The New Great Game: Oil Politics in Central Asia
By Ted Rall, social commentary, political cartoonist and columnist.
Nursultan Nazarbayev has a terrible problem. He's the president and former Communist Party boss of Kazakhstan, the second-largest republic of the former USSR. A few years ago, the country struck oil in the eastern portion of the Caspian Sea. Geologists estimate that beneath the wind-blown steppes of Kazakhstan are 50 billion barrels of oil - by far the biggest untapped reserves in the world. (Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil producer, is believed to have about 30 billion barrels remaining.)
Kazakhstan's Soviet-subsidized economy collapsed immediately after independence in 1991. When I visited the then-capital, Al-maty, in 1997, I was struck by the utter absence of elderly people. People confided that their parents had died of malnutrition during the brutal winters of 1993 and 1994. Middle-class residents of a superpower had been reduced to abject poverty virtually overnight. Thirty-something women who appeared sixty-something hocked their wedding silver in underpasses next to Kazakh-state, art museum reps trying to move enough socialist realist paintings for a dollar each to keep the lights on. The average Kazakh earned $20 a month. Those unwilling or unable to steal died of gangrene adjacent to long-winded tales of woe written on cardboard.
Autocrats tend to die badly during periods of downward mobility. Nazarbayev, therefore, has spent most of the last decade trying to get his land-locked oil out to sea. Once the oil starts flowing, it won't take long before Kazakhstan replaces Kuwait as the land of Benzes and ugly gold jewelry. But the longer the pipeline, the more expensive and vulnerable to sabotage it is. The shortest route runs through Iran, but Kazakhstan is too closely aligned with the U.S. to offend it by cutting a deal with Teheran. Russia has helpfully offered to build a line connecting Kazakh oil rigs to the Black Sea, but neighboring Turkmenistan has experienced trouble with the Russians: they tend to divert the oil for their own uses without paying for it. There's even a plan to run crude out through China, but the proposed 5,300-mile line would be far too long to prove profitable.
The logical alternative is Unocal's plan to extend Turkmen-istan's existing system to the Kazakh field on the Caspian and through Afghanistan to the Pakistani port of Karachi on the Arabian Sea.
As Central Asian expert Ahmed Rashid explains in his 2000 book Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, that the U.S. and Pakistan decided to install a stable regime in Afghanistan around 1994 - a regime that would end the country's civil war and thus ensure the safety of the Unocal pipeline project. Impressed by the ruthlessness and willingness of the then-emerging Taliban to cut a pipeline deal, the U.S. State Department and Pakistan's ISI intelligence service agreed to funnel arms and funding to the Taliban in their war against the ethnically Tajik Northern Alliance. As recently as 1999, U.S. taxpayers paid the entire annual salary of every single Taliban government official, all in the hopes of returning to the days of dollar-a-gallon gas. Pakistan, naturally, would pick up revenues from a Karachi oil port facility. Harkening to 19th century power politics between Russia and British India, Rashid dubbed the struggle for control of post-Soviet Central Asia "the new Great Game."
Predictably, the Taliban Frank-enstein got out of control. The regime's unholy alliance with Osama bin Laden's terror network, their penchant for invading their neighbors and their production of 50% of the world's opium made them unlikely partners for the desired oil deal. Bill Clinton's 1998 cruise missile attack on Afghanistan briefly brought the Taliban back in line, but they continued supporting countless militant Islamic groups. When an Egyptian group, whose members had trained in Afghanistan, hijacked four airplanes and used them to kill more than 6,000 Americans on September 11, Washington's patience with its former client finally expired.
Finally, the Bushies had the perfect excuse to do what the U.S. had wanted all along: invade and/or install an old-school, puppet regime in Kabul. Real-politik no more cares about the 6,000 dead than it concerns itself with oppressed women in Afghanistan. This ersatz war by a phony president is solely about getting the Unocal deal done without interference from annoying local middlemen.
Source: Alternet, Oct. 11, 2001 <www.alternet.org/story.html?StoryID=11692>