

# Canada Requested "Missile Defense" Role

By Richard Sanders, Editor, *Press for Conversion!*

On August 5, 2004, the Canadian government initiated a change to the NORAD agreement in order to add a crucial "missile defense" task to the Canada-U.S. military alliance. The U.S. promptly agreed to Canada's kind offer to share in the important "aerospace warning" function that is required for the tracking and targeting functions of America's "missile defense" weapons systems.

The process by which Canada attained its new "missile defense" job within NORAD, was facilitated by an exchange of bureaucratic letters between Canada's Ambassador to the U.S., Michael Kergin, and the U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell.<sup>1</sup> Kergin's letter reminded Powell of a previous round of official notes, dated January 15, 2004, between Canadian Defence Minister, David Pratt, and U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld.

Pratt's letter to Rumsfeld, which had been sent one short month after Paul Martin became Prime Minister, presented the Canadian government's frank proposal on how it could get more deeply ensconced in "missile defense" work by creating an "overall framework for co-operation."

Here is part of Pratt's up-front letter to the Powell:

"A key focus of our co-operation in missile defence should be through NORAD.... *NORAD's long-standing global threat warning and attack assessment role can make an important contribution to the execution of the missile defence mission. We believe that our two nations should move on an expedited basis to amend the NORAD agreement to take into account NORAD's contribution to the missile defence mission.*

It is our intent to negotiate in the coming months a Missile Defence Framework Memorandum of Understanding with the United States with the objective of including Canada as a participant in the current U.S. missile defence program and expanding and enhancing infor-



David Pratt

On Jan. 15, 2000, Canada's National Defence Minister, David Pratt, wrote to U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, expressing Canada's deep commitment to

**"increased government-to-government and industry-to-industry cooperation on missile defence."**

Pratt said NORAD should be "a key focus

of our co-operation in missile defence" and that Canada wanted to "move on an expedited basis to *amend the NORAD agreement* to take into account NORAD's contribution to the missile defence mission."

NORAD, Pratt explained, would provide a "mutually beneficial framework to ensure the closest possible involvement and insight for Canada, *both government and industry*, in the U.S. missile defence program."

mation exchange. We believe this should provide a mutually beneficial framework *to ensure the closest possible involvement and insight for Canada, both government and industry, in the U.S. missile defence program.* Such an MOU could also help pave the way for *increased government-to-government and industry-to-industry co-operation* on missile defence that we should seek to foster between our countries.

I propose that our staffs work together over the coming months to identify opportunities and mechanisms for such consultations and Canada's contributions....

We should *continue* to explore appropriate *technical, political and financial arrangements* related to the potential defence of Canada and the United States against missile attack, within the framework of our laws. Our staffs should discuss ways in which Canada could contribute to this effort."<sup>2</sup> (Emphasis added)

It is important to highlight the Canadian government's position that NORAD should be "a key focus" of Canada's "co-operation in missile defence." In particular, Canada wanted NORAD's "long-standing global threat warning and attack assessment role" to be used in "the execution of the missile defence mission." This, it turns out, is *exactly* what Canada's government achieved seven months later, in August 2004, upon successfully amending the NORAD treaty.

Pratt's letter also reveals that Canadian government yearnings for increased "missile defense" responsibilities were not limited to a military-to-military role within NORAD. Although this alliance of the two countries' institutions of war is a logical structure within which this important Canada-U.S. partnership is growing, Pratt also said that Canada wanted "the closest possible involvement and insight for Canada, *both government and industry*, in the U.S. missile defence program." He then

mentioned Canada's desire for "increased government-to-government and industry-to-industry co-operation on missile defence."

This sense that Canada's intent was to *enlarge upon already-existing* avenues of bilateral cooperation on "missile defense," besides those conducted by their militaries, is also conveyed when Pratt says that Canada

wanted to "*continue* to explore appropriate *technical, political and financial* arrangements" to assist the highly-contentious U.S.-led weapons development program.

In his very brief, officious reply, Rumsfeld said: "I agree that we should seek to *expand our cooperation* in the area of missile defense."<sup>3</sup> (Emphasis added) Rumsfeld's letter was deliber-

ately worded to denote the obvious reality, also conveyed in Pratt's letter, that the two countries were *already* co-operating on "missile defense."

Some seven months after the Pratt-Rumsfeld exchange, a considerable amount of heated public debate on "missile defense" had passed under the bridge in Canada. Despite strong, widespread public opposition

## From Flip-Flop Flashbacks to False Facades

The Liberal government's August 5, 2004, alteration of the NORAD treaty, was not the first time that Canada initiated changes to NORAD's "missile defense" responsibilities. For many decades there have been debates about whether Canada should or should not support a U.S.-led "anti-ballistic missile defense" system.

As Dr. John Clearwater, author of *U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Canada* (1998) and *Canadian Nuclear Weapons* (2000), has written:

"When the NORAD Treaty was renewed on March 30, 1968, Ottawa added an interpretative clause, which stipulated that the agreement 'will not involve in any way a Canadian commitment to participate in an active ballistic missile defence.'"

("Little Lost Canadians," *Winnipeg Free Press*, March 3, 2005.)

This clause was inserted into the treaty less than one month before the end of Liberal Prime Minister Lester Pearson's five-year term in 1968. (See "U.S. helped Pearson bring down Dief..." on page 12.)

Pearson's anti-BMD clause was not removed until 1981. That was done early in Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's final term. The Trudeau-government decision, to once again allow NORAD facilities and personnel to carry out "missile defense" roles, came just in time for Reagan's first term, when Pentagon proponents of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (aka "Star Wars") had gained tremendous ascendancy.

When Progressive Conservative (PC), Brian Mulroney, became Prime Minister in 1984, he inherited the Liberal government-approved arrangement allowing NORAD to have "missile defense" functions. He also faced the same kind of public debate about Canadian involvement in "Star Wars" that later confounded the Liberal governments. And, the highly-postured response of the PC government was virtually identical to that of the later Liberal government. Both did their very best to deny any official involvement in the U.S. scheme, while simultaneously doing whatever they could to increase their involvement. Both leaders knew that taking a strong position in favour of the plan would directly

contradict Canada's high-profile position at the UN, especially with regards to the ABM Treaty. Also, Conservative and Liberal governments alike knew that voters were largely opposed to Canadian participation in the U.S. scheme.

However, both governments were also closely tied to powerful corporate and military interests within Canada, not to mention in the U.S. These special interest groups wanted the strongest level of government support for "missile defense." So, when the PC and Liberal governments could no longer delay their public responses, they acted almost identically. While both governments publicly pretended that

Canada had said "no" to the Americans on "missile defense," both also continued to work behind the scenes to ensure their support for increased corporate involvement in this weapons development plan. The Liberal government was, however, better able to disguise itself in sheep's clothing.

Thanks perhaps to greater government support in the form of grants, loans, equipment acquisition programs and scientific research and development efforts and patent transfers, Canadian firms have had more triumphs in winning "missile defense" contracts during the Liberal reign of the 1990s than under Mulroney's PC government in the 1980s, even though those were the heady days of Reagan's spending spree on "Star Wars."

Ironically, despite its greater success in promoting Canadian participation in "missile defense," the

Liberal government has also been better able to hone its fraudulent public image. Although Canada has always been just as prone to cleave to the powerful U.S. military magnet, whether a Liberal or Conservative government is in power, the wily Liberal brand is widely thought to be more inclined toward peacemongering. As a result of this subterfuge, although Canada's "missile defense" efforts have greatly prospered under the Liberal's protective cover, the government has simultaneously managed to pull a thick cloak of wool over voters' eyes. As such, the prevailing impression is that the Liberal government has actually taken an anti-"missile defense" stance.




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***Wolf in Sheep's Clothing:***  
Although Canada's "missile defense" efforts have prospered under the Liberal's protective cover, the government has simultaneously managed to pull a thick cloak of wool over voters' eyes.

to "missile defense," Canada's Ambassador Kergin requested in writing that the U.S. agree to the addition of "missile defense" warning functions to NORAD. This letter was, however, much cagier about the extent to which Canada and the U.S. were already partnered on "missile defense." Kergin phraseology tried to maintain the Liberal government's carefully-honed, public deceit that the process being initiated would merely mark the *beginning* of Canadian membership in the notorious U.S. weapons program. Kergin even tried his hand at rewriting history by pretending to quote from Pratt's letter to Rumsfeld in January. Kergin said:

"I also make reference to the exchange of letters between ... Pratt and ... Rumsfeld on January 15, 2004, in which they stated that... our two Governments should explore *extending our partnership to include cooperation in missile defence.*"<sup>4</sup> (Emphasis added)



Michael Kergin

On Aug. 5, 2004, Canada's Ambassador to the U.S., Michael Kergin, discreetly initiated the addition of "missile defense" functions to the NORAD treaty by exchanging notes with Secretary of State Colin Powell. The next day (Hiroshima Day), Powell was in Greenland signing a U.S.-Danish treaty to allow a single radar facility there to be used for similar "missile defense" functions. Denmark admits to being a partner in a missile-defense "coalition of the willing." Canada claims it said "no" to "missile


In fact, as seen in quotations above, the January 15 letters clearly spoke of "*increased... co-operation on missile defence*" (Pratt) and "*expand our cooperation in the area of missile defense*" (Powell).

Kergin then said, in typically-obscurantist bureaucratese, that: "our two governments agree that NORAD's aerospace warning mission for North America also shall include aerospace warning, as defined in NORAD's Terms of Reference, in support of the designated commands responsible for missile defence of North America."<sup>5</sup>

This legalistic statement, when translated into plain English, expresses Canada's agreement to partake in "missile defense" by expanding NORAD's crucial "aerospace warning" function. Then, in the very next sentence, Canada's ambassador to the U.S. writes an extremely abstruse line: "This decision is independent of any discussion on possible cooperation on

## U.S. helped Pearson bring down Diefenbaker's Minority Government to get U.S. Nuclear Weapons into Canada

Liberal Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson allowed U.S. nuclear weapons into Canada. The 1963 election campaign was fought over whether Canada should have U.S. Bomark nuclear missiles on Canadian soil. Progressive Conservative Prime Minister John Diefenbaker was very opposed to the U.S. plan and he paid the highest political price. The Liberal Party changed its policy 180 degrees saying that if elected they would allow the nuclear missiles to be based in Canada.




John Diefenbaker

Few realise that key U.S. officials helped orchestrate the constitutional coup that ousted Diefenbaker in 1963. It was a dirty, backroom campaign led by the U.S. ambassador to Canada and a few bureaucrats from the CIA, State Department and Pentagon. They teamed up with some Canadian

military brass, media personalities, a NATO general and Diefenbaker's Minister of National Defence. They discredited Diefenbaker and then used a non-confidence motion to bring down his minority government. They then used dirty tricks to sabotage his re-election.

Almost immediately after winning the election, Pearson followed through with his end of the deal. The Liberal government quickly approved the placement of American nuclear missiles in Quebec and British Columbia and they were in the country by new year's eve, 1963.



Lester B. Pearson

**Source:** Richard Sanders, "'Knocking Over' Dief the Chief," *Press for Conversion!*, January 2001. COAT website: [coat.ncf.ca/our\\_magazine/links/issue43/articles/plot\\_made\\_in\\_us.htm](http://coat.ncf.ca/our_magazine/links/issue43/articles/plot_made_in_us.htm)



missile defence.”<sup>6</sup>

*What?* How are we to interpret such a barefaced, self-contradiction as this? Here we have a formal letter specifically designed to modify a major bilateral military treaty by *adding* “missile defense” functions to their joint efforts. And yet, although the entire purpose of Kergin’s letter is therefore clearly intended to state Canada’s *commitment to participate* in “missile defense,” it simultaneously makes a totally incongruous assertion. At first glance, this sentence seems to be a caveat to convey the following meaning: “This does not mean that Canada has yet decided to cooperate with the U.S. on missile defense.”

Kergin’s equivocal line was probably crafted for the sole purpose of confusing and deceiving Canadian opponents of the “missile defense” weapons program. It certainly helped. During the seven months since Pratt had crafted his relatively-forthright letter to Rumsfeld back in the early days of Martin’s rule, the political climate had clearly changed. By the time Kergin was finalising the Canadian government’s commitment to “missile defense” through NORAD, the Liberal’s had clearly decided that they should work harder to conceal the extent of their

commitment to America’s divisive “missile defense” program.

However, if one reads Kergin’s enigmatic line very carefully, using the corporate mindset of a government lawyer, it can be seen to be equivocal. It can easily carry another sense altogether. The addition of a few words makes its more-plausible meaning clear: “This decision is independent of any discussion on *other possible areas of cooperation on missile defence.*”

By this, Kergin was likely referring to the “*increased government-to-government and industry-to-industry co-operation on missile defence that we should seek,*” that had been referred to in Pratt’s earlier letter.

However, regardless of Kergin’s apparent attempt at obfuscation, at least Colin Powell knew exactly what the Liberal government was after. Powell responded immediately and affirmatively to Canada’s offer to extend the NORAD agreement to include the crucial “aerospace warning” aspect of “missile de-fense.” (See below: “NORAD’s ‘Warning’ and ‘Control’ Functions.”) Powell replied by saying “the United States of America concurs with the provisions set out in your Note.”<sup>7</sup> By doing so, Kergin’s amendment was incorporated into the NORAD

treaty and “missile defense” responsibilities were immediately added to Canada’s workload at NORAD.

## They Got What They Wanted

Back in 1999, the *Ottawa Citizen*’s “defence reporter,” David Pugliese wrote:

“The Canadian military wants to take part in a controversial U.S. plan to build a North American ballistic missile defence shield by contributing more than \$600 million in space hardware [through the Joint Space Project]. Canadian Forces officials have been pushing for a role in the American national missile defence system since 1997, according to Access to Information documents obtained by the *Citizen*. Under the Canadian military plan its participation in the system would be deemed an ‘asymmetrical’ role, where Canada would not directly fund the American missile defence shield but *provide a variety of space and ground equipment for surveillance and other jobs to support the North American Aerospace Defence Command.*”<sup>12</sup> (Emphasis added)

So, as it turned out, Canadian “missile defense” enthusiasts at DND

## NORAD’s ‘Warning’ and ‘Control’ Functions

Canada’s Department of National Defence (DND) had long been pushing for a robust operational assignment for Canada within the U.S. “missile defense” weapons program. As Ernie Regehr, the executive director of Project Ploughshares (an ecumenical agency of the Canadian Council of Churches), stated not long before Canada initiated the transformation of NORAD, DND has:

“made it clear that it wants the U.S. to place responsibility for command and control of the BMD interceptors with NORAD.... That would make it a joint Canada-U.S. operation.”<sup>8</sup>

Although DND officials did not manage to convince their U.S. counterparts to make the command-and-control functions of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) weapons a “joint” operation under NORAD, they did procure a BMD “aerospace warning” job for NORAD. This aspect of the “missile defense” chore had been mentioned eight years earlier, in March 1996, when Chrétien’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, and Clinton’s Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, renewed the NORAD agreement. At that time, they added provisions to the treaty to permit a future “expansion of roles and missions,” which specifically included “missile defence.” They also “redefined” NORAD’s

mission by dividing it into two interdependent functions, namely “Aerospace Warning and Control.”<sup>9</sup>

Axworthy’s letter to Christopher referred to NORAD “terms of reference” that defined “aerospace warning” as:

“the monitoring of man-made objects in space and the *detection, validation and warning* of attack against North America whether by aircraft, missiles or space vehicles, utilizing mutual support arrangements with other commands. An integral part of aerospace warning will continue to entail monitoring of global aerospace activities and related developments.”<sup>10</sup> (Emphasis added)

But the meaning of NORAD’s “aerospace warning” is not restricted merely to “detection, validation and warning.” As Regehr has explained, in the case of BMD:

“the early warning and assessment functions would have to be directly linked to the command and control of the missile defence interception forces. NORAD’s tracking of the path of the incoming missile would in this case be the primary source of coordinates that would be needed to direct the intercepting BMD missile toward the incoming attack missile. So, the NORAD warning and assessment functions would be virtually inseparable from the planned BMD interception functions.”<sup>11</sup>



Frank McKenna

On February 22, 2005, Canada's Ambassador to the U.S., Frank McKenna, said:

"We're part of it ['missile defense'] now, and the question is, what more do we need?"

"I believe that we've given in large measure what the Americans want, which is the ability to use NORAD and their intercept information in order to be able to target weaponry."

- Frank McKenna is a board member of the Carlyle Group.
- One of the world's largest military firms, Carlyle is a private equity corporation owning missile makers like United Defense.
- Osama bin Laden's parents were major investors in Carlyle until shortly after September 11, 2001.
- President George H.W. Bush still travels the world speaking on behalf of the Carlyle Group.
- The Canada Pension Plan has invested heavily in Carlyle.

eventually got almost everything they wanted. But, more importantly, their U.S. counterparts got what they wanted from Canada too. As noted by Dr. John Clearwater, a Canadian military historian and expert on Canada-U.S. relations with regards to nuclear weapons:

"The clear and simple fact is that Paul Martin and the Liberals have already given the United States exactly what it sought to begin with – full co-operation by NORAD in missile-defence work.... NORAD was already... an integral part of the missile-defence structure.

Since Canada already provides manpower for NORAD early-warning and battle-command posts at our expense, and as these are free gifts to operate the missile-defence program, there is no reason to think that Canada is getting a free ride. In fact, Washington gets the extra staffing without paying the bill."<sup>13</sup>

When President George W. Bush visited Canada in December 2004, he used three public fora to urge Canada to join America's expansive, weapons development program. This had the effect of driving home the illusion that Canada was not *already* on board. It also gave Martin the welcome opportunity to please voters by pretending to stand up to Bush.

This is an age-old game. The American administration knows all-too-well that their allies sometimes have to feign opposition to U.S. policies in order to gain or retain domestic political support. Such oppositional play-acting does not, therefore, undermine U.S. goals. On the contrary, because duplicitous trickery of this variety can strengthen the domestic standing of one's closest friends, such fakery is tolerated and even encouraged. (See "The Pretense of Opposition," below.)

### McKenna's Bombshell: Canada Already Said "Yes"

As Regehr has noted, because Canada had "already made the decision to co-operate with the U.S. on BMD"<sup>14</sup> it was not clear what Bush was really asking for. Or, as Michael O'Hanlon, an analyst with America's conservative Brookings Institute expressed it, in early February 2005, it is "hard to see what more Bush wants."<sup>15</sup>

A few weeks later, on February 22, this recognition that Canada had already said "yes" was expressed once again, this time by Frank McKenna, Canada's newly appointed ambassador to the U.S. "We're part of it now," he said during a Parliamentary committee meeting on foreign affairs, "and the question is, what more do we need?"<sup>16</sup>

McKenna also commented that he could not fathom why, during Bush's recent visit to Canada, the president had repeatedly asked Martin to sign on to the "missile defense" program. When grilled by reporters on whether Canada really was already taking part in "missile defense," McKenna's near-sacrilegious statements seemed to astound the fourth estate.

Journalists were flabbergasted. For years they had dutifully parroted the standard, government line that Canada was *not* sharing the "missile defense" burden. Now, they badgered McKenna to explain what he could possibly mean. McKenna tried to enlighten them by pointing to NORAD:

"There's no doubt, in looking back, that the NORAD amendment [of

### The Pretense of Opposition

An excellent example of the "pretense of opposition" is the 1950s case of Egypt's strident, Arab-nationalist leader, Gamal Nasser. Although he was a strong ally of the U.S., having been helped into power by Nazis in a U.S.-backed 1952 coup, he had to publicly *appear* to be anti-American.

In his 1989 autobiography, *The Game Player*, Miles Copeland, a former CIA specialist in Middle East politics, revealed that Nasser was their "Moslem Billy Graham." Copeland tells how

he sent a "psychological operations" expert, named Paul Linebarger, to work for the CIA in Egypt in the 1950s. Linebarger's job involved helping the Egyptian Ministry of Information, and government-backed media, to write anti-U.S. propaganda that would subtly undermine the USSR and assist the U.S.

**Source:** "CIA: tool of American colonialism, past and present," *KCom Journal*, June 30, 2001. Cited in *Press for Conversion!*, May 2003. <coat.ncf.ca/our\_magazine/links/issue51/articles/51\_09.pdf>

August 5, 2004] has given, has created, part — in fact a great deal — of what the United States means in terms of being able to get the input for defensive weaponry.”

This latest NORAD amendment, he said: “allows our American partners in security in North America to obtain the threat assessments and the information they need to make decisions to deploy missiles.”<sup>17</sup>

McKenna was also quoted as saying: “I believe that we’ve given in large measure what the Americans want, which is the ability to use NORAD and their intercept information in or-

ments were like a profound admission of guilt, and they caused a media frenzy.

The next day, McKenna’s observations made front-page headlines and were the subject of lead stories on radio and TV broadcasts across the country. They triggered what the media repeatedly called an “uproar.” The government must have been livid. McKenna’s honesty was blowing their cover. His statements threatened to undermine the Liberals’ ruse that they had not yet decided whether or not to take Canada down the road towards “missile defense.”

In response to the media swirl

the NORAD treaty as a “backdoor deal on missile defence,” he raised McKenna’s comments in the House of Commons and criticised the Liberals, saying they had “secretly agreed to take part in the missile defence system.”<sup>20</sup>

In reality, the change to the NORAD-treaty had not been much of a secret at all, although the media had been hoodwinked by Kergin’s misleading caveat and therefore played down Canada’s new “missile defense” duties. Nevertheless, Canada’s NORAD-connection to “missile defense” was far enough out in the open that the McKenna story should not have caused the eruption of such a firestorm. Canada was, and clearly still is, in denial about its role in “missile defense.”

Perhaps the most dull-witted response to McKenna’s blundering admission of reality, came from Stephen Harper. As leader of Canada’s official opposition, the Conservative Party, which strongly supports the “missile defense” weapons program, Harper must have understood the significance of Canada’s amendment to the NORAD treaty. However, he still indignantly cried out in Parliament:

“How could this prime minister secretly make this decision, clearly breaking every commitment he’s made to this House and to Canadians?”<sup>21</sup>

The shocked reactions to McKenna’s statements exemplify what psychologists refer to as “cognitive dissonance.” This is the phenomenon of mental discomfort that is experienced when there is a

“discrepancy between what you already know or believe, and new information or interpretation. It therefore occurs when there is a need to accommodate new ideas.”<sup>22</sup>

The discomfiting new idea that needed accommodating was that Canada was *already* implicated in so called “missile defense.” However, the Liberal government clearly did not want this dissonant “uproar” to facilitate a transition into any such new public understanding. They needed a way to put McKenna’s cat back into the bag.

Within a few hours of McKenna’s words hitting the news, there was a “leak” to the media. “It is a firm



A few hours after McKenna’s words hit the news, there was a “leak” to the media. “It is a firm ‘no,’” said one anonymous federal official, but “I am not sure it is an indefinite ‘no.’” Within two days, Martin trumped McKenna’s “yes,” by pretending that Canada was saying “no” to “missile defense.”

der to be able to target weaponry.”<sup>18</sup>

With regards to Bush demanding that Canada “sign on” to “missile defense,” McKenna asked reporters: “What does ‘sign on’ mean?... You couldn’t put it more bluntly than that.”<sup>19</sup>

By focusing entirely on Canada’s connection to “missile defense” through its NORAD obligations, McKenna’s admissions actually served to cover up the many *other ways* in which Canada performs as a major, team player on “missile defense.” However, McKenna was at least admitting one significant Canadian contribution to the project, and that is one more contribution than was generally being acknowledged by the media. In the context of almost complete and total denial that Canada was engaged in any way whatsoever, McKenna’s innocent com-

around McKenna’s frank observations, the public, which is generally unsympathetic to Canadian involvement in multi-billion-dollar U.S. wars and weapons schemes, was truly shocked. After being bombarded with such a constant barrage of misstatements, disinformation and lies emanating from government officials intent on covering up Canada’s hypocritical support for “missile defense” weapons programs, McKenna’s admission seemed astounding.

The day after McKenna had wondered aloud about what more the U.S. could want from Canada on “missile defense,” Conservative Party MP, Rick Casson (Lethbridge, AB), like many Canadians, seemed genuinely surprised that this country was in any way engaged in this enterprise. Referring to



'no,'" said one anonymous federal government official, but "I am not sure it is an indefinite 'no.'"<sup>23</sup> The word thus seeped out that in a couple of days Martin would finally announce Canada's ultimate decision regarding involvement in "missile defense." These rumours had it that the government would say "no," and indeed it officially did, on February 24. His widely-publicised "no" was clearly timed as a means of damage control to deal with McKenna's blundering assertion about what should have been a simple and obvious truth. In effect, Martin's "no" was dealt out in order to trump McKenna's "yes."

### Liberal "No": A Toothless, Symbolic, Political Gesture

Martin's purported "no" to "missile defense" was a symbolic gesture undertaken to garner public support for the Liberal's minority government. It was a token action; an example of the kind of unaccountable puff in political

- No Memoranda of Understanding governing Canada's ongoing participation in "missile defense" were changed or created.
- No alterations were made to any Canada-U.S. agreements, such as the NORAD treaty, through which Canada is firmly embedded in "missile defense" efforts.
- Neither was there a parliamentary committee meeting or any Act of Parliament to iron out the details.
- No government edicts or decrees were issued to modify, in any way whatsoever, the progress of Canadian business deals that cement the two countries' efforts in the field of "missile defense" collaboration.
- There does not even seem to have been a government media release issued to explain what the Liberal's illusory "no" really meant.

So, although Martin's lips did mouth a verbal "no," his statement had absolutely no teeth. As far as Canadian corporations, government scientists

in the House of Commons, that Canada had said "no" to any Canada-U.S. alliance on "missile-defense" efforts. He said:

"After careful consideration of the issue, we have decided that Canada will not participate in the U.S. ballistic missile defence system."<sup>24</sup>

And, apparently, it was Pettigrew who had first told the American government how Canada was going to handle the "missile defense" hot potato. Pettigrew is said to have spoken with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice two days earlier.<sup>25</sup> Their encounter in Brussels took place, on February 22. That was the same day that Frank McKenna was telling the media that Canada had already said "yes" to "missile defense." Talk about mixed messages. While Pettigrew was purportedly having a quiet, private encounter with Rice and supposedly passing along the message that Canada would say "no" to "missile defense," whatever that means, McKenna was publicly relay-

Rick Casson



On budget day, Conservative MP Rick Casson, referring to the McKenna debacle, asked if National Defence Minister Bill Graham would resign. Casson said the "flip-flop" was a "deliberate sleight of hand" to mislead Canadians on the Liberal's real "commitment" to "missile defense." Graham deflected the assault saying that Conservatives "would not want me to resign before the budget this afternoon.... [A]ll honourable members will rejoice with me... that today is going to be a great day for national defence in Canada, a great day for the security of Canada... and a great day for the Liberal government."

Bill Graham



rhetoric that Canadian courts have ruled is completely non-binding. In assessing the significance of this "no," the following should be considered.

Martin's public explanation of the government's alleged opposition to "missile defense" was brief, nondescript and contained no substantive details. There was no explanation of what this so-called "no" actually meant:

- The Liberal government's "no" was not linked to any diplomatic exchange of notes with the U.S.

and military personnel are concerned it is still business as usual with regards to the Canada-U.S. partnership on "missile defense." It is difficult to determine what, if anything, Martin's "no" actually did to tangibly affect bilateral relations on this matter. The government's symbolic "no" was not linked to any authentic, government effort to slow or halt, let alone reverse, Canada's existing commitments to "missile defense."

It was Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew who formally declared,

ing a more-reassuring message to assuage "missile defense" advocates, both north and south of the Canada-U.S. border.

### Deflection from Huge, DND-Spending Increases

February 23 was a busy day for the Liberal government. After many years of apparent "dithering," it finally proclaimed that Canada would unequivocally say "no" to "missile defense." That same day, the government re-

vealed the details of their federal budget. The 2005 budget, which just barely squeaked through Parliament during a non-confidence vote on May 19, contained what the Liberal's described, in February, as "the largest increase in defence spending in 20 years – more than \$12.8 billion over the next five years."<sup>26</sup> However, all this extra money was just icing on the cake of the DND budget which now stands over \$13 billion per year.

Even before this new surge in military spending, the Canadian government was already among the "top 10 percent of military spenders" in the world. In recent years, this has placed Canada's military "close to the top of the world's 190-plus countries."<sup>27</sup> However, thanks to this latest influx of riches into Canada's budget for war, the country will edge its way up even further into the prestigious club of the world's most generous military spenders.

On budget day, Conservative MP Rick Casson, referring to the McKenna debacle, asked in parliament whether Canada's Minister of National Defence, Bill Graham, would resign over what Casson called the Liberal "flip-flop" on "missile defense." He said the government was "misleading Canadians" on its real "commitment" to the program by using a "deliberate sleight of hand" trick. Graham deflected this assault saying that the Conservatives "would not want me to resign before the budget this afternoon. I am looking forward to that far too much. I know all honourable members will rejoice with me in knowing that today is going to be a great day for national defence in Canada, a great day for the security of Canada for Canadians and a great day for the Liberal government."<sup>28</sup>

Graham was probably quite right, at least about the Conservative Party's support for the Liberal's display of over-the-top munificence towards



*Belinda Stronach*

*Stephen Harper*

**At the Conservative leadership convention in 2004, top contestants Stronach and Harper, tried to outdo each other's pledges to boost military spending. However, the Liberal government's actual military-budget increases of 2005 – announced on the same day as their supposed "no" to missile defense" – more than doubled even these Conservative's best offers.**

the military. Only a year earlier, Conservative leadership hopefuls were falling all over themselves, at their Toronto convention, trying to outdo one another in their promises of generosity to the military. For instance, front-runner Stephen Harper said that under his rule, the Canadian government would spend an extra \$1.2 billion per year on the military. For her part, high-profile billionaire Belinda Stronach, heir to Magna Corp., a Canadian export industry that used to sell small arms and still profits from lucrative military-vehicle contracts, vowed to give almost as much. She said Canada's military deserved an "extra \$10 billion over the next 10 years."<sup>29</sup>

Stronach later astounded Canadians on May 17, just two days before the 2005 budget was expected to be defeated in a non-confidence vote. She abandoned the party that she had wanted to lead, and joining the Liberals. Her move changed the balance of power, allowed the budget to pass and got Stronach an immediate Cabinet post overseeing human resources and the government's "democratic renewal" process.<sup>30</sup>

The Liberal government's actual military-budget increases more than doubled the best offers mustered a year

earlier by Stronach and Harper. Such overzealous Liberal-government military spending may lead some to wonder: Who needs Conservatives, when we have Liberals like these?

However, despite such pro-military extravagance, the budget was met with very little criticism, even though Canadians generally place military spending far down their list of priorities, after health, education and the environment. Even the NDP and the peace/anti-war movement seemed to mute their criticism of the military's boost in fortunes. Why?

Answering this question immediately brings us face-to-face once again

with the gripping misconception that Canada is a "global peacekeeper." In particular, Canadians who dare speak out against military-spending increases always encounter the fervent and widespread belief that our troops are astoundingly under-equipped.

However, besides this perennial misperception, there was the matter of the budget's timing. Twinning the budget, with Martin's ostensible "no" to "missile defense," was an exceptionally well-crafted, public-relations coup. Even adversaries of the government have to feel a certain admiration for the Liberal's scientific skill at manipulating public opinion. Even outspoken opponents of "missile defense," within the NDP and the peace/anti-war movement, were so engaged in reacting to Martin's much-hyped "no" that attention was deflected away from the military's huge windfall.

However, in practical terms, the Liberal's 13-billion dollar gift to the military had far more real significance than Martin's statement of opposition to "missile defense." And, ironically, the sizeable influx of new cash into Canada's military coffers will actually benefit various "missile defense"-related projects that DND has been harbouring in its books.



## Duplicity and Hypocrisy, as Usual

A few days after the budget was announced, and Martin had issued his historic "no" to "missile defense," Minister Pettigrew stepped onto the stage once again, this time to inject some much-needed clarity into the nebulous meaning of Canada's professed opposition to "missile defense." On February 26, he was interviewed on the CBC-One radio program, "The House." His message must have been highly reassuring to all those Canadians who identify with, are supportive of, involved in, employed by or profiting from "missile defense"-related work in Canada. (See below, "Pettigrew Says Canada

Open for 'Missile Defence' Business.")

One could not imagine a statement that better epitomises the extreme hypocrisy and duplicity on peace issues that is regularly dished out by the Liberal government. Although "missile defense" undermines Canada's supposed support for disarmament at the UN, Pettigrew said Canada did not oppose America's pursuit of "missile defense." Canada, he said, is open for business on "missile defense." He even seemed insulted that the government might be expected to restrict the profit-seeking rights of Canadian firms.

Through Pettigrew, the government talked from both sides of its mouth. To appeal to millions of voters opposed to so-called "missile defense,"

the Liberal solution was to create the outward appearance of taking a stance against this U.S.-led weapons program. Martin and company had long-pretended to "dither" on whether to "join." Then, Martin played his best hand by making a much-ballyhooed gesture designed to create the impression that the government had said "no" to U.S. pressure on "missile defense."

Meanwhile, the Liberals had already given the go-ahead to "missile defense" and they were actually deepening their involvement through a variety of means including direct military-to-military links within NORAD, and through openness and support for all manner of corporate contracts.

...Continued on page 20

## Pettigrew says Canada Open for 'Missile Defence' Business

On February 26, 2005, Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew (PP) was interviewed by Anthony Germain (AG) on CBC Radio One's, "The House."

**AG:** What are we saying no to?

**PP:** Well, to the evolution or operationalisation of that system... They wanted a memorandum of understanding. That is what they required of Great Britain [and] Denmark.

**AG:** Does that mean...the Canadian government will prohibit or ban Canadian companies from participating in building the system?

**PP:** No, we're not prohibiting the development of it. We respect the American choice. The U.S. has made their risk evaluation, it is the way they want to address their security and we are not going to question that....

**AG:** So if a company such as Montreal's...CAE, which has a contract with Boeing to evaluate opportunities in missile defence [and] if we're going to be consistent with Canadian values, how do we let Canadian companies build a system which we do not favour?

**PP:** No, I do not believe we should control Canadian business.... I would be very pleased if Canadian business can contribute to the defense system of the United States....that's very good.

**AG:** You don't think that's a contradiction?... You want to oppose it, but you want Canadian companies to have a part?

**PP:** It is not part of the values we want to express through our defence, but we're not going to stop business from contributing to the system. I don't see any contradiction between saying, as a government, that we don't believe that Canada, as a country, should be part of the system.... This is not a totalitarian state.... In Canada you express certain values and you let the private sector express itself. There is a

free market and we are not going to tell the market and private companies what they should or should not be doing.

On February 26, Minister Pierre Pettigrew clarified the government's "NO" on "missile defence" by saying:



"We're not prohibiting the development of it. We respect the American choice.... I would be very pleased if Canadian business can contribute...that's very good.... We're not saying we don't agree with the U.S..... But we're not being judgmental. We're not being judgmental.... We're not being judgmental here.... we're not being judgmental here. We respect their choices."

**AG:** You don't think there's a bit of hypocrisy there?

**PP:** I certainly don't think that there is any hypocrisy in allowing Canadian companies to bid on contracts around the world.

**AG:** For systems that we don't agree with?

**PP:** Well, for systems we have decided not to participate in. We're not saying we don't agree with the U.S.... We, as a country, have decided not to participate. But we're not being judgmental. We're not being judgmental.

**AG:** Well we're also...against the use of anti-personnel [land] mines. Would you have a problem with a Canadian company making those products?...

**PP:** [Missile defense] is a system that the Americans have decided to invest massive amounts of money in. We're not being judgmental here. We are saying that as far as Canada's foreign policy...[and] defence security is concerned, we have other priorities.... If the Americans have made another choice, we're not being judgmental here. We respect their choices.

**Source:** "The House," CBC Radio, Feb. 26, 2005. Transcribed by Brooks Kind. [www.cbc.ca/thehouse/media/05-02-26-thehouse\\_ram](http://www.cbc.ca/thehouse/media/05-02-26-thehouse_ram).

# What did Pettigrew know and when did he know it?

When Anthony Germaine asked Pierre Pettigrew “What are we saying no to?”, his response was misleading. While it may be true that Canada does not have a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the U.S. on “missile defense,” the fact is that the two countries do not need one because they already have the NORAD treaty. As Canada’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Pettigrew should know that a treaty is as legally binding as an MOU.

Presumably, Pettigrew knows that Canada and the U.S. are enmeshed by more than 80 *other* treaty-level, military agreements, more than 250 military MOUs and about 145 bilateral fora to discuss joint military commitments.<sup>1</sup>

Pettigrew may even know that the U.S.-UK MOU on “missile defense” focuses on Britain’s main contribution to the weapons project, namely, a single U.S. radar station on British soil. As the their “ballistic missile defense” MOU states:

“A key [UK] contribution to this U.S. DoD [Department of Defense] deployment is U.K....support through an upgrade of the Early Warning Radar at Royal Air Force Fylingdales.”<sup>2</sup>

Pettigrew perhaps even knows that the 1951 U.S.-Denmark MOU<sup>3</sup>, deals with America’s Thule Air Force Base in Greenland. Throughout the Cold War, Thule housed a single, U.S. radar facility similar to more than 50 NORAD radar facilities across Canada’s north. The MOU was amended to allow the U.S. to upgrade its one Greenland-based, early-warning radar system for “missile defense” uses.<sup>4</sup>

Perhaps Pettigrew knows that a Canadian company maintains and operates the Greenland- and UK-based “missile defense” radar stations. (See “U.S. Air Force Space Command’s SSPARS,” on pages 24-25).

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell signed the amended U.S.-Danish MOU on August 6, 2004, the anniversary of America’s unilateral obliteration of Hiroshima. Here’s another coincidence, August 6, 2004, was just *one day after* Canada asked the U.S. to add “missile defense” warning and targeting functions to NORAD. That was just

Pierre Pettigrew



On Friday 13<sup>th</sup> of August 2004, just one week after Pettigrew and Powell quietly formalised NORAD’s “missile defense” role, very few attended their media conference. It focused *not* on NORAD but on Iran’s potential nuclear weapons threat. Powell was back 90 minutes later, with a black cat named after him. The photo op happened “amid furious camera clicks and blinding flashes from a horde of photographers in the State Department’s Treaty Room.”

two weeks into rookie Pettigrew’s stint as Foreign Affairs Minister.<sup>5</sup>

Powell was the very first U.S. Secretary of State to visit Greenland. He was there on August 6 for a signing ceremony and conducted at least one media interview. Such was the importance to the U.S. of changing the 1950s-era, military agreement to add “missile defense” functions to a single radar facility in Greenland.

In contrast, Powell did not stop over in Ottawa on August 5 to update the 1950s NORAD treaty. Neither did conduct any media interviews to thank Canada for adding “missile defense” functions to more than 50 NORAD radar facilities in Canada. A Pettigrew-Powell media conference in Washington on August 13, dealt not with NORAD, but axis-of-evil member Iran.

Pettigrew was savvy enough not to mention NORAD during his CBC interview about Canada’s “no” to “missile defense.” For his part, the interviewer didn’t reference it either. Perhaps it was in this same spirit of avoidance that, last August, Pettigrew and



Colin Powell with a prize-winning black cat “Colin Powell.”

company decided to sidestep the bright spotlight that a high-level visit from Powell would have shone on Canada’s effort to formalise its commitment to “missile defense” through NORAD.

With Canada willing to allow NORAD to perform “missile defense” duties, Powell wasn’t about to complain. Knowing that the Canadian government was trying very hard to downplay its collaboration on “missile defense,” Powell was willing to play along. The Canadian government’s “secret” was safe with him.

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## The Trap that some Call a Victory

Although most Canadians are deeply suspicious of the U.S. plan to build what the media so-often calls a “missile defense shield,” most are still unaware that, even setting aside Canada’s commitment to “missile defense” through NORAD, their government, corporations, scientists and military forces have had a long-standing role in this massive, U.S.-led program to develop and improve advanced weapons systems.

The first mistake was to accept the validity of the central question posed again and again by the corporate media: “Should Canada *get involved* in missile defense?” By uncritically accepting this phony question, many in the peace movement abdicated their ability to expose the reality of Canada’s *existing* involvement. Many activists worked so hard to spread the word to the media, politicians and the general public that Canada should not *get* involved in “missile defense,” that the Canadian public became even more deeply entranced in the pleasant, but delusory, myth of this country’s non-involvement.

So, when Martin trumpeted the claim that Canada was “saying no” to the controversial weapons program, a sigh of relief was heard across the country. Not realising that Martin’s “no” was a symbolic one with no bearing on Canada’s already deeply-ingrained commitment to the missile scheme, Canadians largely embraced Martin’s “no” at face value and gave it much more practical significance than it really deserved.

This trusting response was equally true of many peace activists. For several years, Canada’s peace/anti-war movement had focused tremendous efforts on opposing the “missile defense” weapons program. Realising all-too-well that such work often goes unappreciated, it is with great reluctance that I offer even well-intentioned, constructive criticism. However, if our movement is to grow in effectiveness, we must be willing to debate our successes and our failures. With this hope, and with the greatest respect for friends and colleagues throughout our movement, I feel compelled to draw attention to a trap into which we have fallen.

Tens of thousands of concerned

Canadians wrote letters to newspaper editors and politicians, to sign petitions, to hold educational events and to march in protests opposing “missile defense.” Many of these commendable actions were, however, marred because they overtly stated their goal in terms of trying to *prevent* Canada from *becoming* an accessory to the massive, U.S. weapons program known as “missile defense.” This, of course, belied the commonly-held assumption that Canada was not *already* involved.

Like most Canadians, peace activists have yet to appreciate that their



country *is* playing several essential parts in so-called “missile defense.” As a result, as soon as Martin uttered his famous “no,” many activists sprang into action, circulating thousands of congratulatory emails, posting “We Win!” messages on their websites, holding celebratory parties, telling the media that they were drinking champagne and then soliciting funds from supporters for their supposedly, “well-informed” campaigns that had so successfully stopped the government from *joining* “missile defense.”

The negative effects of accepting the Liberal government’s propaganda at face value have been manifold. Not only did the peace movement’s response serve to concretise the already-widespread public misperception that Canada was “missile defense”-free, it also lent the peace movement’s good name and credibility to the Liberal government, which has

been the main promoter and financier of so many Canadian-led “missile defense” programs. Although the Liberals have expressed no intention whatsoever of dismantling any of the multifarious “missile defense” support systems that they have so-carefully constructed over the years, many in the peace movement were put in the extremely compromising position of supporting the government for its deceptive stance on “missile defense.”

Unfortunately, this response to the government’s trickery actually sabotaged the ongoing need for a pro-

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Although Canada is more deeply involved in “missile defense” than ever before, its role is now more effectively cloaked and hidden. Because of the unskeptical willingness to believe the Liberal government’s subterfuge and the eagerness by some naïve elements within the peace movement to claim a success, efforts to stop Canada’s many ongoing “missile defense” affiliations must now begin virtually from scratch.

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longed struggle to withdraw Canada from its already-sizable participation in “missile defense” programs. The mistaken impression that the “battle” to *prevent* Canada from *joining* “missile defense,” is now over because we have “won,” stopped the growing momentum of opposition that had been built up by the Canadian peace movement over many years. That momentum has now ground to a halt.

It was an absolutely brilliant trap set by the Liberal government. Now that Canadians had been handed a symbolic “no,” and the peace movement had celebrated its Pyrrhic victory, where does that leave those of us who wish to struggle against Canada’s very real and long-standing role in “missile defense?” This struggle to withdraw Canada from its entanglement in the “missile defense” web of deceit is still very important. Although Canada is more deeply involved in “missile defense”



than ever before, its role is now more effectively cloaked and hidden. Because of the unskeptical willingness to believe the Liberal government's subterfuge and eagerness to claim a success, activist's efforts to stop Canada's ongoing role in "missile defense" must now begin virtually from scratch.

Why would the public now join a campaign to end Canada's complicity in "missile defense"? People have been successfully duped into believing the lie that Canada was *never* involved. What's more, with Martin's "no," the government is now seen as committed to stopping any future involvement.

To make matters worse, the mistaken impression left on the public by the media, and even some naïve elements within the peace movement, is that Martin said "no" because he is so responsive to "well-informed public opinion." This blind faith in the Liberal government's democratic nature, conveys the wildly-mistaken belief that Martin and his party can be trusted to follow the thoughtful lead of the peace movement, rather than the priorities of their real allies in the corporate world.

Such false hopes for the Liberal Party have often dragged down the peace movement's ambitions. In reality, both the Liberal and Conservative Parties are inextricably linked in a thousand ways to the corporate world.

Both parties will use whatever Machiavellian contrivances they can muster to serve their real masters. Hypocrisy, duplicity and the doling out of pseudo-victories are standard devices in the toolkit of such political hucksters.

If we as a peace movement give credibility to the erroneous belief that the powerful leadership controlling the Liberal Party is our ally, and that it will work with us to forge a new Canada that stands against profiting from war, then we are hopelessly naïve and co-opted. The Liberals and Conservatives draw their leaders from the same corporate pool. They divide between them the lion's share of support from Canada's powerful business elite, including those that benefit from war. So, regardless of which party gains electoral power, this same elite always wins.

By unreservedly praising wily government public-relations gestures, like the clever pretence of opposing

"missile defense," we ignore that this move was contrivance was cynically undertaken to win voters' support and confidence. By doing so, we also ignore the many back-room deals that continue to draw Canada deeper and deeper into a morass of weapons programs that deplete our public treasury in order to enrich the coffers of war pri-

vateers. Such innocent acceptance of the government's deliberate ploys to deceive will only help to prolong Canada's position as one of the world's top military spenders and exporters. And, it will only serve to continue Canada's position as a prominent team-player in the euphemistically-labelled program to build a "missile defense shield."

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