Freedom Network (Réseau Liberté):
Embedding CBC Reporters in Haiti’s Elitist Media

By Richard Sanders, Editor, Press for Conversion!

The goal of Freedom Network (Réseau Liberté - RL), says Paul Breton, the director of its international programs, is to assist the media in “countries in transition to democracy.”1  RL’s founder and CEO, Réal Barnabé, also stresses their noble sounding ambition to “promote press freedom in countries in transition, and in emerging countries,”2  such as “Iraq, Haiti, Kosovo [and] Bosnia.”3 

Left unmentioned is that these places have all been ravaged by wars, invasions and/or regime changes in which Canada and its allies have actively participated. And neither do Barnabé or Breton question whether these military interventions have actually created real “transitions to democracy.” That is accepted as a matter of faith.

Since its creation in 1996, RL has worked hand in glove with the Canadian government in about 25 carefully targeted countries.4  In this work, funded largely by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), RL has often teamed up with other Canadian organizations. For example, when conducting seminars on “business journalism” for Haitians and Iraqis, RL teamed up with the Haïtian-Canadian Chamber of Commerce and Industry5 and Alternatives,6 respectively.  (See pp.6-7.)

RL also works with a slew of governmental and quasi-governmental entities that support the kind of democracy, human rights, development and press freedom, that led to the 2004 regime change in Haiti. (See pp.30-31.)

Media Project in Haiti

RL was initially contracted by CIDA—during the Canadian-backed coup regime—to conduct a two-year, $2 million project called “Media and Democratic Development in Haiti.”7  This project began in May 20058  but has been extended until August 2008.9  RL’s partners in this enterprise are Alternatives, which created a “Media in Haiti” website10  and the CBC’s Canadian Institute for Training in Public Broadcasting (CITPB), which described the project as “promoting democratic transition in Haiti.”11  

Their method of promoting democracy includes sending Canadian journalists to work in the Haitian newsrooms of an extremely right-wing media cartel called the National Association of the Haitian Media (ANMH).  This network—formed in 2001 by the “owners and directors of 12 radio and three TV stations”12 —was a cornerstone of the Group of 184 (G184) (See pp.50-53). This CIDA-funded13 coalition’s propaganda effort to overthrow Haiti’s democratically elected Lavalas Party government, was led by Haiti’s media elite in ANMH. See pp.34-37.)

ANMH’s stated “mission” is “to help Haitian journalists’ associations and to professionalise the Haitian media.”14   This directly matches RL’s mission to “support activities” of Haitian “journalists’ or media associations”15 and to assist in the “professionalization of a free press.”16  

With this shared ideological mission, RL forged intimate ties with several ANMH companies. Backed by CIDA, RL hired Canadian journalists to spend a month at a time working with six Haitian news teams including ANMH’s Le Matin, Le Nouvelliste, Radio Metropole and Radio Caraibes. In January 2004, independent journalist Kevin Pina, listed these radio stations among the

“active players in the U.S. campaign to destabilize Haiti’s constitutional government. With total disregard for principles of ‘objective journalism,’ they circulate exaggerated reports of violence by Lavalas, turn a blind eye to violence on the part of the opposition [whose]....clear objective...is to throw the constitution in the trash and force President Aristide to resign.”17 

This process of working “alongside reporters and editors,...in the field”18  and “in their daily tasks,”19  says RL, means “the expert acts as a partner.”20   This strategy created a “bond of trust” between these Canadians and the Haitian “journalists and managers”21 who hosted them. RL, which calls this process “accompanying” or “coaching,” notes that they made it “clear that the coaching would respect the needs and editorial line and freedom of the media.”22  (Emphasis added.)

What was the “editorial line” of Haiti’s media?  Charles Arthur’s report on Haiti in the World Press Freedom Review explained:

“The main, Port-au-Prince-based media houses—grouped in the National Association of Haitian Media (ANMH)—continued to take an open position of support for the ouster of [Aristide’s] Lavalas Family government and of extreme hostility to the large swathes of the poor population who continued to voice support for the exiled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The ANMH radio stations in particular exercised a clear editorial line favouring the Group of 184, a political platform led by the country’s small private sector. At the same time, these stations’ news broadcasts consistently described opponents of the interim government, living in shanty-towns, such as Bel Air and Cité Soleil, as ‘outlaws’ and ‘terrorists.’”23 

Such views were echoed in RL’s newsletter when Guy Filion—the assistant program director for CBC’s French news services—praised the Haitian media’s election coverage by saying that besides airing live media conferences of the coup-installed prime minister, the regime’s police and the UN forces occupying the country, “Even thugs from Cité Soleil were giving interviews on television! This was true election coverage....”24   This use of “thugs” to represent those Haitians who opposed the coup regime (and who had previously empowered Aristide’s government in two landslide electoral victories) cannot be considered balanced reporting. However, it was considered “true election coverage” by this CIDA-paid Canadian journalist hired by RL to train Haiti’s media in proper, election journalism.

It is not known whether Filion harboured these prejudices before his deployment to Haiti, or whether he acquired them once there while “trying to understand,” as he put it, “the state of mind of the directors of the Haitian national television [TNH].”25 

By placing Canadian journalists into this rabidly partisan, anti-Aristide milieu, RL ran ethical risks akin to embedding journalists within military forces. Reporters placed in ANMH’s combative newsrooms may not face physical casualties, but they do work on the frontlines of an information war where assaults on objectivity occur daily. If RL’s Canadian journalists did not already harbour anti-Aristide sentiments before their intensive “coaching” experiences, they would certainly risk absorbing such political predilections after being submerged in the propaganda campaigns of Haiti’s elite media. Not unlike captives, who—when released—spout the political rhetoric of their kidnappers (in what is called the “Stockholm Syndrome”), RL journalists would likely return home from Haiti armed with newly implanted political biases that could then be spread liberally among their colleagues in the media and hence to the broader Canadian public. A cynical mind might even think that such domestic propaganda spinoffs were one of the intended benefits to the Canadian government of this $2 million CIDA project which ostensibly promoted “Media and Democratic Development in Haiti.”

Radio Metropole

RL worked in close partnership with Radio Metropole, a national station reaching Haiti’s entire population. Its owner and CEO, Richard Widmaïer, was then president of ANMH, having held this position during the crucial pre-coup period as well as under the rule of the repressive Canadian-backed regime that followed. (See p.34.)

Jean Martin, a 30-year veteran of CBC’s Radio-Canada, received an RL contract to “coach” Metropole journalists for a month. Upon his return to Canada, Martin received lavish praise from ANMH’s president, which RL proudly published. Widmaïer said:

“Mr. Martin’s presence in our newsroom and in the field has enabled our reporters to improve their reporting, interviewing and on-air presentation techniques. We had productive discussions on such issues as newsroom management, the importance of editorial meetings and the coverage of current events during an election period. As a result, this has definitely raised the standard of our information programs.”26 

This rave review clearly indicates that Martin followed RL’s policy of showing “respect” for the host’s “editorial line.” He seemingly did not rock the political boat at Radio Metropole, criticise its blatantly subjective news, or question the ethics of media ownership by corporate leaders pushing their elitist agenda to overthrow the elected government.

RL’s close links to Metropole were also revealed by Émélie Rivard-Boudreau who said “we maintain good relations with ...Nancy Roc, journalist from Radio Métropole.”27  The independent Haiti Progrès newsweekly has referred to Roc as a “virulently anti-Aristide reporter.”28  This may explain why she has for so long been a darling of the foreign media. Having launched her so called “brilliant career”29  in 1986, Roc has worked for CNN, NBC, CBC, BBC, TV5 and the Voice of America. Now living in Montréal, she continues to air programs on Metropole and organizes Haitian-Canadian events for government and corporate sponsors. Roc is now coordinating a major teleconferencing project whose partners include RL, the governments of Canada, the U.S., France and Haiti, several banks and corporations, CIDA-funded organizations in Haiti and Canada, and seven ANMH members: Télé-Haïti, Métropole, Vision 2000, Radio Kiskeya, Radio Caraïbes, Le Nouvelliste and Le Matin.30 

TNH and RNH

Nancy Roc was also praised in RL’s newsletter31  for hosting a program produced by RL and Télé Québec. This praise came from Jacques Price Jean, the director general of Haitian National Television (TNH). In April 2004, soon after Aristide’s elected government was toppled and replaced, Price Jean was appointed by the coup regime to head the de facto government’s TV network.32  Before being elevated to run the dictatorship’s TV programs, Price Jean had worked for Radio France Internationale and Tele-Haiti.33  Tele Haiti, the country’s biggest private TV network is a member of ANMH. It was founded by G184 leader and sweatshop owner, Andy Apaid.34  “Rebel” leader Guy Philippe, whose campaign of terror in February 2004 provided the pretext for the foreign invasion, coup and occupation, has identified Apaid as one of several prominent Haitian business leaders who supplied weapons and money for his paramilitary offensive against Aristide’s government and its supporters.35 

Price Jean, the TNH’s coup-empowered director general wrote to “congratulate” and “thank Réseau Liberté for supporting the TNH.”36   RL’s support came in the form of a month’s “coaching” during the coup regime by Pierre Mignault, a 30-year veteran of CBC’s Radio-Canada.37

The TNH’s links to ANMH were also revealed by Guy Filion, another Canadian journalist who worked in Haiti for RL. He reported that TNH broadcast a program “on the day after [the 2006 election] with its radio partners of the Association nationale des médias haïtiens (ANMH).”38 

RL also embedded a long-time Radio-Canada journalist (Marc Gilbert) in Haiti’s National Radio (RNH).39  

In explaining its decision to partner with the radio and TV stations that were administered by the coup-regime, RL said that these “were natural choices considering their evolution towards greater independence from the government”40 and “in their evolution towards increased independence from political power.”41  Apparently RL, like the G184 and ANMH, believed these stations had been too pro-Aristide before the coup, but thought they were improving under the coup regime’s tutelage.  This view was also shared by the TNH’s Price Jean, who said his station was no longer perceived as a “pro-government propaganda tool.”42 

RL’s founder Réal Barnabé, says they have “worked particularly hard on the theme of transforming state TV and radio to public service,”43  and this theme recurs in numerous other RL documents.44 

Radio Kiskeya

RL also works closely with another prominent leader of ANMH. As RL has explained, “we maintain good relations with Liliane Pierre-Paul from Radio Kiskeya.”45  Pierre-Paul founded the station and is its “co-owner, program director and [news] anchor.”46  She also “helped found”47 ANMH and is the secretary on its executive board.48  In her opinion, ANMH “promotes pluralism, democracy and freedom of the press.”49 Her husband was the executive secretary of the G184 and her sister helps lead SOFA, a CIDA-funded anti-Lavalas women’s group.50

In 2006, Pierre-Paul reported glowingly on a Haitian Film Festival in Montréal sponsored by the Canadian and Québec governments, RL and several CIDA funded “NGOs,” such as Rights and Democracy, Alternatives and Oxfam Québec.51  This event coincided with a three-day CIDA-funded workshop organized by RL and co-sponsored by CBC’s CITPB, to train a dozen Haitian journalists in “cultural journalism.”52

Pierre-Paul’s anti-Aristide bias permeates much of her work. For example, even when covering Brazil’s football victory over Argentina in the 2005 World Cup, she managed to include a political diatribe in which she placed Aristide on a short list of Haiti’s “worst dictators.”53  Putting Aristide in the same category as the Duvaliers (1957-1986), Avril (1988-1990) and Cedras (1991-1994), Pierre-Paul then went on to describe how Haiti’s dictators always misled the people by pretending to represent them. She then noted that after “each bloodthirsty coming to power,”54 these dictators always invested millions in the carnival. Aristide however did represent Haitians, because he came to power through two landslide elections, that were anything but “bloodthirsty.”

Radio Caraïbes

For at least a month during the coup regime, RL embedded Derek Quinn, the senior editor at the CBC’s Radio Canada International, in the newsroom of Radio Caraïbes, a powerful station that reaches the entire Port-au-Prince population and much of Haiti’s countryside. An RL article on “coaching” states that:

“Based on the content of Radio Caraïbes’s broadcasts, as well as its membership in the National Association of Haitian Media (ANMH), its listeners would tend to share the political views of the Group of 184 (opposition to Jean-Bertrand Aris-tide).”55

This analysis seems to suggest that listeners choose this station because they share its political views. But, more likely, Radio Caraïbes’s audience has only come to “share” the station’s anti-Aristide, pro-G184 bias, because they have absorbed these elitist views by listening to the station. Afterall, is this not why political and economic elites purchase media companies in the first place? Their goal is to wage propaganda campaigns, influence people and make money in the process.

Le Matin & Le Nouvelliste

Another RL coach is André Lachance, who has worked for the Journal de Montréal, Radio-Canada, Tele-Québec and Syfia International.56 Syfia, the news agency of the International Organisation of the Francophonie (OIF), is funded by the governments of Belgium, Canada, France and Switzerland.57  Lachance also says he spent three years with the OIF Haitian training journalists with Alterpresse, HaitiPress Network, Le Nouvelliste and Le Matin.58  Then, he worked with RL as “a trainer/accompanist (coach) with journalists from Radio Ginen, Le Nouvelliste, Ticket Magazine, Anaïze, Le Matin and Spotlight.”59 Le Nouvelliste and Le Matin are Haiti’s only daily newspapers, while Ticket and Spotlight are their weekly celebrity/entertainment magazines.  Lachance explains that in 2007, he “spent not less than five months in the newsrooms of Le Nouvelliste and Le Matin.”60

These two newspapers are stars in the ANMH pantheon. ANMH’s Le Matin, is owned by Reginald Boulos, who was a G184 leader and the president of one of its key corporate member groups, Haiti’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry. He is also a founder and financier of the Haiti Democracy Project (HDP), a Washington-based lobby group representing Haiti’s elite. (See p.52.) Le Nouvelliste’s owner, Max Chauvet, is a founding member of ANMH and its current treasurer.  He commented in 2005 that thanks to the coup regime, Haiti’s media had made “progress”61 toward press freedom since Aristide’s successful ouster.

Teaming up with ANMH

In October 2007, the Association of Haitian Journalists (AJH) held its elections. It did so thanks to financing from RL, ANMH and Marie Laurence Jocelyn Lassègue, the former general-secretary of another G184 member group, Fanm Yo La (which was also funded by CIDA). Two RL staff members—Paul Breton and Jacquelin Télémaque—were “observers” at these elections, which took place in the auditorium of RL partner and ANMH member, Radio Caraïbes.62  The result was a new AJH executive dominated by ANMH-linked journalists:

• Jacques Desrosiers, from Le Matin—owned by the G184’s leader, Boulos—became the AJH’s new secretary-general.

• Marie Raphaëlle Pierre, from another ANMH station, Radio Ibo, became AJH’s administrative secretary.63 Ibo’s director, Hérold Jean-François, is a former president of ANMH and sits on its board.64

News of the AJH election and its elite/foreign funding, raised the hackles of Elsie Haas, a well known Haitian journalist now living in France. Haas, a prolific film-maker and chief editor of the Paris-based Haiti-Tribune, commented:

“How on earth can another association of journalists such as ANMH be financially involved in the organization of these elections?....

“Doesn’t it look like corruption? This is democracy? For the validity of the results, shouldn’t independence be a sine qua non?

“And just what are these Canadians from Réseau Liberté [RL] doing in an election of the leaders of a Haitian journalists’ association?  Are Haitian journalists getting mixed up in the elections of Canadian journalists’ associations?

“It is...a takeover bid for the little that remains of Haiti’s independent press....

“[I]t is clever for Le Matin, the newspaper of Boulos...to take control of the Haiti’s two associations of journalists....

“The control of news organizations is crucial for those who want everything for themselves but nothing for the others, just as it is all around the world.”65

The AJH had previously been headed by a Reuters journalist, Guyler Delva, who now leads an independent commission investigating the murders of Haitian journalists. When Delva suggested that ANMH’s Boulos might be behind death threats he was receiving in late 2007, the Boulos-funded HDP responded by calling Delva a “pro-Aristide propagandist.”66 HDP quoted a U.S. embassy official in Haiti, who had said Delva was Aristide’s “Palace information activist” who had “seized control” of the AJH in a 2001 “coup.”67 

Unlike ANMH, which believed the 2004 coup brought “press freedom,” Delva objectively observed that it was a dangerous time for journalists. He noted in 2005 that the term “emergency period” was “more appropriate today than under the regime of former president Jean Bertrand Aristide.” During Aristide’s government, Delva continued, “everybody condemned violations of freedom of the press, but currently nobody is speaking out.”68

Media Criticism 101

A similar paucity of real criticism regarding the disreputable state of Haiti’s elite media can also be found in RL statements. Their few criticisms do not address the major underlying problem that Haiti’s corporate elite owns and controls much of the country’s media and wields it to disseminate propaganda that amounts to veritable class warfare.

When Lachance returned from “coaching” reporters at ANMH daily papers, he ran an article in RL’s newsletter69 criticising young Haitian journalists. This raised the ire of many Canadians of Haitian origin and Media Mosaïque Montréal published four articles and an editorial blasting his comments. He was, for instance, accused of having a “very condescending attitude” and “a disdain that borders on outright racism.’’70

Among the comments that got Lachance in hot water were that Haitian reporters

“usually speak in Creole, which can be a handicap when time comes to write in French in Media such as Le Nouvelliste and Le Matin...or in websites, like Alterpresse, HaïtiPress Network, Radio Kiskeya or Radio Métropole. In their articles, the syntax is similar to the Creole one and ancient and unclear expressions, which make the reading difficult and sometimes incomprehensible.”71

Then, referring to a Haitian journalist who spent his money buying French publications to improve his language skills, Lachance says, in English: “These are young journalists like him that we must help, like does Réseau Liberté.” 72 (sic)

Lachance, who had spent years working for the International Organisation of the Francophonie (OIF), neglected to point out that French is the colonial language of Haiti’s elite. Neither did he address the need for more Kreyole-language media to serve public needs, since it is Haiti’s lingua franca, not French.

Lachance also criticised Haitian journalists who

“yield to temptation of practicing ‘press conference journalism,’ preferring answering to invitations—often well-paid—coming from NGO’s (sic) and state institutions....

Without any health or salary insurance, without any salary sometimes, like is often the case among the forty private radio stations in the metropolitan area that encourage their ‘journalists’ to compensate themselves by international NGO’s ‘envelopes [containing money].’”73 

Lachance’s analysis does not critique Haiti’s media owners who—seeing their companies as propaganda tools—are happy to have their journalists produce fawning reportage of “international NGOs.” Not only does this practice get media owners off the hook for paying journalists’ salaries, the political messages spread by foreign government-funded “NGOs” (certainly those of the U.S., Canada and France) were generally anti-Aristide and therefore coincided with the economic self-interests of Haiti’s elites.

Lachance’s comments “prompt-ed an outcry” from journalists “in Haiti and abroad, who said they were ‘offended.’”74  However, he quickly became something of a cause celeb for Haiti’s media elite. In March 2008, they rallied to his defence when he attended a Haitian Press Club meeting at l’Institut français d’Haïti, which “disseminates the French language and culture in Haiti.”75 A recent article on this event by the Haitian Press Network (where Lachance had worked as an OIF trainer), is entitled “Andre Lachance was right, according to secretary general of the AJH.”76  The newly elected AJH leader, Desrosiers, a journalist with ANMH’s Boulos-owned Le Matin (where Lachance had worked as an RL “coach”) was joined in this assessment by Eddy Alexis Jackson, the AJH’s new deputy director. Jackson—who launched his career in 1997 at ANMH’s Radio Ibo77—agreed, saying “Lachance was right, but he has sinned against Haitian sociology.”78  The editor of Le Matin then joined in to explain that “this sociology...is that we do not like foreigners telling us that we are ugly. We are best placed to do this ourselves.”79 

But ANMH leaders, like the editor of Le Matin, do not allow their media outlets to paint an “ugly” picture of Haiti’s elite, quite the opposite. As a Haitian proverb states: “A monkey never thinks her baby is ugly.” Similarly, neither did the RL portray the truly ugly side of Haiti’s elite-owned media. However, RL’s “Coaching Manual” does offer some interesting insights into various superficial problems with Haitian media. For instance:

• “News Reports are based primarily on the coverage of press conferences.... During press conferences, they do not seek the point of view of those who are blamed or have different opinions....”

• “Journalists are assigned only on the basis of invitations to press conferences.”

• “Certain stations pay such low salaries that they admit and encourage journalists to take under-the-table payments from the organisations they cover. This suggests that lengthy on-air reports are aimed at pleasing the ‘client,’ not serving the public.”80 

An article by RL’s Paul Breton also refers to the “institutionalized” problem that Haitian journalists receive payments from press conference sponsors, and that this is sometimes their “main source of income.”81

However, the CBC’s Guy Filion praised the “press conference” journalism that he saw during an RL assignment in Haiti. Filion speaks of the “pleasant surprise” he found in the media’s 2006 election coverage:

“There were special presentations every evening, [coup appointed] Prime Minister Latortue’s press conferences as well as those given by the Interim Electoral Council..., police authorities, the [UN forces] MINUSTAH, etc., were broadcasted live.”82 (Emphasis added.)

Because a “main source of income” for RL is CIDA, we can only expect that “its reports are aimed at pleasing” the interests of that particular “client.”  Not surprisingly then RL’s reportage from Haiti coincides with foreign policies of the Canadian government, which after-all is providing its “envelopes” and “payments.”  So, RL—like the Haitian journalists it has criticised—survives by serving the master that pays its bills.

Since the Canadian government was undeniably engaged in planning and carrying out the 2004 coup, and then supporting the coup-installed regime,83 it is obviously not an unbiased observer of Haitian affairs. Therefore, the Canadian government’s contract with RL to assist election coverage conducted by Haiti’s highly-partisan G184-linked media outlets appears to be a blatant, political conflict of interest.

The Canadian journalists that RL embedded in the Haitian media were tasked to serve the political “needs” of those companies’ owners. To do this, “coaches” were explicitly told by RL that they must “respect the... editorial line”84 of the media companies hosting them. How different is this from the dynamic by which Haitian journalists lend their media services to whichever “international NGOs” or “state institutions” their employers deploy them to cover?

RL itself is very much like the prosperous “international NGOs” that visit Haiti and bribe its journalists with cash-stuffed “envelopes.” However, instead of handing over money to journalists, RL lends experienced Canadian journalists to Haiti’s media owners. By supplying the salaries of these seconded workers for extended periods, RL serves the economic interests of Haiti’s media employers, helping them push their “editorial line” at reduced costs.

Another dimension of economic servitude that RL’s critiques ignore is that some of ANMH’s powerful media moguls also control much of that impoverished country’s wealth. For example, Tele-Haiti’s founder, Apaid, owns huge sweat shops enforcing slave-like conditions. His company, Alpha Industries, has churned out, among many other things, about “40 million pieces of military outerwear” for U.S. “Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine Corps personnel.”85  And, Le Matin’s owner, Boulos, owns Pharval Labs whose products killed 88 children86 in 1996 “when distributed throughout Port-au-Prince’s poorest neighborhoods.”87  

And, neither do RL’s critiques ever mention that the media corporations that hosted Canadian journalists in Haiti were not only deeply engaged in destabilizing Aristide’s elected government but that ANMH leaders were the basis of the G184’s powerful propaganda machine.

One might think that RL would recognize that ANMH’s successful efforts to provoke Haiti’s illegal regime change were a much more significant offence than anything committed by poverty-stricken young Kreyole-speaking journalists who supplemented their pathetic salaries by doing journalistic favours for foreign “NGOs” and the “state institutions” of the repressive coup government.

But recognizing this reality is not what CIDA or the Canadian government at large had in mind when—after helping overthrow Aristide’s government—it contracted RL to assist Haiti’s media in that country’s coup-launched “transition to democracy.”88

References

1. Paul Breton, "The role of the media in conflict prevention," p.1, 3.
http://www.peacebuild.ca/consultations/docs/en/BretonEN.doc
2. Réal Barnabé: Fondateur et PDG du Réseau Liberté,” Guinée News, September 26, 2007.
http://www.reseauliberte.com/media/6gio88.htm
3. Transcript of CRTC Proceedings, April 30, 2007.
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/transcripts/2007/tb0430_a.htm
4. Ibid.
5. Marie Lachance, “The Form-action; from Theory to Practice,” Info Liberté, December 21, 2007.
http://www.reseauliberte.com/media/r886qc.pdf
6. Guy Filion, “Haiti: My first assignment with Réseau Liberté,” Réseau Liberté Newsletter, May 2006.
http://www.reseauliberte.com/media/mtrd0y.doc
7. Canada-Haiti Cooperation, Interim Cooperation Framework, Result Summary 2. Presentation of Results.
http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/NIC-61993852-HZU
"Canada continues to support Haiti," CIDA news release, May 4, 2005.
http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JER-32494544-KBR
8. Americas, CIDA contracts, October 2005.
http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUImages/Contracting/$file/Octobre05%20AMERIQUES_web.pdf
9. Médias et développement démocratique en Haïti - Prolongation, August 2008.
http://www.reseauliberte.com/?rubrique=projet&item=
10. Médias et développement démocratique en Haïti... Op. cit.
11. Strike the Right Balance. CBC/Radio-Canada Annual Report 2005-2006.
http://www.cbc.radio-canada.ca/annualreports/2005-2006/pdf/AR0506_e.pdf
12. Charles Arthur, "Haiti: 2001," World Press Freedom Review 2001, International Press Institute.
http://www.freemedia.at/cms/ipi/freedom_detail.html?country=/KW0001/KW0202/KW0040/&year=2001
13. Richard Sanders, "The G184: Exposing the Haitian Elite's Enthusiasm for Violence," Press for Conversion! Sept. 2007, pp.33-41.
http://coat.ncf.ca/our_magazine/links/61/33-41.pdf
14. Charles Arthur, Op. cit.
15. Paul Breton, Op. cit., p.1.
16. Paul Breton, Op. cit., p.4.
17. Kevin Pina, "Haiti's Cracked Screen," Black Commentator, January 15, 2004.
http://www.blackcommentator.com/73/73_haiti_pina.html
18. Coaching Manual for Media Support during Elections, July 2006. Published by IMS, RL and M&DG.
http://www.reseauliberte.com/media/wek120.pdf
19. Ibid., p.4.
20. Ibid., p.38.
21. Réal Barnabé and Paul Breton, “Le coaching: une approche respectueuse des journalistes et des gestionnaires de médias haïtiens,” Les Cahiers du journalisme, Spring 2007.
http://www.cahiersdujournalisme.net/pdf/17/22_Barnabe_Breton.pdf
22. Coaching manual..., Op. cit., p.38.
http://www.reseauliberte.com/media/wek120.pdf
23. "Haiti," 2005 World Press Freedom Review, March 31, 2006.
http://www.caribbeannetnews.com/cgi-script/csArticles/articles/000011/001124.htm
24. Guy Filion, Op. cit.
25. Ibid.
26. Richard Widmaïer, Letter dated March 20, 2006, Réseau Liberté Newsletter, May 2006. Op. cit.
27. Email to author from Émélie Rivard-Boudreau, Réseau Liberté, January 16, 2008.
28. “As U.S. Envoy Charges ‘Terrorism’: Lavalas Renegades Prepare to Enter Occupation Elections,” Haïti Progrès, July 6, 2005.
http://www.haitiprogres.com/eng07-06.html
29. Metropolis by Nancy Roc.
http://metropolis.metropolehaiti.com
30. Repenser Haïti avec la jeunesse haïtienne
http://aihc.ca/teleconference
31. Jacques Price Jean, “Letter dated April 10, 2006,” Réseau Liberté Newsletter, May 2006. Op. cit.
32. Agence France-Presse, April 20, 2004. Cited by Jafrikayiti.
http://www.oplpeople.com/message/2351.html
33. Ibid.
34. Pina, Op. cit.
35. Guy Philippe fait des révélations embarrassantes, May 31, 2007.
http://www.lenouvelliste.com/article.php?PubID=1&ArticleID=44223
36. Jacques Price Jean, Letter dated April 10, 2006, Réseau Liberté Newsletter, May 2006. Op. cit.
37. Barnabé and Breton, Op. cit.
38. Guy Filion, Op. cit.
39. Barnabé and Breton, Op. cit.
40. Coaching manual, Op. cit., p.38.
41. "Le coaching...," Op. cit.
42. “25ème anniversaire de la TNH,” Radio Métropole, December 23, 2004.
http://www.delhti.ec.europa.eu/fr/presse/revue/Decembre%202004.doc
43. Transcript CRTC Proceedings, Op. cit.
44. See: (a) Barnabé and Breton, Op. cit.
(b) (b) Médias et développement démocratique en Haïti - Prolongation, August 2008.
http://www.reseauliberte.com/?rubrique=projet&item=6
(c) Paul Breton, Op. cit.
45. Email to author from Émélie Rivard-Boudreau, Réseau Liberté, Jan. 16, 2008.
46. Peggy Simpson, Fifteen Years of Courage: Liliane Pierre Paul
http://www.iwmf.org/features/8518
47. Ibid.
48. L'ANMH proteste, February 11, 2008.
http://www.lenouvelliste.com/article.php?PubID=1&ArticleID=54047&PubDate=2008-02-19
49. L'ANMH proteste. Op. cit.
50. Peter Hallward, Damming the Flood, 2007. p.108.
51. Sponsors
http://www.festivalfilmhaitien.com/com_gouvernement_en.html
52. Atelier de formation: Cinéma haïtien et journalisme culturel
http://www.mediasdhaiti.org/article.php3?id_article=45
53. Liliane Pierre-Paul, "A Bas Heleno! Vive Adriano!!!" Radio Kiskeya, July 8, 2005.
http://radiokiskeya.com/spip.php?article962
54. Ibid.
55. Barnabé and Breton, Op. cit.
56. Ibid.
57. Partenaires
http://www.syfia.info/fr/partenaires.asp
58. Letter from André Lachance, Média Mosaïque Montréal, January 21, 2008.
http://www.mediamosaique.com/afficherNouvelle.asp?newsId=1346&bc=d1efd7&rub=Nouvelles
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Forum SIP: Désaccord sur la notion d’ ‘urgence’ en matière de liberté de la presse en Haiti, February 4, 2005.
http://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article2183
62. Un nouveau comité à la tête de l’Association des Journalistes haïtiens, October 29, 2007.
http://www.reseauliberte.com/media/xc3129.PDF
63. Ibid.
64. Nancy Roc, “La guerre déclarée contre la Presse Indépendante,” Radio Métropole, January 17, 2004.
http://www.oplpeople.com/message/2139.html
65. Que penser du nouveau secrétariat de l’AJP?
http://elsie-news.over-blog.com/article-13427482.html
66. James Morrell, "A Haitian Slanderer," December 28, 2007.
http://www.haitipolicy.org/content/3860.htm?PHPSESSID=6321cf5e7fe78
67. Daniel Whitman, A Haiti Chronicle: The Undoing of a Latent Democracy, 1999-2001, 2005. Cited by James Morrell, Op. cit.
68. Forum SIP... Op. cit.
69. André Lachance, “Youth: Hope for Haitian journalism,” Info Liberté, December 21, 2007. Op. cit.
70. “André Lachance réagit à la publication d’un article de MMM,” Média Mosaïque, Jaunary 21, 2008.
http://www.mediamosaique.com/afficherNouvelle.asp?newsId=1346&bc=d1efd7&rub=Nouvelles
71. Lachance, "Youth...," Op. cit.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. "Lachance was right, according to the secretary general of the AJH,"  Haiti Press Network, March 17, 2008.
http://news.caribseek.com/Haiti/AlterPresse/article_63385.shtml
75. L'Institut
http://www.ifhaiti.org/L-Institut-francais-d-Haiti_r5.html
76. "Lachance was right...," Op. cit.
77. “L’AJH ressuscitée, mais toujours SDF,” October 29, 2007.
http://www.lenouvelliste.com/article.php?PubID=1&ArticleID=50321&PubDate=2007-10-29
78. "Lachance was right...," Op. cit.
79. "Lachance was right...," Op. cit.
80. Coaching manual..., Op. cit., pp.38-39.
81. Paul Breton, Op. cit.
82. Guy Filion, Op. cit.
83. Press for Conversion!, issues 60 and 61.
http://coat.ncf.ca/our_magazine/links/61/61-TOC.htm
http://coat.ncf.ca/our_magazine/links/60/60.htm
84. Coaching manual..., p.38.
85. The Alpha Story
http://www.alphaindustries.com/thealphastory.php
86. Pharma Brief Special, 2007.
http://www.bukopharma.de/Service/Archiv/E2007_01_special.pdf
87. Haiti Information Project, New Attack in Haiti, ZNet, January 20, 2006.
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=9559
88. Breton, Op. cit.