only ready and willing to fly them, they

were already conveniently trained to teach others how to fly them.

These graduates of the Iraq air war were not only the first Canadian pilots certified to fly American C-17s,<sup>13</sup> they were also chosen to set up and oversee the elaborate training programs that were needed to prepare dozens of pilots and aircrew on how to operate, load and maintain these expensive new Canadian warplanes.

More Canadians “trained”

## Canadian Pilots Flew C-17 Missions in Iraq War in 2007

Canadian Forces personnel learned to operate Canada’s newest military plane, the giant Boeing C-17, by training on American jets, including flying those planes into Iraq in support of the U.S. war, according to a memo written by Canada’s top general and obtained by Canwest News Service.

General Rick Hillier, [then] chief of Canada’s defence staff, wrote to Gordon O’Connor, then-minister of national defence, in May 2007 that in the summer and fall of that year, Canadian military aircrew would fly into Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. That decision was taken without informing Parliament.

“Canadians have been very clear from the beginning that they wanted no part of George Bush’s war on Iraq,” said NDP defence critic Dawn Black, “and they certainly don’t want to see Canadians getting involved through a back door.”

The flights into Iraq were part of the second phase of training for



Canadian crews, a phase referred to by the military as “seasoning.”

“To ensure flexibility, as well as obtain maximum exposure to the roles and missions of the C-17, deployment approval on [Operations] Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom [i.e., the Iraq and Afghan wars] has been requested,” General Hillier wrote. “The overall risk associated with allowing [Canadian Forces] CF aircrew

to operate on [U.S. Air Force] USAF C-17 missions to Iraq is low.”

Dan Dugas, a spokesman for Defence Minister Peter MacKay, said the Canadians on exchange can end up in Iraq, as they did in this case, when the U.S. unit they have been assigned to is sent by U.S. authorities to Iraq. Under the terms of the Canada-U.S. officer exchange program, the participating officers essentially become



America's "Daisy Cutter" and the "Mother of all Bombs" (MOAB) are among the largest non-nuclear bombs ever made. Major Reynolds said of his time with the U.S. Air Force in Iraq: *"I sat for days in the 'alert posture' and hoped I would be able to drop one on the Whaleback."*

in Iraq War Missions, 2007 According to *Ottawa Citizen* reporter David Pugliese, the C-17 program trained "four crews per aircraft." That meant "32 pilots and 24 loadmasters. Another 96 technicians and 10 maintenance management personnel" to "round out Canada's C-17 team."<sup>14</sup>

Pugliese also noted that: "Reynolds, who helped design the Canadian C-17 air crew training course with fellow pilot Maj. Jean Maisonneuve, credits an earlier exchange program with the U.S. Air Force for the speed in which everything was put into place. Several years ago both he and Maisonneuve

part of the other country's military.

Canada took delivery of the first of its four Boeing C-17s in 2007.

The C-17s are among the biggest planes in the world. They are used by the U.S., British, Australian and other air forces for strategic airlift, the long-haul transport of military equipment and personnel.

In anticipation of the delivery of the airplanes, Canada sent a first crew, consisting of at least one pilot, co-pilot and a loadmaster, to McChord Air Force Base in Washington. That crew trained at McChord until July 2007. A second Canadian C-17 aircrew was then sent to Altus Air Force Base in Oklahoma. Altus is the where the U.S. air force does most of its training for its C-17 crews. That second crew was then assigned for "seasoning" with a U.S. unit flying into Iraq, according to General Hillier's memo.

**Source:** "Canadian pilots flew missions in Iraq," *Ottawa Citizen*, April 22, 2008.

[www.canada.com/story\\_print.html?id=46f230d1-ca87-47a6-99aa-d14e77652d18](http://www.canada.com/story_print.html?id=46f230d1-ca87-47a6-99aa-d14e77652d18)

were involved in C-17 operations, with both eventually flying the aircraft on missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Reynolds also credits the close working relationship between the Canadian and U.S. air forces for the ease in setting up the training package. Many of the officers he had to deal with in arranging the courses were former colleagues from his days flying with the U.S. Air Force."<sup>15</sup>

Like the U.S. training Reynolds and Maisonneuve had in the early 2000s, the new Canadian cadre were also "seasoned" or "embedded" in actual Iraq war missions. (See sidebar, p.44-45.) In the first of three training reports to online followers, "Globesmasher" noted in February 2007 that after their "initial qualification training" at McChord Air Force Base in Oklahoma, the new Canadian trainees "move onto another USAF base to begin 4 months of 'imbedded' [sic] training with the USAF.... The maintainers (the technicians) have already begun their initial qualification training in Charleston [Air Force Base in South Carolina] (about 50 of them) and they too will be 'imbedded' with the USAF."<sup>16</sup>

About three months later, Reynolds provided a progress report: "[W]e are extremely busy in the USA right now getting the initial cadre of crews (6 pilots and 6 loadmasters) up to speed. We're trying to cram as much training (the embedded seasoning training) as we can.... The next batch/wave/phase of initial cadre...should be ready for their 'applied training'...in July."<sup>17</sup>

In his next update two months later, Major Reynolds revealed that the so-called "applied" or "embedded sea-

soning training" for Canada's C-17 crews included "exposure" to war zone "operations" with the USAF in Iraq:

"Most of the guys from the first phase will be returning with about ~160 hours or so of flying experience and ready to fly operationally as soon as the aircraft arrive in YTR [Canadian Forces Base Trenton, Ontario]. Most of their training down here consisted of local training missions and also 10 day 'staged' operations from various USAF locations into Iraq for [Operation Iraqi Freedom] OIF for a little bit of 'operational' exposure."<sup>18</sup>

### On the "Daisy Cutters" and the "Mother of all Bombs"

During his own "'operational' exposure" to the war in Iraq, Major Reynolds had to confront the possibility that he would be ordered drop weapons. Although the C-17 is a cargo/transport aircraft, and not a bomber, the C-17 Globemaster III can drop what are often-touted as the world's largest "conventional" bombs, namely MOABs. Technically speaking, MOAB stands for "Massive Ordnance Air Blast." However, "The MOAB" is more often known, quite affectionately by some, as "The Mother Of All Bombs."

In one internet discussion about these horrendous weapons, "Globesmasher," aka Major Reynolds, revealed a personal, almost-nostalgic disclosure about one of his hopes during the Iraq war. When one member of an online military forum wondered aloud whether the "C17 could deliver a couple of MOAB's??" Reynolds responded quite candidly:

"Yes it can.  
The C-17 (and the C-130s) can both



drop the MOAB ([Guided Bomb Unit] GBU-43) and also the Daisy Cutter ([Bomb Live Unit] BLU-82). The Daisy Cutter is smaller than the MOAB and weighs in at only about 15,000 lbs of high explosive.

They are both rigged [within the aircraft] to [Heavy Equipment] HE xtraction [sic] platforms and are dropped using the HE airdrop checklists ... pretty easy really.


The USAF kept an airdrop aircrew on alert...so that they could go out and drop any of these as required. I never got called but *I sat for days in the 'alert posture' and hoped I would be able to drop one on the Whaleback to support the guys on the ground ... never happened though.*<sup>19</sup> (Emphasis added)

Rushed quickly and publicly through the development process “in only nine weeks to be available for the Iraq campaign,”<sup>20</sup> the first MOAB explosion was a carefully calculated public event. The test blast, carried out on March 11, 2003, just days before the official start of the war, was covered that day by CNN and other media.<sup>21</sup>

Weighing in at over 21,000 pounds and measuring thirty feet in length, the MOAB is often described as the most powerful, non-nuclear weapon in the U.S. arsenal. It is, in fact, “the largest-ever satellite-guided, air-delivered weapon in history.”<sup>22</sup> The walloping explosion it creates was designed not only to “attack large area targets” but also to “have a substantial psychological effect on those who witness its use.”<sup>23</sup> And apparently, judging from Reynolds’ MOAB-positive attitude, besides creating the expected “psychological effect” of instilling terror among Iraqis, the MOAB also had a profound “psychological effect” upon those who were itching to drop this “Massive Ordnance” on Iraqis during the opening salvos of war.

The other infamous bomb mentioned glowingly by Major Reynolds, the so-called “Daisy Cutter,” appeared in the early 1970s. Huge blasts from these unguided, “dumb bombs” were “used to clear helicopter landing zones about 250 feet in diameter”<sup>24</sup> in Southeast Asia. These euphemistically-labeled “Daisy Cutters” felled large swaths of rainforest as if the trees were

The A-10 Wart Hog’s “Avenger” Gatling gun can fire 3,900 rounds of Depleted Uranium slugs per minute.



The A-10, says Canadian C-17 pilot Major Jeremy Reynolds (aka “Globesmasher”) has “an incredible track record in Iraq.” This “incredible machine” is as “ugly as sin,” he continues, “but you don’t have to be good looking to kill effectively.”

mere daisies. U.S. helicopters then descended with troops and weapons to wage the Vietnam war. “Daisy Cutters” blasted their way into the psyches of another generation of victims during the 1991 Iraq War when they were used “as much for their psychological effect as for their destructive power.”<sup>25</sup>

#### “Pick Your Poison”

The A-10 & Depleted Uranium Besides being a great admirer and would-be dropper of gargantuan munitions like MOABs and “Daisy Cutters,” Major Reynolds has also waxed poetic upon two of the most horrendous war machines ever used in Iraq or elsewhere, namely, the A-10 “Thunderbolt” or “Wart Hog,” and the AC-130 “Spectre.” These American warplanes carrying the designation “A” for “Attack,” provide what the military call “air support.” This refers to the “act of using aircraft to attack an enemy to assist ground military forces.”<sup>26</sup>

For six months in 2006, dozens of participants in a Canadian military discussion group called “Army.ca Forums,” debated their favourite “air support” aircraft. When one discussant posted a message saying “Pick Your Poison: What’s the Best Air Support,” Major Reynolds weighed in with his preference for the A-10 “Wart Hog.” He expressed his reasons for choosing this aircraft by using in a prose style resembling poetry:

“A10

Low, slow and packs a deadly punch.  
Has plenty of loiter time and can get  
right down in the weeds.

Well built, strong ..... has an incredible  
track record in Iraq ....  
Incredible machine.

Ugly as sin ..... but you don’t have  
to be good looking to kill effectively.”<sup>27</sup>

Although the A-10 may—as Major Reynolds says—be as “ugly as sin,” this arguably has less to do its appearance than with people’s willingness to use it to “kill effectively.” The A-10 is infamous—in some circles at least—for the special variety of deadly munitions that it employs. Its slugs keep on killing long after they’ve hit their targets and aerosolized into tiny particles. In fact, this is when the A-10’s abhorrent killing powers really begin to shine.

This warplane’s *raison d’être* is a weapon called the GAU-8 “Avenger,” a seven-barrel gatling gun that fires 3,900 rounds of Depleted Uranium (DU) munitions per minute. Twice as dense as lead, DU projectiles pierce tank armour. Upon impact, these large DU bullets are pulverized to create toxic and radioactive dust specks that can travel on the wind for as much as 26 miles.

When inhaled, DU dust increases infectious diseases caused by severe immunodeficiencies, renal and hepatic dysfunctions, leukemia,





The AC-130 "Spectre" is one of the world's most heavily armed gunships.

"The Spectre is very cool," says Major Reynolds. "It's unbelievable the amount of weapons and ammo they have shoe-horned into the back of that thing. I would love to fly one."

elaptic anemia, malignant neoplasms and congenital deformities. With a half life of 4.5 billion years, the health and environmental effects of DU munitions are incalculable.

Nazi research on DU munitions was passed to the U.S. military in 1945 which first fired them from A-10s in 1966, during the Vietnam war. A-10s were used most extensively during the destruction of Iraq in 1991 when 148 A-10s flying over 8,000 combat sorties, fired almost a million DU shells. U.S. and British forces reportedly fired more than 300 tons of DU munitions during that air war.

DU is a byproduct of the enrichment process used to produce fuel rods for nuclear power plants. The nuclear industry provides DU to weapons manufacturers free of charge, thus saving them the cost of safely disposing of this radioactive waste. DU has thus been "disposed of" in various wars, including Somalia (1993), Bosnia (1994-1995), Sudan (1998), Yugoslavia (1999), Afghanistan (2001-) and Iraq (2003-).<sup>28</sup>

Could it be that Canada's Major Reynold's is somehow unaware of this horrific reality? While extoling the A-10's "incredible track record in Iraq," and doling out his radiant praise for the wondrous powers of this killing machine, he does not even mention Depleted Uranium.

The AC-130 "Spectre"

### Gunship is "Very Cool"

Reynolds also articulated his great appreciation for another American war machine used for "air support," namely the AC-130 "Spectre." He eulogizes this "Attack" aircraft in his usual off-the-cuff style and then recalls a personal experience from his C-17 training years when he was "on exchange" with the U.S. Air Force:

"... the Spectre is very cool.

I toured through one up at Karshi Kanabad [sic] back in 2003.

It's unbelievable the amount of weapons and ammo they have shoe-horned into the back of that thing.

I would love to fly one of those."<sup>29</sup>

Major Reynold's great desire to pilot an AC-130 "Spectre" may in part derive from the fact that this warplane is a modified C-130 "Hercules." Before becoming a C-17 pilot, Reynolds "flew Heres for 5 great years with [Canada's] 429 Sqn [Squadron] ('96 - '01) and got to see the world."<sup>30</sup>

Converting a C-130 cargo/transport into an extremely lethal AC-130 "air support" attack plane is accomplished by adding three huge guns onto one side of the plane. To attack, AC-130s circle their ground targets and "saturate" them with cannon fire.<sup>31</sup>

Then again, perhaps the reason "Globesmasher" thinks these particular U.S. "Attack" aircraft are so "very cool" is revealed in his obvious delight that they wield such "unbelievable"

quantities of "weapons and ammo." There is no doubt that the "Spectre," or "Spooky," is one of the most heavily-armed "gunships" in existence.

Reynolds' attraction to the "Spectre" may also arise from his appreciation for the role it has played in so many U.S. wars. Since its appearance in the early 1960s, U.S. forces have used the "Spectre" to great effect in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, Europe and Africa, including such wars and invasions as: Vietnam (1962-1975), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), Somalia (1992-1994), Yugoslavia (1995) and Iraq (1991 and 2003).<sup>32</sup>

"Globesmasher" does not reveal the nature of the "tour" he took aboard an AC-130 when in Karshi Khanabad (K2) in 2003. Beginning in 2001, K2 was an important U.S. military base in Uzbekistan, just north of the Afghan border. However, in 2005, the Uzbek government forced the American military to vacate K2.<sup>33</sup> During those first few years of the war, thousands of Afghan civilians were massacred by U.S. forces in their successful bid to install and entrench the dreaded Northern Alliance warlords as Afghanistan's new and improved government. We will never know how many innocent Afghans died or what percent of those deaths were the result of attacks that used AC-130s.

However, research by University of New Hampshire professor Marc Herold, shows that between 3,000 and 3,400 Afghan civilians were directly killed by U.S. warplanes and Special Forces attacks between October 7, 2001 and March 2002.<sup>34</sup> This accounting excludes civilian deaths that occurred later due to injuries from such attacks. Also excluded are civilian deaths that were an *indirect* consequence of U.S. attacks. A database of civilian deaths compiled by Herold using media reports, cites 26 separate atrocities during the first 20 months of the Afghan war, in which AC-130s were used in attacks that snuffed out the lives of Afghan civilians.<sup>35</sup>

But despite, or more likely perhaps *because of* the killing sprees conducted using AC-130s, Maj. Reynolds says he "would love to fly one."

Totally Enamoured

Without a doubt, the favourite plane of Majors Reynolds and Maisonneuve is the C-17. Both rave about this war-plane and were overjoyed when Canada got four of its own. "It's like a CC-130 on steroids," said Maisonneuve.

Canadian military enthusiasts are keen to promote the C-17 because "it carries four times the payload, flies 40% faster and...twice as far [as a CC-130].... Travelling at 209 kilometres per hour, it can come to a full stop on a runway measuring between 609 and 914 metres—that's at a weight of 200 tons."<sup>36</sup>

Major Reynolds simply gushed about how wonderful the C-17 is and what a great life he has had flying it:

"[I]t is such a pleasure to fly. I feel very fortunate to be able to operate the most modern, capable and versatile piece of transport equipment in the world in a very challenging and demanding role. What more can one ask for in a career?"<sup>37</sup>

Reynolds, is a key cheerleader for Canada's C-17s and the "independent global reach and flexibility"<sup>38</sup> that they now provide Canadian warfighters. Reynolds reflected that Canada's acquisition of these aircraft "brought a whole new capability" to our military. It was "a watershed moment" in "air mobility...giving an incredibly robust capability," he said. "With this fleet we truly can declare: 'Anything, anytime, anywhere.'"<sup>39</sup>

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So, the next time a proud fellow citizen tells you that Canada didn't join the Iraq war, send them this article and remind them of Mark Twain's famous quip:

“It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so.”

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