

Meggitt Defence Systems Canada


Meggitt Defence Systems Canada, formerly known as Schreiner Target Services Canada (see below), has received several multi-year contracts to supply Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) for use as targets to test and evaluate the AEGIS weapons system. AEGIS forms the basis of sea-based, "missile defense" programs of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency. (See sub-heading "AEGIS Combat System" p. 22, and sidebar, "U.S. using AEGIS to draw Allied Navies into BMD," pp. 14-15.)

Meggitt makes six different types of UAVs. At least one of these, the Vindicator Target System, is still in use for testing the AEGIS "missile defense" combat system.

This Meggitt product is a slow-speed, winged vehicle about 2.7 meters in length. It is described as a

"long-endurance, cost-effective, recoverable aerial target drone with a fully programmable digital autopilot at the heart of its avionics package."¹

Meggitt's new and improved Vindicator II has "an upgraded Flight Control system with a 3 axis vertical gyroscope."² The vehicle's flight path is controlled by Meggitt's Universal



For at least seven years, these Canadian targets have been used to test and evaluate AEGIS weapons system, the backbone of the U.S. Navy's "missile defense" program.

Target Control Station. It makes the target drone move in "precise flight profiles"

that are exactly repeatable or variable to meet the exact requirements of individual weapons sensing and

tracking systems."³

The Vindicator II was used in so called "test and evaluation (T&E) events" for AEGIS "missile defense" weapons systems on at least seven occasions between 1999 and 2004. These



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Formerly known as Schreiner Target Services Canada

In October 2004, a international group of military companies based in England, called Meggitt PLC, reached an agreement to purchase Schreiner Target Services Canada for £2.9 million. Schreiner Canada was thus added to Meggitt's Defence Systems division.

Schreiner Canada, the "Canadian Centre of Excellence for Towed Targets and UAVs,"¹ was a subsidiary of the Netherlands-based Schreiner Luchtvaart Groep BV. It was owned by Canada's CHC Helicopter Corp., in Vancouver.²

Schreiner's major export clients included the U.S.,



Saudi Arabia, Norway, Japan and Singapore³ and it had several multiyear contracts with Canada's military.⁴

Schreiner Canada's new owner, Meggitt PLC, operates in

North America, Europe and Asia, and touts itself as "the world leader in aerial free flying and towed targets, electronic scoring and electro-mechanical launch and recovery systems."⁵


The products of Meggitt Defence Systems "are used to support, train and evaluate armed forces and law enforcement agencies worldwide."⁶

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weapons tests occurred in June and December 1999, November 2000, February and September 2002, October 2003 and March 2004. They took place at U.S. weapons-testing ranges in Hawaii, Puerto Rico and California.⁴

Thanks to the *Federal Business Opportunities (FBO) Daily*, a U.S. internet source that publishes solicitations for, and announcements of, U.S. government contracts, we have some details about two of the contracts that Schreiner Canada received for the supply of targets to test the U.S. Navy's AEGIS "missile defense" weapons system. For instance, in March 2001, the *FBO Daily* announced that the Weapons Division of the U.S. Naval Air Warfare Center, in Point Mugu, California, "award[ed] a contract, using other than



The Vindicator

Meggitt Canada is the "Canadian Centre of Excellence for Targets and Unmanned Vehicles"

full and open competition"⁵ to Schreiner Canada. This sole-source contract was for providing:

"slow speed, low altitude, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) target services. These services are required in support of AEGIS test and evaluation events and operations for tracking and live missile-firing exercise. The contractor shall provide all the UAV flight services including a

validated threat helicopter radar signature simulation (HRSS) unit as a turn-key operation including target platform launch, in-flight control, and recovery at various Navy ranges. This contract shall be for approximately eight target deployments over a three-year period."⁶

Three years later, after the successful completion of that contract, Schreiner Canada received a gushing

The Offensive "Missile Defense" Program is Right On Target

Meggitt Defence Systems Canada—and its predecessor Schreiner Target Services Canada—have provided extremely easy-to-hit targets for testing AEGIS weapons systems. Similarly, Canada's NovAtel, which makes GPS systems, has sold technology used in testing "missile defense" weapons. Many critics of "missile defense," use such evidence to argue that the

U.S. will be able to keep its more technologically-advanced adversaries from using cheap decoys to baffle and overwhelm U.S. "missile defense" targeting systems when they fire their ballistic missiles at the U.S. homeland?

Such questions, are used to critique the effectiveness of "missile defense." (See item on Dr. Theodore Postol, pp. 36-37.) These critiques are widely off target, however,

tests are rigged and that America's program to build a "defensive shield" is far behind schedule.


Some readers may be led to sarcastically wonder how the U.S. will ever manage to convince its mortal enemies that they should always use easily-targeted, slow-flying missiles that follow flight paths that have been approved in advance by the Pentagon. Or, how the U.S. will convince its foes to put GPS beacons on their weapons of mass destruction so that U.S. weapons sensors will be able to find them. Or, how

when it comes to revealing a hidden role of the "missile defense" program, i.e., improving America's offensive arsenals.

Under the aegis of the cleverly-termed "missile defense" program, the U.S. military is creating and developing whole new weapons systems as well as using elaborate testing programs to improve the targeting capabilities of their existing missile systems. Such advances in American weapons technologies can and will, of course, eventually be used for a wide variety of purposes, including offensive ones. Some of the fu-



SM-3



Taurus-3

Who can stop the U.S. from using these "missile defense" weapons from targeting cities?

“Letter of Appreciation” from the U.S. Naval officer who was responsible for that “missile defense” weapons testing program. The letter, signed by Elliott Dematta of the Program Executive Office, Integrated Warfare Systems, Department of the Navy, in Washington D.C., was addressed to Schreiner’s vice president and general manager, Robert Palmer. This formal letter, dated May 5, 2003, is now posted on the Meggitt PLC website. It reveals some additional details about the AEGIS “missile defense” testing program in which Schreiner Canada participated. In his letter, Dematta dished out some praise:

“I want to express our appreciation to the Vindicator UAV team for their outstanding work in preparing for and conducting the target tracking

and missile firing exercises at the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility [Vieques, Puerto Rico] and Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division range at Point Mugu, California... February 2002 through March 2003.”⁷

The letter goes on to reveal that this Canadian company had made a significant contribution to what was a first in the U.S. “missile defense” testing program. Dematta revealed that these: “tracking and missile firing events were the first time we have operationally flown UAVs during our at-sea test program. The responsiveness of your team, in meeting the many challenges presented in preparing for these AEGIS Program firsts contributed greatly to the success

of the events.”⁸

On May 26, 2004, only a few weeks after Dematta wrote this glowing letter of thanks for Canada’s support, the *FBO Daily* announced that the U.S. Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, intended to procure Schreiner’s services for

“additional slow speed, low altitude, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) target services. These services are required in support of AEGIS test and evaluation (T&E) events and operations for tracking and live missile-firing exercises. This contract modification shall be for approximately ten (10) target deployments over a two-year period of performance.”⁹

These tests, which will continue until the spring of 2006, have been con-

ture uses of these new and improved weapons will likely bear no resemblance whatsoever to the now widespread myths about a “missile defense shield” that will supposedly defend the American population.

The tracking, targeting and firing systems of various American weapons are now being tested and enhanced under the protection of an extensive public relations scheme. The elaborate pretext is that “missile defense” weapons technologies are now being created and improved upon in order to provide the U.S. military with a “defensive shield” to heroically protect the “homeland” from a ruthless attack by rogue states, or perhaps by terrorists that have gained possession of a few expensive, ballistic missiles.

However, the reality is that once a U.S. missile system has been created or upgraded—using Canadian technology and the convenient “missile defense” excuse—there will be no turning back. There is no reason why such high-tech, U.S. weapons systems, once developed and/or improved, will *have* to be used to fulfil the very specific—and farfetched—purpose of providing a supposed

“missile defense shield” to protect Americans and their allies. There is no reason why these “missile defense” weapons could not be used for offensive purposes is naïve.

Therefore, arguments that critique U.S. “missile defense” weapons systems because they have not been terribly successful when fired at fast-moving, incoming mis-

siles, or that they can be overwhelmed by decoys, are missing the point. Such arguments wrongly assume that the only purpose of America’s “missile defense” program is to design and improve weapons so they can target incoming missiles. Who could possibly stop the U.S. military from using their newly-acquired “missile defense” weapons to attack and destroy whatever slow-moving or even stationary targets are within their range?

One of the most important roles of today’s antiwar movement is to expose the *offensive* realities of the massive, weapons development program that is popularly known by the deceptive term—“missile defense.” To do this, we must avoid the trap of using terms like “defense,” that are thrown at us by war advocates when describing these weapons systems.

Hidden behind the false flag of deceptive terms, like “missile shield” and “defensive,” there is a massive, weapons development and testing program. The language used to define this program is designed to mislead people into believing that its purpose is purely defensive.

What better ploy could be devised to garner public support for plans to spend hundreds of billions on offensive weapons that might otherwise be recognised as excessive, aggressive and totally unnecessary?

Perhaps using images of smiling children in uniform saluting behind the U.S. flag?



Photo: U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command website

ducted at the same three U.S. weapons ranges: Barking Sands, Hawaii; Point Mugu, California and Wallops Island, Virginia.”¹⁰

On October 5, 2004, Elliott Dematta, whose “letter of appreciation” praised Schreiner’s contribution to AEGIS “missile defense” testing, made a presentation at a three-day, military trade show/conference on Unmanned

Vehicle Systems, organized by Aviation Alberta. The event’s delegates were described in the local Medicine Hat, Alberta, paper as “a mix of military brass, political figures, industry heavyweights and international players.”¹¹

Dematta’s talk, called “Canadian Targets for U.S. Navy Test & Evaluation” provides many additional details about the many “missile

defense” tests in which Schreiner’s targets were used. We learn, for instance, that the purpose of these tests was to “verify radar tracking and confirm SM-2 [Standard Missile-2] intercept capabilities against UAV and Helo [simulated helicopter] targets.”¹²

We also learn that after the extensive testing of seven different types of UAVs, Canada’s Schreiner option

Industry Canada’s Support for War and BMD

Why are Canadian military products so inexpensive that they are often preferred by the Pentagon? The answer can often be found in Canada’s corporate-welfare system.

Industry Canada, for instance, is proud of its generous “investments” in Canadian war industries. The main artery through which the government pours public money into the coffers of military industries, is Industry Canada’s Technology Partnerships Canada program. Originally called the Defence Industry Productivity (DIP) program, it has given away literally billions of dollars to Canada’s war industries.

Another major government program to subsidise domestic war industries is marketed under the guise of the Canada’s “Industrial and Regional Benefits [IRB] Policy.” This program was discussed at an Industry Canada presentation during a military trade show/conference on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in October, 2004. (It was at this same event that Elliott Dematta, of the U.S. Navy’s Integrated Warfare Systems’ Program Executive Office, passionately eulogized the role of Canadian target systems in conducting U.S. AEGIS weapons tests. See article above.)

At that military trade show/conference, Bryan Dalphy, the “senior investment officer” responsible for the so called “Defence Industries” portfolio at Industry Canada, gave a presentation called: “Canada’s Industrial and Regional Benefits [IRB] Policy.”¹ He outlined the Canadian government’s generous role in supporting domestic military industries. The crowning achievement of IC’s so called “investment” strategy is the IRB program. In reality, this is a simply a government program to subsidize Canadian military corporations.

Dalphy, however, described the IRB program in different terms, saying it is “Canada’s model of ‘industrial participation.’” He also noted the following points about it:

- “Approved by Cabinet in 1986, the program uses defence procurement to lever long-term industrial and regional development.
- Not a defence industrial base program, though largest proportion of benefits falls within the defence and aerospace sectors.
- Generally IRBs are mandatory for projects over \$100 million (Major Crown Projects), and discretionary in the \$2 to 100 million range.”²

Dalphy’s “Snapshot of Current and Future IRB Projects” is most telling. He explained that “*current* IRB activities” include 24 projects with a total contract value of \$5.7 billion dollars. He proudly noted that there were also 24



**Industry
Canada**

In 2004, Ballistic Missile Defense topped Industry Canada’s (IC) list of “Strategic Business Opportunities.” In October 2004, at an Alberta arms trade show, Bryan Dalphy—IC’s “senior investment officer” for so-called “Defence Industries”—promoted “Ballistic Missile Defence” as the first item on a list of “Strategic Business Opportunities.” Dalphy told the assembled arms company reps to contact Lucie Boily, Industry Canada’s “BMD Officer.”

future IRB contracts worth \$15.4 billion. Not surprisingly, most of these “investments” are war-related and are disbursed through the Department of National Defence.

Canada’s largest, war-related industries are currently the main beneficiaries of IRB “commitments,” namely: Boeing, General Dynamics Canada, Lockheed Martin, EH Industries and BAE Systems.³

One thing that Dalphy, however, did not mention is that each of these war-related corporations, that are benefiting from the unwitting generosity of the Canadian taxpayer, are foreign-owned. The first three are U.S.-owned, EHI is a British-Italian venture and BAE Systems is British.

But, even if these and other war companies—that receive billions in public funds—were domestically owned, such “investments” would still not provide much benefit to Canadian society. The problem is not just that taxes are helping foreign capitalists, but that public monies are being wasted on producing of weapons and other war-related hardware.

Canadian government subsidies should instead be used to support sectors of the economy that are socially-useful. If Canadian military industries were truly defending Canada, one could argue that such IRB “investments” do indeed support Canadian society. However, most of Canada’s military production is exported and most of it is feeding the U.S. war economy. Rather than enhancing Canadian public security, U.S.-led wars—that Canadian taxpayers are enabling and subsidising—while beneficial to large corporations,

was finally chosen over its closest runner up, the Pioneer UAV¹³ which is produced by Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd. and marketed in the U.S. by Pioneer UAV, Inc. of Maryland.¹⁴

Dematta's presentation also reveals some details about the Schreiner UAV's that were equipped with Helicopter Radar Signature Simulation (HRSS) unit, which allows the UAV to

pretend to be a helicopter. The Vindicator II/HRSS was used as a "Helo emulator during Aegis T&E events" in June 2000, March 2002, March and July 2003. In addition to the three U.S. military tests sites mentioned previously, these HRSS tests were also done in Virginia¹⁵ at NASA'S Wallops Flight Facility in 2003.¹⁶ (That was the location of "missile defense" weapons tests using an-

other Canadian target, the Black Brant rocket. It was created and built with government assistance by Bristol Aerospace of Winnipeg, Manitoba. (See "Bristol Aerospace," *Press for Conversion!*, June 2005, issue 56, pp. 28-31.)

In his presentation, Dematta overflowed with praise for Schreiner's Vindicator II targets, saying they "satisfied critical needs," "were used in a

are detrimental to the peace and security of Canadians.

If instead of "investing" billions in war industries, the Canadian government used public resources to support job-creation programs that actually contributed to Canadian society, in sectors such as health, housing, education and day care, etc., then the real benefits to Canadians would be significant. For every billion dollars that is invested in such socially-useful, labour-intensive sectors of the economy, thousands of additional jobs are created than with comparable subsidies to companies in the highly capital-intensive, military-industrial sector. But, besides simply creating more jobs, such civilian investments would actually be contributing to Canadian social needs. This cannot be said for Canada's military industrial "investment" program.

For decades, Canadian handouts to military corporations have largely been designed to:

- (1) add to the profits already made by companies that are, in turn, financially supportive of Canada's Liberal and Conservative political parties, and
- (2) tailor production capacities of Canada's military industries so they can help fulfil the war-fighting needs of our close friend and neighbour to the south, i.e., the U.S.

"Strategic Business Opportunities" for "Missile Defense"

Dalphy concluded his presentation on the benefits of the government's IRB subsidies to Canadian military companies, by listing six major categories of "Strategic Business Opportunities."⁴ Here are the six "opportunities" that Industry Canada recommended to its corporate partners in the military industrial sector:

- "Ballistic Missile Defence
- Joint Strike Fighter
- Maritime Helicopter Project
- Joint Supply Ship
- Fixed Wing Search and Rescue
- Mobile Gun System"⁵


The first item on Dalphy's list of "Strategic Business Opportunities" was none other than "Ballistic Missile Defence"! What does this tell us about the government attitude toward this massive U.S.-led weapons-development program? Dalphy was careful to note that there had been "no decision yet on official participation" in BMD.

In case any of the delegates were wondering about *unofficial* participation, Dalphy clarified that that there was "potential high-technology participation by Canadian firms."⁴

What's more, Dalphy then informed attendees at this arms trade show that the name of Industry Canada's "BMD Officer," was Lucie Boily. And, in case they wanted to scribe it down for future reference, Dalphy's powerpoint presentation included the name and email address of the government's official "BMD Officer," <boily.lucie@ic.gc.ca>⁶ It is, of course, unknown how many arms industry reps availed themselves of this government support re: "potential high-technology participation" in "strategic business opportunities" of the "Ballistic Missile Defence" weapons program.

By including "Ballistic Missile Defence" as the very first item on the list of "Strategic Business Opportunities," along with existing areas in which Canadian military businesses are currently scoring multibillion-dollar contracts, Dalphy was certainly sending out the signal that the government was supportive of Canadian corporations wishing to cash in on lucrative "missile defense" contracts.

And, the fact that Industry Canada had already assigned a full-time, top-ranking, staff officer to promote Ballistic Missile Defense, and that the email address of this "BMD Officer" was circulated at an military-industry trade show/conference in October 2004, also demonstrates that the Liberal government was already helping Canadian corporations that wanted to take advantage of the biggest weapons development program in world history, namely America's so called "missile defense" program. *Thanks Canada!*



David Emerson, Canada's Industry Minister, has spoken glowingly about the industrial benefits of "missile defense." He was a director of MacDonald Dettwiler & Assoc. (MDA), a BC company whose U.S. owner (OrbitalSciences) was a major "missile defense" weapons contractor. When the Liberal government privatised two publicly-funded radar satellites—worth about \$1 billion—it gave them to MDA. Radarsat data was sold to the Pentagon by an OrbitalSciences subsidiary run by retired military men who had spent their careers promoting "missile defense."

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variety of important T&E events to satisfy a number of critical missions” and that they were “highly beneficial,” “affordable, portable and flexible solution” that “will continue to serve a role in U.S. Navy T&E.”¹⁷ He concluded with this note on “future joint initiatives”:

“Joint efforts with our Canadian partners help ensure efficient and effective solutions [and] Canadian target

utilization highly beneficial to past and future U.S. Navy T&E efforts.”¹⁸

Dematta highlighted one main factor that he convincingly argued were what made Schreiner Canada’s targets the very best choice for “AEGIS missile defense” T&E needs. That factor was their *cost*. The bottom line, he said, is that these Canadian-made targets are more “affordable” than their alterna-

tives.¹⁹ (To learn why Canadian military products are often the best buy for foreign military customers, see “Industry Canada’s Support for War and BMD,” pp. 32-33.)

Canadian government programs dispense public funds to increase the profitability of war industries, like Meggitt, that keep “missile defense” weapons on target. *Thanks Canada.*

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Canadian Commercial Corporation

The CCC does more than \$1.2 billion in business annually, approximately 70% of it weapons, weapons components and services to the Pentagon and NASA.

Canada’s hospitals are collapsing, public schools are being closed, and the ranks of our homeless increase, but weapons exporters take shelter from the economic storm under the Canadian flag. “For Canadian Exporters, CCC wraps the Canadian flag around their proposal, providing a government-backed guarantee of contract performance,” says the CCC. We go all the way for the USA.

The U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) takes care of friends like Canada, who treat their flag with such reverence. “All purchases from Canada over US\$100,000 must be contracted through the CCC,” according to the Defence Production and Sharing Agreement, in effect since 1956.

Dealing with the CCC means Canadian companies get treated one better than U.S. firms. They are exempt from U.S. cost-accounting standards, import taxation and parts of the Buy American Act. Canadian taxpayers pick up the tab.

The CCC is a Crown Corporation, wholly owned by the Canadian people, managed by our government. Thus when the CCC “becomes the prime contractor for the DoD, Canadian citizens are underwriting the American Empire.

Source: Excerpt, Stephen James-Kerr, “Meet Canada, the Global Arms Dealer,” May 25, 2003. <paulmartintime.ca/mediacoverage/000008.html>

Dave W. Stapley was appointed by International Trade Minister, Pierre Pettigrew, to the CCC’s Board of Directors in 2000¹ and was reappointed for another three-year term in 2003.² He has been President of DRS Technologies Canada since 1998. (See pp. 5-11). Before that he worked for DRS Canada’s predecessor, Spar Aerospace, where he rose from Director “Government Relations and Business Development” (1986-1991), to Vice President “Government Relations and Marketing” (1991-1992), to President, Spar Applied Systems (1992-1998).³

Conflict of Interest?

For at least five years now, Stapley has also been an Executive Vice President of the Canadian Defence Industries Association,⁴ Canada’s most powerful lobby group promoting the interests of war industries.

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